BRITAIN'S STRENGTH.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16300, 5 August 1916, Page 1 (Supplement)

BRITAIN'S STRENGTH.

HOW WILL IT BE USED?

BY LIFXT.-COLONEL A. A. GRACE, N.Z.F A.

'I RE German Chancellor's most recentlyreported speech prepares the German ! people for the retirement of Hindenburg's armies from their advanced line, which stretches from the Dwina to the Pripet marshes. Without saying it in so mainwords, he admits the fact, apparent to the world at large, that the Teutons cannot hold their extended battle-fronts with the number of troops at their disposal, especially if the Powers of the Great Alliance exert the full force which they j have at their command. Dr. Von Beth- , maun Hollweg's actual words are not , given us, but he i s reported to have .'"hinted that it might he increasingly I difficult to maintain the present line - . . . -especially if Britain threw in the 1 whole weight of her armies."

But recently one of France's leading statesmen has told us that Britain has in France at the present time two huge armies, which, when they are reinforced to the full extent possible to ] the British leaders, will form in the aggregate the greatest military force in the west. One of these armies, we know, is fighting under Sir Douglas Haig. Where is the other? Doubtless it is in reserve, at what point is not of any great consequence. At the beginning of the war the French armies totalled four million troops. It is probable that in addition two million troops have been added to those armies. France has lost enormously, and it is probable that to-dav she has not so many as four million troops with the colours. However that may he, Britain is able to do more than make ! good her gallant ally's losses, and there. |is nothing to prevent the French and j British from concentrating against the Germans armies which total seven or eight million troops. The question arises : What would be the best way in which to | employ such huge aggregations of force? Waiting for the Great Blow. The four-hundred-mile hattlefront. stretching from Switzerland to the sea. is held possibly by about three million troops— that is on the basis of four men t«> every yard of frontage. The rest of the Allied armies are in reserve, some at strategical points from which they can be moved with facility to the support of the battle-line, others in general reservo. It therefore becomes evident that it is possible for the Aliies to use their enormous surplus power in great aggressive movements at such point or points of the enemy's front as may be I determined. That enemy has at last 1 reduced himself to such a state of deple ■ tion that he no longer has at command : armies of reserve with which to maintain j the offensive; gradually his defensive line j in the west is growing so thin that it becomes possible for it to be broken, in the. same manner as it is being broken in the east; before very long we may expect to see General Joffre strike such a blow at the invaders of his country as shall hurl j them back from those regions of Northern ] France and Belgium which they have so ! ruthlessly despoiled. The growing ! strength of the Allies of the West and the' Teutons' acknowledged helplessness to 1 maintain the requisite armies in the field. ; warrant this statement. The only ques 1 tions which seem in doubt are : When the great blow will be struck, from whence it I will he struck, and at what point or ! points of the German line it will be i struck ? I

Main Aggressive Not Yet Begun

I Sir Douglas Haig's army is undoubtedly I attacking with a fury which is not only | comparable with the Germans' assault on ! "Verdun, but with a success which did not I accompany the stupendous and prodigal j efforts of the German Crown Prince. But though the success of .Sir Douglas Haig's offensive is undoubted, and though it may result in a decided modification of the German line of resistance in Northern France, j it would seem that it is not intended to be the main aggressive movement of the Allied j armies acting under the command of Gene- ! ral Joffre. Such an aggressive may be j made for the purpose of holding the enemy to the assaulted front and of causing him to concentrate on that front vast reinforcements and war supplies: and it would seem, that if by such operations the Teutons were induced to concentrate the bulk of their strength against Sir Douglas Haig's line, in order to prevent the recovery of Belgium, then the vast surplus reserve armies of the Allies might strike a decisive blow elsewhere at the weakened German battle-front. Just prior to the I German assault on Verdun the French had concentrated at Bar-le-Due an army with which some such attempt was probably to have been made. As things fell out, that army was employed for the defence of the French line at Verdun, not for offence. But the soundness of the strategy contemplated by General Joffre remains to-day, and it is quite possible that the plan of attack, though frustrated for a time, may be carried out in its ) entirety at a later date. ' Allies' Aggressive Force. | It would appear possible that in the | west, the Allies can concentrate, after pro- ! viding for the maintenance of their entire battle-front, a striking force of .something | like three million troops. There seems to I be nothing to prevent them from suddenly I hurling at the Herman line, at selected '.points, as many as 40 army corps, in addii tion to the vast armies of French and I British already attacking the Germans . along the whole length of their line : and 1 this great operation could he carried out without interfering in any wav with the : local reserve armies which are stationed behind the battle front, and without reducing : the general reserve armies in France below 1 the figure of one million troops. It would sfeiii excellent strategy to draw the largest possible number of Herman troops to the British front in Northern Frame and then to hurl these forty reserve army corps at ( the German line in Lorraine, or at some ; other section of the line south-east of the ; Son line. Final Result Assured. I 'II unexpected, however, often hap- | pens in war, and it may he that the British oft' n-!\e in I'ieardv and Artois may le-nlt ii smli disorganisation of the Germans in those parts as may lead to the : disruption of their battle-line which is imposed between the Allied aimies ami Belj gium. In such a case it might, of course, : happen that the opportunity would be ! seized and that the great blow would be : struck in the northern section of the J •-front. It does not matter where sueI cess comes, so long as it conies. But these I observations are made for the purpose of j preventing any apparent failure of Sir | Douglas H"aig to obtain derisive results i being interpreted by the public: as a mis- ! carriage of the general aggressive operations of the Allies in the west. I One thing is certain. The German j Chancellor may he quite certain that I Britain will throw the whole weight of her ! armies against his accursed nation. Where ' that weight will be used, how and at 1 what, time, are questions which cannot be ! answered. With certainty it may be said that it will he used by the sworn enemies of Germany in a way best calculated to break her armies, at a time when they , will be powerless to recover from the i defeat which will be the result of the terrifio blow -which will be delivered.