THE DISABILITY OF ALLIES IN WAR.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 16020, 11 September 1915, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE DISABILITY OF ALLIES IN WAR.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A A. GRACE, N.Z.F.A. One of the great disadvantages which affect allied nations in war is the difficulty of effecting concerted action. It was so in the Seven Years' War, it was so in the wars waged against Napoleon; it is so to-day. The tendency is for each of the allies in a war to consider the part which it is playing individually to be the most important, and the general plan of campaign in consequence suffers. Indeed, war is so complex and so changing that it is very difficult for several allies to pursue with unanimity 'the policy originally agreed upon, or to adapt themselves to its altering phases as the war progresses from one stage to another. On the other hand, the autocratic head of -a homogeneous people, such as were the French under Louis XIV. and Napoleon, the Prussians under Frederick the Great, and the Germans under Kaiser Wilhelm to-day, can wage war with the certain knowledge that all his armies will conform to the general campaign and that the unity of purpose which made that plan of campaign possible will characterise his armies to the end of the war, whether that end is disastrous or victorious.

There is no doubt that nrior to the beginning of the present great war France and Russia had agreed upon a common policy ; there is no doubt that the Germans had their plan of campaign cut and dried; but how far the German plans were upset by the absention of Italy it is hard to say. while we know that the entrance of Turkey into the arena on the Germans' side must have considerably upset the original plans of Russia and France. But there is this advantage with the Germans, that whatever the vicissitudes of the war, they can adjust their plans with perfect precision because of the autocracy under which they Prussians, Bavarians, Austrians, and Hungariansare working whereas for the allies to adjust their plans to altered conditions is a matter of no little difficulty, because of the lack erf a central governing body which can dictate and carry out a plan of campaign with all the alterations and even transformations to which that plan may have to be subjected before the war can be brought to a successful issue. In the operations at the Dardanelles we have a very plain example of the disability under which allied nations wage war. That part of the campaign had not been •worked out and arranged, because it was not foreseen that Turkey would become the henchman of Germany; consequently the operations at the Dardanelles have from the beginning shown a disregard for the principles of strategy which must indeed have delighted and encouraged the war council at Berlin. Tactically, General Sir lan Hamilton has done wonders with the inadequate force with which he was asked to unlock the door to Constantinople ; tactically, Admiral Garden no doubt did all that his ships could effect against forts and mines and torpedoes in the narrow waters of the Dardanelles. For the strategy which in the circumstances made their tactical work ineffective these great leaders were in no way responsible. Who then was responsible? That is a question which it is impossible to answer, because no one knows who is responsible for the strategy used by allied nations. Who is responsible for that strategy being altered and corrected? That question is unanswerable'for the same reason. .

We begin to see how great is the disadvantage of allied nations in war, owing to the control of their armies not being under one supreme authority. No doubt the campaign at the Dardanelles will be carried through to a successful issue, but if that campaign had been planned by a central and supreme war council, instead of by- nobody at all, as would seem to be the case, there is little doubt that bv now Constantinople would have been in the hands of the allies, and communications with Russia, via the Bosphorus, would have been opened no, and the supplying the armies of the Tsar with munitions and of the nations of western Europe with wheat would have been effected.

There are clear signs of Turkey becoming exhausted. She may receive succour from Bulgaria, hut she may not. The Germans may seek to force a way through Servia to Turkey, and Bulgaria may render what aid she can to Germany for favours promised, or she may not. The Allies may reinforce their armies on the peninsula of Gallipoli, and those reinforcements may turn the scale at any time against the Turks. But the situation is very complicated, and may become even more so with the yossible advent of Teuton troops in the Balkans. But, while these words are being written, perhaps the Allies' plans are maturing, whereas the plans of the Germans for the relief of the Turks cannot materialise immediately, and. if certain developments take place in the Balkans, can never materialise at all.

Whatever authority is responsible for the management of the campaign for the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. it must be plain that no time must be lost in striking the Turk with redoubled numbers and redoubled force. The victory is almost won. Sir lan Hamilton's war-worn troops, who in the face of sjreat odds and under great difficulties have performed deeds of the utmost valour and importance", merely need sufficient reinforcements to enable them to complete their work. Those reinforcements can certainly be sent from the surplus troops of the Allies— they may be French, perhaps thev may be British, perhaps they may be' Italian—and. when they arrive on tho peninsula, no great time should elapse before ' the Turkish position is rendered untenable. But there is one point which cannot be lost sight of by those controlling the campaign of the Allies of the West. There must be no unnecessary dissipating of their force, no unnecessary deviating of troops from the main armies to the Turkish arena. It was to cause such deviation, as well as for effecting the comparative isolation of Russia, that the Germans persuaded the Turks to declare war Nothing would suit the Germans better than for unnecessarily large armies to he despatched from the West to Turkey, even if as a consequence the Turk were driven into Asia Minor. There is one country which can spare large numbers of troops for the desired purpose, and that without affecting the general plan of her main campaign, and that is Italy Moreover, she is nearest to the scene of the operations at the Dardanelles. It is good policy to draw reinforcements from the nearest point instead of from a distance, .- nd one which tends to economy of force, which is one of the great principles alike of tactics and strategy. Sir lan Hamilton has under hie command Sikhs, Gurkhas. Maoris French Australians, New Zealanders, British* Soon, perhaps before these words are printed Italians may be numbered amongst his troops, and that in such force as finally to settle the question of the mastery of the Dardanelles. In Avar, all cannot be of uniform success. \ lassitudes must occur. Now there may he victory—as on the Marne—but tomorrow there may be. retreat— has occurred in Russia. The situation at the Dardanelles, ever since the wonderful landing of Sir lan Hamilton's army was effected, has been full of hope. The exertion of a little more force by the Allies and the gate to Constantinople will be unlocked.

Then the hand of Russia will quickly be united with that of France, of Britain, and of Italy: that preponderance of force which the Allies possess may be utilised at. any point where their arms cross those of the Germans, and the fate of that arrogant and tyrannous people may he said to be MaJM,