THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY APRIL 12, 1916. THE TIGRIS CAMPAIGN.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16202, 12 April 1916, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY APRIL 12, 1916. THE TIGRIS CAMPAIGN.

Without attaching undue value to the Turkish reports concerning the fighting on the Tigris, it is evident that the relief of Kut-el-Amara is an exceedingly difficult operation. The level character of the great Mesopotamian plain is indicated by the remarkable series of branches "and channels which link and complicate the river-systems of the Tigris and Euphrates, as well as by the numerous and primitive artificial canals which arc the basis of the famous productiveness of this historic region. It will be remembered that the Russian advance upon Erzeroum was made through snow-drifts and amid snow storms. In the great Armenian plateau, frost and cold hold the snows of the long winter until the coming of Spring, when the icy rivers are swollen not only by rapid thaws but also by heavy rains. A great part of the Armenian plateau drains into the Tigris, the head-waters of which rapidly reach the Mesopotamian plain through which they pour reluctantly to the Persian Gulf. Floods are a natural consequence, with almost impenetrable marshes in the lower levels that mark the numerous "bends" and the ancient river channels. For in Mesopotamia, as in every similar region, there is a constant tendency for the river and its branchings to change their channels. This is the season of flood on the Tigris. Tho spreading of the waters from the shallow river beds over extensive flats and contiguous marshes form the great difficulty to tho British advance upon Kut-el-Amara.

In the course of a few weeks the heat of the rapid summcr»on these sub-tropical plains and the cessation of the inflow from the sun-baked Armenian plateau will reduce the Tigris to its channels and render the marshes passable. We shall then have a renewal of the geographical conditions under which Kut-el-Araara was reached. Water will have to be carried by columns whose operations are now limited by floods; the expeditionary forces must cling to the river not merely as a transport road but as a source of necessary supply. The present anxiety as to the force surrounded at Kut-eUAmara is caused not by any doubt of its being relieved later in the season, but by the apparently imperative necessity for prompt and adequate succour. Whether Kut-el* Araara could be successfully evacuated—its defenders cutting their way to the relieving force— another question altogether. There has hitherto been no suggestion that this has been contemplated, while there can be no dispute as to the immense strategic value of the advanced post. Ctesiphon was of no inherent strategic importance, other

than .that appertaining -to its relation to the attempted march to Bagdad; it was simp]" so many miles nearer a military objective than is Kut-el-Amara. , Kut-ci-Amara, on the other hand, not only commands the Tigris but the great branch which unites the Tigris with the Euphrates. Such a strategical point would certainly not be abandoned, excepting urder compulsion, unless it were intended to contract the entire area of British operations in Mesopotamia. With Russian allies already in Southern Armenia and advancing through Persia, such a contraction of the British theatre is highly improbable.

We may therefore, that the relic-lug operations of General Laki> are being undertaken with the intention of definitely holding Kufc-el-Amara and of finally expelling Turkish authority from Bagdad itself. This involves much more than a raid, requiring the driving back of the enemy with a completeness the leaves no hostile forces in the rear. In other words the Mesopotamian operations have developed into a campaign, in which the German-led Turks are making the most desperate efforts to prevent, not merely to hamper, the British advance. The Turks are handicapped as to time by the progress to north and north-east of the Russians, while the British are possibly also handicapped as to time by tho limitations of what is practically the garrison of Kut-el-Amara. No information has been offered of the forces at General Lake's disposal, but we must hope that they are adequate for the task. The inadequacy of the original expedition has been made evident, and has only escaped searching criticism because our British authorities are so prone to blunder and bungle in the initial stages of every military undertaking. The importance of the Mesopotamian campaign must be considered from the German point of view in order to be fully grasped. Germany's immediate aim has long been the mastery of Eastern Asia. For this she has incited her Austrian vassals in the Balkans for this she has flattered and bullied Turkey; for this she has spent huge v sums in railway enterprises. Only by her arrogant miscalculation of tho temper of tho British peoples did she cntanglo herself in war with Britain before she had made herself supreme "from Berlin to Bagdad" and had thus become able to make a crushing attack upon the Suez Canal and thus cut our Empire into two.