THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 1916. THE RUSSIANS IN FRANCE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16214, 27 April 1916, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 1916. THE RUSSIANS IN FRANCE.

♦ The dramatic advent of Russian troops on French soil, at a time when the German General Stafl appears to bo contemplating whai may prove Germany's last greal aggressive in the west, furnishes s ' picturesque feature which is calctt lated to exercise a wide moral influence not only throughout France, ; but also throughout Europe. This , unlooked-for development reveals indisputable facts of the greatest im- > portance. Speculation may interest • itself in the question of how these Russian troops reached France, and whence they embarked, whether they sailed from far Manchuria or from Ekaterina in the Arctic Ocean, whether they were transported in . Japanese steamers convoyed by Japanese men-of-war, or in British steamers convoyed by British cruisers: the great fact is that they have left Russian 3oil and have landed in France. That they have done so proves several things. It proves that Russia not only has sufficient troops for the carrying out of her own campaigns in the east against Germany, Austria, and Turkey, but that she possesses a surplus j which she can spare for service in the west. It proves that some of the advantage the Central Powers possess by reason of their being able to use internal lines is counteracted by the power of inter-communication which is conferred on the members of the Great Alliance by command of the sea. It proves that they can with secrecy and suddenness trans- . fer from one part of the vast theatre [ of war to another armies of such a size as may turn the balance of strength so emphatically as to mean for Germany the difference between prospective victory and actual . defeat. It demonstrates anothsr thing. It shows that the German employment of submarines has been ineffectual in hampering the military movements of the Allies at sea. Indeed, it would seem to demon- » strate the fact that the German submarine warfare is entirely misdirected, that while the submarine commanders are sending their torpedoes against neutral and enemy merchant ships, the Powers of the Great Allianco are carrying through to a successful issuo great naval operations to prevent which is to Germany of paramount importance. While the German submarines are ingloriously employed in sinking Dutch, Norwegian, even Spanish shipping, the mighty armada freighted with a Russian army safely reaches its destination. Do we perceive here a strange instanco of German obtuseness, or is it possible that the submarine captains of the Germany Navy prefer to prey on harmless merchantmen rather than to seek out their natural foes, the cruiser and the destroyer? The strength of the Allied combination in the west lies in the ability possessed by Britain, France, and Italy to support each other. Britain to-day is helping Franco by holding nearly 100 miles of western battlefront. If Italy were to require support, there is nothing to prevent French troops moving into northern Italy, their sectors being then occupied by British troops. For the purpose of effecting a successful offensive it is possible for General Joffre to draw troops from Britain to any part of his battle-front. A similar concentration might be made in Italy. The full benefit of this ability to accumulate force is much decreased, however, if Italy continues to persist in declaring herself at war with Austria but not with Germany; this would prevent the transference of Italian troops to France, where they could be used only against Germany. May it not be that this extraordinary transportation of Russian troops across thousands of miles of sea has as one of its objects the stimulating of Italian, opinion in such a manner as to bring about a more comprehensive scheme of co-operation between herself and her allies The most important fact which is proved by this rcraarkablo transportation of troops is undoubtedly the extraordinary recuperation of Russia's military power. That she can to-day send troops to France is proof enough of her marvellous recovery from the enormous loss in men and material which she suffered during last year's retreat. When that retreat was ended the Tsar was reported to have called to the colours no less than eight million recruits. Lord Kitchener announced, in December, that by the end of March seven millions of those n6w Russian troops would be fully equipped. It would appear that this prognostication has been substantiated in fact, and that to-day Russia's armies are not only stronger than ever before, but so strong that, while waging war successfully in Asia Minor against the Turks, in Galicia against Austria, and in Lithuania against the German hosts commanded by the redoubtable Hindenburg, she can spare -'■•■

troops for the reinforcing , of her allies in the west. There may be other reasons behind this unexpected transference. It may be disclosed in the future that these troops of the Tsar have some special mission, on French soil. But whether that be so or no, the exhilarating effect of their presence upon the French people and the French Army will be readily understood and appreciated. With fully 80 Army Corps under arras and probably not 50 German Army Corps opposed to them, it is not to be supposed that the French need this romantic and thrilling union of the arms of the east and the west in order to resist successfully the prodigal and fruitless assaults of the Kaiser's armies. The spectacular appearance of the Russians is not thrilling France because ' it assures them against defeat, but , because it assures them of the potentialities of the Great Alliance and of final and conclusive victory.