THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS SATURDAY, MARCH 4, 1916. THE PROBLEM OF VERDUN.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16169, 4 March 1916, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS SATURDAY, MARCH 4, 1916. THE PROBLEM OF VERDUN.

/The' immensity of the war' being waged ; on the western front is graphically indicated . by the. suggestion of a leading French general that " probably the fighting at Verdun is only a diversion." It is possible, 'of course, that such utterances as : these, with '• the repeated French statements that- their reserves are not being drawn upon, are intended to" obscure from German view the plans of General Joffre, but the fact remains that' the German strategy has not been clearly exposed by a movement in which hundreds of thousands of men took part.' We may reasonably assume, however, that even , German ...commanders would not have sacrificed, a : vast multitude of their best troops in an attack which was ';not intended to succeed, whatever other movements were intended to follow. ' : :, Had they succeeded in ? breaking the line and occupying Verdun and its forts, tho French would have ; been: compelled to redress their front and to employ an ; enormous number ' of men, great parks of artillery, and vast'stores. of ammunition in checking the further advance of the victorious invader. It is reasonable to think that in such a case , the Germans—instead of using their, entire resources in a sustained conflict against' steadily concentrating French forces '—~w ould have delivered another j massed; attack upon a more westerly, sector of the French line, and thus endeav- . oured to; reach' Paris while the French ' armies were in a state of confusion'. « Such a second attack ' would be the real offensive/ to which the attack on Verdun would be a '. colossal diversion. ; A diversion of this character j would. be technically successful, if the French reserves were thus withdrawn from the position's whence they i can ; strengthen and reinforce any threatened .; sector, . but General Joffre has 'con- , sistently displayed a -//remarkable quality of patience 'and far-sighted, ' ness, and would not be compelled to concentrate towards Verdun by any German advance which failed of complete local success, [f he refused to.; meet the breaking of his line &t Verdun, this presumed diver- [ sion would promptly become a main offensive, and give the Germans the mastery of all Eastern France, '. "-But, - however interesting . are. attempts to decipher the hidden intentiontiof the German War Office, it is , .'.;' : --' ;•: • '-'•:• : '/ ': '-: ' " '- : . : ,/ /. '

; more instructive to see how.far any .-■ possible intentions have;approached success. ■;> The facts, ; as far . as we ; know-: them, are '-that 'the tremen- ; dous German advance ; from the '■ north has been stayed on the line 3 of . Douaumont,' and .that, the ■ appar--1 ently;. feeble attack ( from/ the :; east ; has had the end of .all'feeble movements. It remains ,to. be seen ' whether . the Germans will attemptanother x battering . rush on r Verdun from, the new, line they j have ac- . quired, approximately four miles r nearer their : immediate objective. • Whatever deeply-laid strategic purpose was in the great attack which they ; inaugurated ; a fortnight ago has certainly not been accomplished, though it may be claimed that they are in a better. position to carry out their task than .they were before. If they are satisfied with the : gain, and prepared to buy further advance at similar cost, it may be supposed- that they, will repeat it. If they decide, on the other hand, that the Verdun sector is too strong to be forced, and find that they cannot otherwise induce a French concentration in that . quarter, 'they may be expected to produce another, plan from'' the ; vast number , they have in stock." Whatever else may be said of German strategy, it cannot be -said to be limited by lack of forethought. Within its visible limitations German strategy is versatility itself. ' . ,; In forty years of peace the German War Office has undoubtedly worked out plans and schemes for every conceivable military eventuality. The promptness of the German adaptation of system when Britain was unexpectedly added.to the . number of its enemies, teaches us that nothing had been overlooked and all preparations made. •■: In a certain sense this' completeness of preparation for every eventuality, this possession of an endless variety of plans and schemes for meeting every conceivable emergency, may be a source of some weakness, caus- ■ ing a too-ready disposition- to try plan after plan, scheme after scheme. The headlong rush upon Paris becomes a desperate attempt to reach Calais, or to capture Russian armies in a tremendous " drive," or / f to strike at Egypt through Servia and Constantinople, or to draw the French from the direct road to Paris by hurling v half-a-million men ,at Verdun.; Any weakness inherent in the German system is more than compensated 1 for, -however,; by the way in which this. thoroughness of preparation suits the German character. : It would in all probability have been successful had not the very decay -of the militarist spirit in ,the western nations given: rise to an extreme caution in their plans when - war , was finally forced upon them. Even the dashing French became convinced that the /stakes were too great to be risked upon the throw of any, doubtful engagement. British and French and / Russians found themselves in' agreement upon the basis that the war must be made to drag along . until they .were in a position to end it by the application of.- irresistibly .• " superior ' military strength. • This stolidity of ■ Allied action }. is the ; ; ] stumbling-block v . of German strategy.., It may be found that its effect at, Verdun has been to make that terrific struggle— ever its purpose may have T been— nothing more than a combat'; in which many thousands were slain.' In other words, the form of fighting which is to Germany the most fatal of a11. .:y--'' : 'V-//r. ;:'W^fS