SUBMARINE WARFARE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LV, Issue 16823, 13 April 1918, Page 2 (Supplement)

SUBMARINE WARFARE.

WHY GERMANY DECIDED. GROT RESULTS EXPECTED. The Handelsblad, a Dutch paper, publishes an article setting forth the steps which led to the adoption by Germany of the policy of unlimited submarine warfare, based upon documents which, it says, circumstances have placed in the hands of a correspondent, At the close of the year 1915 the German Admiralty staff prepared a semi-offi-cial memorandum to prove that an unrestricted submarine campaign would compel Great Britain to sue fur peace "in (six months at the most." The memorandum, | which based its arguments on statistics of i food prices, freight, and insurance rate in | Great Britain, was submitted to the Im--1 perial Chancellor, who passed it on to , Heir Helfferich, the Secretary of Stat* for I Finance. lit, however, rejected the document on the ground that, in the absence . of authentic estimates of stocks, it was ! impossible to set a time limit to England's I staying power, and. also that he was ox i oeedmgly doubtful as to what line would i be taken by neutrals, especially the United States, iferr Helffericu maintained that so desperate a remedy should only be em- ! ployed as a last rest urce. j The authors of the memorandum then ! sent a reply in which they reinforced their ! argument by adducing the evidence of 10

experts, representing finance, commerce, the mining industry, and agriculture, who had been invited to seud answers in writing to the three following questions: — (1) What would be the effect on England of unrestricted submarine warfare?

(2) What would he its effect on Germany's relations with tho United States and other neutrals?

(3) To what extent does the internal situation in Germany demand the use of this drastic weapon?

Hopes that Britain Would Seek Peace.

The replies were written in February, 1916—nearly two years ago. All agreed on the first pointthe effect of unrestricted submarine warfare on Great Britain would be that she would have to sue for peace in six months at tho most. Herr Muller, president of the Drosdner Bank, who seemed to be in a position to confirm the statistics given in the memorandum, pointed out that the supply of indispensable foodstuffs was, at the time of writing, less than the normal supply in peace time. He held that the submarine warfare, if relentlessly and vigorously pursued, would accomplish its purpose in loss than that calculated in the memorandum—in fact, three months should do it.

Dr. Salomonsohn, of the Diconto (iesellschaft, thought that a ruthless submarine campaign would lay a heavy burden upon England, and owing to the absence of the spirit of self sacrifice on the part of her people she would be forced to make peace. Like Herr Muller, he thought that six months was an excessive estimate, and that less time would suffice.

On the question of the effect on neutrals the experts were divided. Herr Muller predicted that ruthless submarine war wculd cause a wholesale flight of neutrals from the war zone. Their newspapers might abuse Germany at first, but they would soon get tired. The danger was from the United States, but that would become less in proportion as Germany operated more decisively and ruthlessly. Ho maintained that the bitter feeling in the United States after the war was hardly worth considering, because, if Germany were successful, she could dictate terms to ensure a mostfavoured-nation treatment for herself, and Could therelore ignore bad feelings on the part of North America. It is noteworthy that, although the opinion of these experts differed as I* the prospect of war with tho United States, not a single one of them advised the restriction of the submarine warfare on that account. As to the third point, all the experts agreed that the internal situation in Germany demanded that the most drastic method of submarine warfare .should be emn'oyed. Heir Zuckschwerdt. Councillor of Com nutee. urging its advisability, owing to the feeling of the nation, said the nation would stand by the Government, but not if it yielded to threats from America. Such weakness would lead to fiurioua coo.sequences.