THINGS IN GENERAL.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16267, 28 June 1916, Page 9

THINGS IN GENERAL.

WILL BOUMANIA FIGHT? The success of the Russians in Bukovina revives interest in the attitude, of Roumania. In the early days of the war we built, our hopes on Roumania too. high, but that is not to say there was no ground for expecting Roumania to intervene. It is in fact difficult to conclude that Roumania will remain neutral to the end, except on the assumption that she is controlled as Greece has been controlled, by influences running contrary to her national interests. There is no clear evidence that Roumania lias reached the latter stage, and the .spectacle of present-day Greece should be a lesson rather than an incontive to those in Roumania who might be disposed to follow the footsteps of Constantino. There is therefore good reason to hope that Houmama'a ultimate action will be dictated by national policy. If it is she must fight, as Italy is fighting, for the same cause, and with the prospect of a. greater reward. OPPRESSED ROUMANIANS. There is much in common between the Italian and the Roumanian outlook Both have large numbers of "nationals" ground under the Austro-Hungarian heel. Ronmanias position is the more complicated, because she looks both ways—across the Austrian frontier to Transylvania and across the Russian frontier to Bessarabia, bne has a grudge against Russia, which though not intense is sufficient to temper the edge of popular feeling against Hungary and to give the pro-Germans some fertile soil in which to sow their seed Add to this the little fact that the Roumanians are accustomed to be ruled while Italy is governed by the national will and we have the chief reasons why no shot lias yet been fired for the unredeemed Roumania, while " Italia Irredenta" has become a battle-cry rallying hundreds o{ thousands to the colours. But, in spite of these checks, the cause remains. There are 4,000.000 Roumanians living in AustroHungarian provinces, bordering on Roumania. who are hoping that the war will free them from oppression. They have neither rights nor liberties. Of the Roumanians of voting age in Hungary only about a fourth are given the franchise, and few of those who have it are able to exercise it. The statistics of Hungary •how that tho more Roumanian a district 18, the fewer votes it possesses. At election time polling booths in Roumanian districts are put in impossible places, bridges are broken down, and horses are suddenly placed under veterinary supervision, so that Roumanians may" not be able to travel to the booths. The army iB organised to control tho elections, and Roumanians who have walked many miles to vote are held up before thev reach the polling booth or shot down if" they insist. ETery Hungarian election is accompanied by bloodshed. When a Roumanian reaches the booth he finds a Magyar presiding, who may disqualify him for some flimsy reason. _ At best the vote has to be recorded in public and by word of month, and thus. Roumanians are terrorised into voting orally for Magyar candidates. By this means the Magyars hold absolute control of Roumanian districts, and by the control they secure for themselves at the expense of tho Roumanian's education, position, wealth, and everything that is worth having. This is the cause that appeals to the people of Roumania. that has led to pro-allv processions in Bucharest and that is likelv yet, in sm"te of all checks, to make the Roumanians of the kingdom strike a blow for their kinsmen across the Austrian frontier.

CALCULATING RULERS. So far Roumania has been inactive because her rulers have been calculating. Of what good is it, they ask, to fight for Transylvania if the Central Powers are to win the war? Thus we may lose both Transylvania and Bessarabia. And German influence has been powerful in Bucharest as in Athene, and able to convince many that Germany must conquer. But these days are passing. The calculating Roumanian may well be beginning to doubt the strength of Germany. When h« has settled his doubts his habit of calculating will help him to a right decision. For the prize in view to Roumania is no trifle. Roumania might •merge from a victorious war doubled in •ize and in population. The kingdom would not only be enormously enlarged, but would be easily defended, whereas ''n its present shape it is open to an Austrian invasion. There is thus every inducement for the calculating Roumanians to throw their weight on the allied side when it is clear to them that the allies are winning.

WAR AND THE ALTERNATIVE.

for the Roumanians intervention would now seem to be a matter of time and judgment. If the allies win without Roumania's help then Roumania has missed a golden opportunity. In such an event unredeemed Roumanians may be freed from Magyar oppression, but only by the goodwill of the allies, and the Roumanian kingdom may not be extended by a single acre. This, we may be certain, the ruling Roumanians wish to avoid, for a missed opportunity might easily mean their downfall, while inter vention on the right side, at the right time, would bring them honour and undisputed authority in a great and powerful Roumania. 'thus, as the fear of Germany disappears, the calculating' Roumanian and the irridentist must come together. There will still be pro-German elements. They have been profiting during the war by sales to Germany while food in Bucharest grew scarce and dear. But when the chances of German victory are eliminated the ultimate fate of, Roumania is so clear that no German propaganda can obscure it. There will come a day, and it may be soon, when the allies will be able to say to Roumania— to her King and her politicians, as to her People fight now for the liberation of your kinsmen or for ever hold your peace." In that clay, surely, the "irridentists must win. TIME AND THE OFFENSIVE. The man in the street is becoming impatient. lie has been looking for an, allied offensive, and as it has not begun, ho is asking why. He has seen for two years activity in summer, and comparative inactivity in winter, and he has hoped that this summer there might be a fight to a finish. The Russians have begun, and he is wondering why there is no forward movement in the west. The cause of his impatience is that he has fixed his mind solely on the weather, whereas there are other factors governing and limiting offensive warfare. Chief of these is munitions. In no war has the workshop ever played more than a fraction of the part it in 'laying in this war. The allies have attained to an enormous output of munitions, but no conceivable output could keep pace with the expenditure of our armies on the scale that we imply when wo speak of a grand offensive. At present we are piling up stocks of munitions. When we open a general attack on the l German and Austrian armies, we begin to draw upon these stocks. The experience of the —in particular the experience of Loos and of the Champagne— shown that an offensive, to be successful, must be sustained. To sustain a great offensive we must have huge stocks of munitions to draw upon and ample reserves of men. If Joffre had given the order to advance "with the first sign of spring, he might have had to call a halt before the expiry of summer. In his wisdom—and who can doubt it?— has decided that this is not profitable. So why grumble. Joffre waits, and while he waits his munition stocks are piling up, and Germany is losing men greater in numbers than the allies, and in relative proportion enormously greater. As the days pass the allies grow stronger, and if the period of the offensive is limited not by the weather but by the stock of munitions, then .we are losing no time, but gaining in power as the time goes.

GERMAN IMPATIENCE. weU y £ U ,T* a^ ure for impatience, it is frameof that J this is the German oSase m rZ d 'n nd - ior u * a Sca» TT G 6rman 8 Patient for cause. He knows that the allies are stocking munitions at a greater pace than in Xn'WT' «»**hS?hiK£eSS incrSSne 01 L. the decline, theirs is still increasing. Therefore, he wants a Quick decision, an early peace TnfW, q^l * wfe t ing P- »tVe h Hun en tt e 9 is w,thm his munition limits. The fire ml b 7* mkens< '' but on a short Une-a therefot 0t m" ? 0 fightin « 'rontsTand! with "A ay be P ros «med to be easily It T a an o ff aPaC,ty of German workshops! but Mr a n T 6 th * fc can *» sustained, bit Joffre smiles because Verdun brings the cecuuon no nearer, and it is eating up SrS an >T SOUrCeB in men at a rate beyond Both tii° PeS and Rations of the allies confine It lo °h inß ahead ' the one SS confidence, the other with fear What meaning can you take out of recent hap" BEKrtiC ft^' 6 hopes lieTn i™ V. J he allled Strength, not in increasing her own. I n the early davs of the war, while her own internal length ™„f g Tu g ' t er u external successes were great. Though she lost Italy, she gained cri? » a, l d Bulgaria, and persuaded Greece to be helpful by a state of military inactivity falsely called neutrality. aI?" 18 - h f iur ?? of the tide ' externally as well as internally. In the blowing ur> ?' J? Umt i o £. facto ™s> the hare-brained anding of Sir Roger Casement in Ireland, the stirring up of trouble in Mexico, you have the present measure of the activities of German » *$*£•< The first has so stiffened the soft back of America that Berlin has been forced to use courteous words to Washington and German submarine commanders must now look before they re lest they exhaust even the patience of President Wilson. The second left many regrets in Ireland, but no joy in Germany. The third, however it ends, could only have a fractional ettect on the allied munition supply. All these things show how time is working against the Germans, and with the allies, and incidentally they should teach us to leave impatience to the Germans, and to wait confidently for the day when Joffre drops the handkerchief. Thb General.