THE DARDANELLES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 15930, 29 May 1915, Page 4

THE DARDANELLES.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFENCES.

KEY TO TURKISH ' FORTS. VALUE OF LANDING PARTY. The following description of the defences of the Dardanelles is taken from an article by H. Charles Woods in the Fortnightly Review. -,

The position of the forts referred to in the article by letters can be seen by reference to the accompanying map. ~, The coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula rises in many places precipitously from the water's edge; Nearly the whole of the country in rear of Maidos and of Kilid Bahr consists of hills' which, in many places, attain. a height of 600 ft or 700 ft above the level of the sea. These hills are intersected by small, rocky valleys, with steep, almost precipitous sides. Much of this country is covered with scrubby bushes about. 2ft high, but the area immediately*-to the west and south-west of Kilid Bahr is prettily wooded, tho trees extending almost to the sea shore. Unless the Turks and the Germans have recently improved them, the roads along and across • the ; peninsula are bad, for in the past communication has usually been maintained by sea. *

The most important town on the peninsula is Gallipoli, at the north-eastern entrance to the Dardanelles. The town i 3 essentially Turkish, and was the first to fall into the hands of the Osmanlis, soon after Sulicman Pasha crossed the Dardanelles and planted the standard of the Crescent in Europe in the year 1355. The only other places of any importance are Maidos and Kilid Bahr, lying' much lower down the peninsula., the latter-named village being situated at the narrowest part of the channel. Both these towns would be practically unknown Rn<s neglected were it not for the strategic value of the country which surrounds them. Forts on Gallipoli.

The modem defences of the Dardanelles, situated on the Peninsula of Callipoli, may practically be divided into four,groups :— (1) The two forts built to/protect the' outer entrance to 'the channel, and lying in tho immediate neighbourhood of Cape '-HeU.es: and' of Sedd-el-Bahr."; -Whilst we now know officially that these forts (lettered officially A and B) were 1 armed with fairly • big .:• guns, .their - importance and power of resistance have always been con- ; sidered as insignificant as compared with those constructed to guard the Narrows. In this first group, too, {!■> would include, also, "• two . forts, or batteries 'I (lettered: F and ■ I), which} are situated ••,' respectively about-'aevW.and': a-lialf miles and about nine ;and a-half roileiL from the southwestern v extremityv or the Dardanelles, They are both placed close to the water's edge. I ; (2) The forts in rear of, and near, Kilid Bahr, and therefore » on, or immediately I below or above,- the narrowest part of the straits. These forte (lettered from J ; to T, ; and which include another designated CC); constitute by..;, far the. strongest por-' ;tion'biltho defences ; of the straits. Here the shore literally bristles with redoubts— 11 in numbers-some being hidden amongst the trees which \ cover the Vhills, .whilst others are dotted about right down to the watqr's edge. Yildiis or Tekeh Fort (let-, teredP)} which 'has'always been considered as , one , of , the ; most important of these forts, lies at the extreme outer end of the group; and a little to the southwest of Kilidßalir. It owes its strength to its height above \ the water,. to its field of * fire, and -to > the .consequent . difficulty of damaging it from;the sea. |' >•;.•£ «. ; " (3) The forts built to the ; north' • and north-east of: Maidos—forU ; which, therefore, lie within ; or: above [■ the , narrowest part of * the; channel. These defences, : of whiAthere are four (lettered DD, KE, and. two not yet' designated), are.built

upon the/ summits of the various s hills, which border this part. of "^ the Straits. They are so '. constructed as to; be able to fire across. the channel towards Nagara Point, up the Dardanelles in -Mie direction of Gallipoli, and down ,the straits towards Chanak. ? "*' -- ' : ; ,/->•• -<• (4) The •Bulair, lines. '"' These defences? run across the Isthmus of Bulaii', and .thus defend the Peninsula of Gallipoli from an attack by a forco advancing from the laud side. '< They consist of three or ; four redoubts, connected .* : by," trenchest : constructed to cover the only road I running into the peninsula from the remainder of European Turkey. The, importance of these lines has now been considerably diminished, because, as we now know, it is possible, by means of the fire of modern ships, to threaten and to cut off all means of communication by way of the Isthmus of Bulair. Equally 'well, and by the same method, it would be comparatively easy to render ineffective the fire of these forts, were it necessary to "give assistance and to support an attack delivered against the peninsula from the mainland, an attack which would have to be conducted'over the open, rolling, hilly ground which here extends from sea to sea. The Asiatic Side. There )a a great contrast between the two shores of the Dardanelles. The- Asiatic coast is for the most part lower, and the appearance of the country is. greener and more fertile than that of the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Communication by land is also but a passable road connects Lapsaki, just opposite Gallipoli, with Chanak, and thence runs on down tho coast towards the entrance of the straits. The only centre y of any importance is Chanak or Dardanelles, situated opposite Kiiid'-Bahr, and united with that place by a submarine cable'. The town, which , possesses a population of some 10,000 people, is prettily located on the water's edge. Thero is an anchorage for ships, I both above and below it, and in tho past the little bay immediately to Ike north of tho village has usually been occupied j by some of "tho ships which go to mako up the Turkish Fleet. As a letter of fact,, it was here that the Messudiyeh was torpedoed by the British submarine 81l on December 14 last. Asiatic Coast Defences. Partly owing to their positions, situated for the most part more or less upon the level of the sea, the defences of the Asiatic coast are, from a natural point of view, decid»diy Ices strong than are those built upon the European side. .These. Asiatip forts may/ also 'be., conveniently divided (into, three main.or principal groups ;— ■;' (1) The two forts built to protect-tlfe outer entrance of the channel, which lie in the more or less immediate vicinity of /'Kum Kale.,. Whilst ; we now know that these forts (lettered C and D) were armed With guns of a considerable siae, they have always been - considered, . like ■ those upon the European 'shore, as a sort of advanced guard to 'the main defences of the straits. In this outer group, too, I would, also. include the batteries located near While Cliffs (lettered' G), Dardanus Fort ' (lettered E), and the redoubt situated on Kcphez Point (lettered II). ~'i 'V (2) Tha" forts at and near, the'town of Chanak, and therefore on or near the narrowest part of the channel. One of these, Hamidieh I. Tabia (lettered U), is located rather under a mile to the south of the tbwii, another, Hamidieh 111. Tabia (lettered V) lies at Chanak, and two more (lettered respectively and X) are located above but within a distance of about one mile from'the" Narrows themselves,,. N (3) The forts'built tin or in the neighbourhood ' of Nagara ;.Point,•• and therefore at a distance of about three and a-half mjles above 'the Narrows. These forts i (lettered ; respectively ' Y, Z, and AA) occupy, a very strong position; owing to, the way in which ; this .cape.and' also Capo Abydos v run out into the; channel, thus • giving two of them good fields of firo in ; more' than one direction.., * '■'.. '..^ f"tThe official hews, informing us that ships, provided with long-ranged x gunß, have attacked the forts situated.on both sides of the Narrows, by means < of in direct fire, is far more important than it! seemed to appear at first sight. In the

past it ha 3 often been . said that to. shell the forts ' in. this manner would probably only ■' bo a waste of ammunition, and that it might well be a danger were ;-. this method adopted at' same time that ships were endeavouring to -force their way up the channel. I. The "success, "now. achieved, proves the first of these contentions ! to have been unjustified. ',-.Again,' jOie danger to shins in the'channel due to the fact that many of tho' J forts. |o' be shelled omthe Narrows are situated absolutely on o» just above the water's edge, has so far been obviated by using this indirect, fire, not a * the samo s time that, but as a preparatory measure, before, the allied fleet endeavoured to,steam up between, the towns of Kilid Bahr and Chanak. *\ '■" '•> '•.<•"'■ '• r'-- i

Some years ago,' I believe; in 1905 or 1906, the Turks', in order', to endeavour to guard against a surprise; by the landing of a force on the north-western coast of the Gallipoli x Peninsula, built a small look-out station on Gaba Tepe—a little promontory situated on tho western shore of the peninsula, and lying at a distance of about seven miles to the north-west of Kilid Bahr. This look-out ' station, destroyed by the fire of'an allied cruiser on March 4, was located. in the immediate vicinity of the best landing places. Such a disembarkation would naturally be a matter of very considerable difficulty, for it would probably be strongly opposed bv a force located in the hills, a force which would be in an* extremely strong position unless that position could be rendered untenable by fire directed from battleships lying in the jEgean. -

What the Allies May Do. ( An army once gaining possession of the hills which lie in the rear of Maidos and of Kilid Bahr would bo able to cut off the water supply of many of the European forts—a supply obtained through;, pipes from the hills in the rear. ' Moreover, as most of the forts are oneii at the back, and as few, if any, of their guns can be fired otherwise than towards the straits, such a force would, too, be able greatly to affect the accuracy of the aim; if not- actually to. silence the fire, of the great Dardanelles guns which defend the all-important area of- the channel which has now grown to be known as the Narrows. In addition to the fact that an army onro occupying the hills' in the rear of Kilid, Bahr would bo able to threaten not only the European forts, hut likewise those constructed on the Asiatic shores, it would also he possible lor a force, landed on the jEgean coast of Asia Minor, to advance towards the Dardanelles. But to menace the Asiatic. forts, situated-on the Narrows, from the rear, would a far more difficult undertaking. than, to occupy the hills of the Peninsula of Galhpoli. To begin with, these Asiatic forts cannot bs commanded from the land . hi the same way as can the European defences. Moreover, a force, disembarked 'from the iEgean, instead of./being; compelled to advance only a distance of about five miles, would have to undertake, a march of at 'least 20 miles over an area of, country in which no proper roads exist. r