RUSSIA AND ROUMANIA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16621, 18 August 1917, Page 1 (Supplement)

RUSSIA AND ROUMANIA.

their position analysed.

BY LIEUT. -COL. A. A. GRACE, N.B.r.A. RES. It seemed to be the irony of fate when, a year ago, the Roumanians entered the war very largely through the influence of Russia, and found themselves, a few months later, when the storm of Teuton aggression burst on them in all its fury, left in the lurch by the Russian Government. That cruel withholding of support is to be attributed to treachery working for German ends in the court of the exIsar. Nicholas has paid the penalty of his feebleness, superstition, and obscurantism, but, nevertheless, instead of the war being carried into the heart of Hungary, as could, and should, have been the case, the greater part of Roumania groans under the Teuton heel; new life was given to Teuton hopes, and the length of the war was increased. It might well be deemed that Roumania had risked enough for Russia, and had suffered enough through her remissness. But, no. No sooner has revolution hurled the Tsar from the throne and destroyed German influence in Russian circles of government, than chaos seizes the entire nation; the army and the navy become mere debating societies, and again the Teuton triumphs iii the field. Again Roumania suffers. The Russian armies of Galicia walk away from the foe and leave the Roumanian right wing in jeopardy, and- Mackensen strikes with tremendous force and great skill at tho Roumanian centre, at a point a little north of Foksha-ni. Roumania's Weakness.

The Roumanian, front is shaped' like a bow, one end of which appears to be " in the air," and the other resting on the lower Danube, while the arc of the bow reaches the border of Hungary and Mo]. davia, in the southern Carpathians. It would not seem possible for this line to be maintained unless the Russians pull themselves together east of Czernowitz, and likewise send sufficient reinforcements to Roumania, in order to protect and strengthen the Roumanian right and to repel {he assaults of Mackensen- If these things are done and done quickly all may go well, but, if not, the Roumanians may be forced back, first to the line of the lower Sereth, and subsequently to the line of the Pruth. Strategically speaking, a retirement behind the Pruth would hot be a serious matter. It might be the best thing that could happen, provided the Roumanian armies were to preserve their cohesion, and it may be necessary if those armies are to retain their cohesion. But I whether or no such a retirement takes place it must be remembered that the loss of territory in war is nothing in comparison with the destruction of armies. The abandonment of territory to the Teuton would be painful, but the maintenance of the Roumanian armies in a unbroken state is of primary importance. The object " of the Teutons is to break The Roumanian armies rather than to occupy Moldavia, though naturally, if unable to effect their major purpose, they would celebrate with enthusiasm the minor success of occupying the rest of Roumania. The question which naturally arises is : What steps do the Russians propose to take to save Roumania from falling entirely into the hands of the Teutons. »

Discipline and Skill Required. We are told by M. Kerensky that the reserve armies of Russia number some ten millions of troops. If only one-half of these are fully trained and equipped, sufficient reinforcements should be available to meet any emergency which may occur in Roumania and anywhere along the whole eastern battle-front. The Teutons, we are told, have but three and a-half million troops operating on that battle-front. Therefore, it would appear that the Russians should easily be able to stem the Teuton advance, and preserve the moiety of Roumanian soil from the invader. The railway system of Russia, though not elaborate, is well suited to meeting the emergency which has arisen in Roumania and to the east of the Upper Sereth. Arterial lines converge towards the threatened sectors from the north-east and south-east. Mackensen's offensive can be countered by bringing troops from Odessa via Galatz (250 miles) and via Jassy (some 200 miles) to the scene of action., and from Kieff (250 miles) troops could be quickly brought to the country immediately east of Czernowitz, and to the upper reaches of the Zbrticz, which forrns the boundary of southern Galicia and Russia. Of course such rapid movemc .it of troops demands a railway service which is adequately staffed, properly equipped, and managed, working in accord with the military authorities ; it demands discipline in the reserve troops who are to be transported ; it also demands prescience in the chiefs of the army and obedience to the orders which they issue. If Roumania falls entirely into the handp of the Teutons, and if Bessarabia and Poaolia are invaded, the cause will lie with the lack of discipline in the Russian armies and in the Russian nation generally. Allied Strength in the West. The Allied Powers of the West are doing, and will do, all they can to help the Roumanians in their time of stress, by attacking the Teutons in-such ways as to prevent them from transferring troops from the west to the east- Already the British have developed tremendous pressure in Flanders and Belgium. It may be expected that the Italians will follow "suit at selected points of their battle-front, and it may be taken for granted that the French will hold to their ground all the Germans opposed to them. The magnitude of the Allied Armies of the West is so groat, their equipment and training are so perfect, the awful determination and marvellous skill of their aggressive operations are so ominous, that the comparatively weak Teuton armies opposed to them will not bear further depletion in order that Hinclenburg's aggressive against Russia and Iloumania may be materially increased. This brings us to consider what is likely to be the strength of that aggressive. The German armies of reserve are composed mainly of youths, of men over what is usually considered military age, and of wounded and invalided soldiers returned to the colours. The composition cf such reserves is _ unsuitable for the purposes of aggressive warfare. Moreover, the size of these reserve armies is certainly not very great, otherwise the" Teuton battle-fronts would be held much more strongly than is evidently the case. Instead of the Teutons being in a position, or a condition, to operate aggressively, as a matter of fact that power reallv lies with the Powers of the Great Alliance, and it would be made tfse of to its full extent at the present time if the Russians' internal affairs permitted them to give their whole attention to the war. It is not to be doubted that presently they will have straightened their domestic affairs into order, and that a properly constituted authority will be established, and that the nation will direct all its energies to driving the invader from Russian soil. In many ways this aggressive against Southern Russia is likely to awaken the Russians to a sense of their danger and to their obligations to Roumania. It gives the Provisional Government a good battlecry. It inspires the soldiers of the army with warlike ardour and a desire to meet the Teutons. It spurs the people to action, and prompts them to obey the Provisional Government, lest their hearths and homes should be violated. It tends to bring Russia to her senses. Written August 15..