THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1915. THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 16098, 11 December 1915, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1915. THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.

Germany has such immense financial interests in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia that it would be unwise for us to dismiss casually the report that she contemplates a great Asiatic campaign through those regions and in the direction of India, When she forced the door of the Balkans she opened up communication with countries in which she can expect to obtain large reinforcements and abundant supplies, in return for a comparatively small number of Germans to stiffen the Ottoman levies and munitions of war which are small in comparison with the vast amounts needed on her eastern and western fronts. It is becoming increasingly clear that it would have been sound policy for the Allies to have so strengthened Servia as to have awed the Bulgarians into neutrality and made the Danubian front impregnable. This not having been done we have to consider the possibilities of German activities in Asia and particularly in Mesopotamia, where the Germanofficered Turks have recently foiled the Anglo-Indian march upon Bagdad. There is no need to be despondent because General Townshend found it necessary to retreat from Ctesiphon, for his army is. intact and now lies entreacbod at Kut-el-Amara in communication with its base of supplies on the Persian Gulf. We must realise, however, the possibility of the Mesopotamian campaign assuming an importance heretofore unexpected, for it is necessary that any German expedition against India should be met and defeated before it crosses the Tigris and gathers Persia into the German net.

In his attack upon the Turkish army before Bagdad General Townshend appears to have relied upon the support of Arab tribesmen, ■who on the day of battle made common cause with the Turks, the enemy thus outnumbering the Anglo-Indian army by four to one. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that our forces retreated. That they reached Kut-el-Amara, -where they are beside water and can receive supplies from their base, can only be due to their superior training and discipline. The intelligence officers were evidently at fault, but officers and men as evidently did their duty on the battlefield and throughout a difficult retirement. The Turks presumably concentrated for the defence of Bagdad all theii troops in the military district uf that name, and these, computed on a basis of 10 per cent, of the popu--1 lation of the district, together with the treacherous Arab tribesmen, would probably number about 200,000 troops. The Anglo-Indian expedition has been officially stated as " more than a division," and would certainly not be more than 50,000 troops. Reinforcements are being sent from India and some detachments have already reached Mesopotamia, so that we may hope to see an adequate force gathered at Kut-el-Amara for the conquest of Bagdad. Critics will say that this should have been done before, but India was conquered by little armies, and it is a tradition in India that courage is worth more than numbers, and that discipline, training, and skill in manoeuvring count for more than multitudes. J Moreover, the smaller an expeditionary force the more easily and quickly it can be moved, and the more chance therefore of capturing its objective before the enemy can concentrate. In accordance with j this well-tried system the Mesopotamian force was reduced to the I smallest size thought to be sufficient, and reliance was placed on the Arab tribesmen, who are the- traditional foemen of the Turks. The admonitions of the great authorities on war, Jomini, Hamley, Clausewitz, Napoleon himself, were cast aside, as Anglo-Indians have habitually cast them aside, and an aggressive campaign was undertaken with an army numerically inferior. The Turks, handled by German officers and, thanks to German intrigue, in league for once with the semi-independent Arab tribes, lured General Townshend's army to Ctesiphon, where it was deemed to be sufficiently committed. No army in such a situation as that in which Genera] Townshend's found itself that day at Ctesiphon, could hope to win: that it i etreated in good order to Kut-el-Amara, in the face of .in overwhelming and exultant enemy, speaks volumes for its spirit ind soldierly qualities.

Ctesiphon was a victory to German intrigue as to German generalship, but we can see that it was not such a victory as was hoped for and expected. Nothing less than another Sedan was in the minds of the German leaders, whose guileful tactics cannot be used twice. The Anglo-Indian army at Kut-el-Amara has still to be beaten, and is evidently not to be beaten by the maximum force available for tie defence of Bagdad, whatever that force may be. We may look with confident expectancy to the army at Kut-el-Amara receiving supplies and reinforcements with alacrity. That piace is not more than five or six clays' journey by river-steamer from Busf-orah, which in its turn is not more than six days' voyage from Karachi, on the Persian Gulf. These facilities are quicker and better than anything the Turks possess for communicating with their bases of supply in Asia Minor. From the abundance of the means at its disposal the Indian Government can reinforce, with the utmost speed it may, the army which it despatched to capture Bagdad. The armies of the Independent Princes of India have long since been placed at the disposal of the King-Emperor, and the time has apparently come to use them. The raising of new Indian armies, if not already commenced, will follow as a natural sequence. Now that the Turk has shown himself to be a major factor in the scheme of German aggression, a menace to and India alike, wo may expect to hear that the Indian Government is making increased and unprecedented use of the numerous warlike races under its control. The defeat at Ctesiphon may galvanise into life the enorm'•us dormant military energies of the vast Indian Empire.