THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1917. THE RUSSIAN FRONT.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16600, 25 July 1917, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1917. THE RUSSIAN FRONT.

The Russian situation very naturally ' creates uneasiness, for the new ! Republic has not yet proved itself, ! and can only do so by evidence that ! a government has been established I which commands the allegiance of the nation as a whole. The collapse lof the Tsarocracy was in itself j good, both for the Russian people and for the Allied cause. As a result of German intrigues, notoriously favoured by the German consort of the Tsar, the government of the old autocracy had become completely reactionary and pro-German. It had treacherously embarrassed and betrayed the national army, thus destroying the loyalty to the dynasty of all patriotic soldiers; it had set itself to eliminate political reforms and to restore bureaucratic tyranny, thus driving all constitutionalists into determined opposition ; it had secretly arranged a separate peace, based upon the partition of Roumania and the mutual suppression by Kaiser and Tsar of democratic tendencies. A decision to dissolve the Duma brought matters to a climax and the revolutionary unheaval exposed the hollowness of the authority which the Tsar's Ministers imagined to be irresistible. Unfortunately for Russia and for the Alliance, the various forces which were united for revolt have not united for reconstruction and reorganisation. German money has been lavishly spent and German agents freely employed to foster the domestic anarchy which impedes Russian reorganisation. In spite of the exertions of Russian patriots, headed by General Brussiloff in the army and M. Kerensky in the administration, these German intrigues have had a most demoralising influence. Domestic anarchy is accompanied by a weakening of military discipline, an immediate result of the latter weakness being | apparent in che progress of | the German offensive, and the threatened loss of all the advantages gained by the recent advance of General Korniloff in Galicia. While the gravity of the Russian situation should not be underestimated it is necessary, however, to remember the elasticity of the Russian Front as compared to the rigid lines drawn elsewhere in the European theatres. Between the Pripet marshes and Riga the line has remained practically fixed since September, 1915, but southward of the great marshes it has swayed to and fro upon the application of special pressure by either combatant. The cause of this is twofold ; partly the character of the country and partly the character of the opposing armies. North of the marshes Germans confront Russians, the line depending upon rivers and upon railway communications by which stubborn antagonists have been brought to a state of comparative equilibrium based upon positions which cannot easily be torn from those in possession. South of the I marshes Austro-Hungarians confront Russians in territory which lends ; itself to strategic action, and the ' Slay divisions in the Austro-Hun-i garian army have never done their . best to defeat their brother-Slavs of j Russia. Whenever the Russians ! have been energetically led and • have steadily fought against AustroHungarian armies they have made | great progress, unless hopelessly ; handicapped by lack of munition- , ment. In 1935 our allies advanced | through Galicia to the Carpathians : arid to the vicinity of Cracow, and i were only driven back by German ! reinforcements accompanied by j overwhelming artillery. Tn 1916 | they advanced again to the Car- ! pathians, occupying Bukovina and I Southern Galicia, and were again stayed by German reinforcements, I assisted by the treachery of the i Stunner Cabinet in Pctrograd. In | 1917, we have the same theatre ! chosen by General Brussiloff, now j Russian commander-in-chief, for an ; offensive led by General Korniloff ; it is marked by somewhat similar I initial successes and is met in the I customary way by German rein--1 forcements brought down to stiffen 1 the Austro-Hungarian forces. The j deplorable characteristic of the prej sent phase of the struggle is that for ! the first time the Russian soldiers | are proving unreliable, their traditional steadiness and stubbornness being evidently undermined by sedition in their ranks and by uncertainty as to the authority of the '•evolutionary government.

We may rely with confidence upon the loyalty to the Allied cause of all Russian constitutionalists. The success of the revolution, the permanence of the Republic, the establishment of free institutions suited to the national temperament, depend absolutely upon the defeat of Prussianised Germany and the deposition of the autocracies that

make the Central Powers a peril to democracy throughout the world. There are many indications that a keener sense of the imminent danger to Russian nationality and of the part being played by German intrigue in the present Russian crisis is being awakened at Petrograd, and that drastic measures are being taken to meet a desperate situation. This problem of political reorganisation really dominates the situation. Whether the Russian Front moves east or moves west for a few miles in any sector at any time is not of any vital importance. The Germans may snatch Tarnopol or the Russians may snatch Halicz, but any such movement is insignificant if it be only part of the ebb and flow of military superiority in contested sectors of an elastic line. What is of very great importance, though not necessarily of supreme importance, is that Russia shall not go out of action, that she shall maintain an effective military organisation and employ that organisation in pressing constantly upon the Central Powers from the eastward. If the Russian constitutionalists can do this, if Kerensky can re-establish order within the new republic, and if Brussiloff can so restore discipline in the army that the Germans are forced to exert themselves in the east as well as in the west, we can view without uneasiness any local modifications of the Russian Front. Should the Russians, by some characteristic change in their peculiarly emotional national temper, swing against the Germans as they swung against the Tsarocracy, anything is possible in the east ; should* they do no more than hold on, they "will give invaluable assistance ; should they utterly fail us—which is extremely improbable—we shall still bo no worse off than if the Tsar had not been deposed, possibly much better off, for who can say what treachery was designed by the Stunner Cabinet, which deliberately betrayed Roumania and secretly sought the destruction of democracy? For our part we can only influence the Russian situation by setting before this struggling and confused democracy the example of a democracy rooted in our hearts and armoured by our traditions, by showing that we intend to win the war, as far as lies in our power, whatever the cost and however prolonged the struggle.