THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, JULY 5, 1917. THE : POSITION AT SALONIKA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16583, 5 July 1917, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, JULY 5, 1917. THE : POSITION AT SALONIKA.

The renewed military activity on the Russian front follows opportunely upon the deposition of Constantino in improving the position at Salonika. Though there were no demonstrations of delight in the countries of the Entente Powers when the autocratic Constantino and his German and pro-German entourage were banished from Greece, Germany advertised, by characteristic signs of the greatest chagrin, that the Central Powers had lost control of the political affairs of the Hellenes. While King Constantine was able, with the help of factions bribed with German money or attracted by German promises or terrorised by German threats to keep the kingdom in a state of turmoil and the army in an attitude which menaced the Allied forces based on Salonika, General Sarrail was prevented from operating with any confidence against the enemy on the Macedonian front. Through this Macedonian front lies 'the way to Servia and the Balkan Railway, on the north, and to Constantinople on the east. It was stated some time ago by reputable critics that General Sarrail had at his command an army of not less than 400,000 troops and the number has appar ently been increased during recent months. It has certainly been sufficiently large to overawe the reactionary factions in Greece and at the same time to prevent the Central Powers from gaining possession of Salonika, though this is an essential point in their schemes of Balkan conquest and world-domin-ion. Without Salonika the Berlin to Bagdad railway is necessarily insecure. On the other hand General Sarrail was not strong enough to press an offensive to the north, and at the same time to hold in check Constantine's troops to the south. The elimination of this element of danger from treacherous attack in the rear simplifies General Sarrail's major task of advancing northward, with a view to bringing the Bulgarians and their confederates to decisive action. The Allied forces in the Salonikan theatre consist of French, British, Italian, Servian, and Russian troops. The length of frontage which they hold stretches east and west for approximately 150 miles. Upon the assumption that even with great topographical advantages this line would require on the average two men to each yard, it is estimated that General Sarrail has now half-a-million troops, and possibly more. One factor in the problem greatly i

lessens his difficulties as regards reinforcements, and therefore as regards his strategy; the Italians,, commanding the Straits of Otranto, and having a military road across the south of Albania, can land troops at Valona or Durazzo, and take the enemy on its western flank. The deposition of Constantino, whose forces probably numbered two army corps or possibly 50,000 men, has liberated at least an equal number of Allied troops from precautionary employment for service at the front. Now that M. Venizelos is once more at the head of the Greek Government, this potentially enemy army of Constantino is being transformed into an auxiliary to the Nationalists already fighting under General Sarrail. The population of Greece is about five millions, so that on a ten per cent basis # she would muster armies totalling half-a-million. Half this number may become available, with the help of the Allies in regard to equipment, for co-operation in ridding Macedonian Greece of its Bulgarian invaders, and fulfilling the treaty obligations which Constantino repudiated in Servia's direst need.

_ Midsummer is the most suitable time for carrying out military operations in the Balkans. It has long been evident that the Central Powers are not able to concentrate a sufficient force with which to take the aggressive against General Sarrail; it is therefore to be expected, as an outcome of the changed situation in Greece, that he will undertake the offensive against them. In itself tho advance of the Allies in the Balkans may bo of no direct military importance, unless it can effect the severance of the Balkan Railway and the liberation of Servia and Wallachia ; but it is part of the strategy of the Great Alliance to press the Central Powers simultaneously at as many points as possible, and so to render nugatory the advantage they have in possessing internal lines of communication, whereby reinforcements may be carried to any part of their immense frontage which has been singled out for attack- If sufficient pressure be brought to bear simultaneously, east, west, and south, then their inferior numbers will be held stationary, and the Great Alliance will be able to concentrate its surplus strength at such point or points where it may wish to break up the enemy's front. Up to the present time this strategical purpose has never been attained, because when one of the Allies was ready to strike another was unready. The Russian revolution and the subsequent inaction of the Russian troops dislocated all plans for co-ordinate action in the spring of 1917. The late King of Greece in his small way contributed to this lack of co-ordina-tion by threatening to attack General Sarrail's troops in the rear whenever they proposed to advance. The situation in Greece could at any time have been cleared up had it not been for the intrigues between Berlin, Petr'ograd, and Athens, which have been dramatically exposed by the promptness with which the deposition of Constantino followed upon the dethronement of the Tsar. ■ •■ ■