A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15748, 24 October 1914, Page 1 (Supplement)

A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS.

BT. CRITIC. Information of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 can be gained, and the gaps in one's knowledge admirably supplied by what is now an old book, '"Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire." written by George Hooper and published by Bell, London (Wildman and Arey. Auckland). " The war of 1870-71 was opened by a campaign of 50 days, complete in itself; and the author pleads the dramatic unity ' of the great event as a reason for treating |it in a separate form. "Although," he remarks, "the foundation of those ulterior successes which enabled the Germans to proclaim the King of Prussia Emperor in Germany, and to do so in the palace of .Louis XIV., yet, from an historical point of view, the astonishing series of battles and marches which ended in the investment of Metz and the capitulation of Sedan may be regarded as standing apart, because they curried with them the downfall of the Second Empire. "In July, 1870, a. young diplomat, Baron de Winipfen. started from the French capital for Berlin. lie was the bearer of a declaration of war from the Emperor Napoleon 111. to William 1., King -of Prussia. He found a united people, and an army surpassing in completeness as it. did in armaments the victors of Prague, Hosbach, .and Leuthen. The Germany known to the Congress of Vienna had disappeared; the deformed had been transformed. The little seed of unity sown early in the century, had grown into a forest tree. Its king field his kingship as a business and a trust, taking as his watchwords work and duty. The relative weakness of Prussia had beer, burnt into the souls of Prussian statesmen ; King William determined that that grave defect should be cured. He picked out three persons, two soldiers, and a statesman. General von lloon ho appointed Minister of War, and no man in modern times has shown greater qualities in the organisation of an arm)'. He placed General von Moltke at the, head of the general staff : it rapidly became what it now (1887) is, the brain of the army, alike in quarters and in the field. Einallv he called Otto von Bismarck" from the diplomatic service, and made this Pomeranian squire his chief political adviser, and the. manager of his delicate, and weighty State affairs." Germany mobilised. " Hie German staff maps of i ranee, especially east of Paris, actually laid down roads which in July, 1870, had not yet been marked upon any map issued by the French War Office. j Plans devised and adopted long before- ! hand were executed to the letter; more than 300,000 combatants—artillery, horse, and infantry, in complete fighting trim— were brought to specified places on specified davs, almost exactly in fulfilment of a scheme reasoned out and drawn up two years before. The French abijiptly declared war ; the challenge was accepted ; the orders went forth, and 'thereupon united Germany stood to arms'— use the words of .Marshal von Moltke." 'The French Government, on the other hand, actually possessed only one formed I Corps d' Armee; the second, stationed at ! Chalons, and commanded by General Frosj sard, was wanting in "essential equipments. Nominally, the French, army was lormidable in numbers, but owing to faulty organisation there were, for the first fortnight after the declaration of war, thousands of reserve men travelling over France in search of their regiments. It is pamfui-*o read in Mr. Hooper's narrative the details of the woeful lack of ordinary supplies. Even General Michel telegraphed to Paris :—" Stave arrived at Belfort; cant find my brieade; can't find the general of division. Don Know where my regiments are." The troops had " neither tents, cooking pots, nor flannel belts; neither medical or veterinary canteens, nor medicines, nor forges, nor pickets for the horses; they were without hospital attendants, workmen, and train. As to the magazines of Belfort— they were empty." The first movement, an ostentatious one : was '.j r* n—;. ... Uvv>uniOA v... August 'I; it >vas what Hooper calls "a fcl.nki.i4, ...simple of stage thunder." After this there was a pause—the French did not pursue the retreating companies of the 40th and 69th, hold the town, or even destrov the bridges. Though large numbers of Prussian corps must have been near at hand, by not appearing they roused among the French a feeling of apprehension. Information was not only inexact, but was even misleading. No'mas-ter-mind at headquarters filled them with confidence or gave a firm direction to the soldiers. A querulous dread arose of Prussian spies. The amazing thing to „us is the neglect of ordinary military precautions. When the Crown Prince's army advanced, it found bridges intact and "telegraph wires untouched, enabling it to receive all the information it asked for. The French army was kept "pottering to and fro under the Emperor," losing in morale every hour; the Germans gained confidence with even- step they took towards the frontier, "intensely proud of an almost perfect war apparatus." The first real blow came . when the Crown Prince gave battle on the Lauter to the scattered army of MacMahon strung out between the Lauter and Lyons. Doiiay tried to de-' fend Geisberg, was killed, and the position fell; and "the main current of the campaign flowed Metzward." In this war -the orders from the King of Prussia were "to seek out and fight the enemy wherever he might be found." and this eagerness precipitated what the French were unprepared for—the ' attacks upon Woerth and Elsasshausen.v MacMahon was obliged to order retreat. Compare, the incidents with those of 1814 ! 'the French unsure, unprepared, without confidence in their headquarters, misled into believing that their movements could only be those of advance; while actually with a few days' fighting they were in retreat.. Spicher'en followed Woerth. The Emperor was in Metz. nominally " at the head of a great, yet scattered, and roughly-handled army, with formidable enemies pressing upon his front and equally formidable enemies pouring through the rugged hill paths, threatening the sole railways which led direct through j Chalons to Paris. He was scared by the suddenness of the shook and the rapidity of events; and bewildered because he was incapable of grasping or understanding the. thick-coming realities presented bywar on" a grand scale." It is significant of his character that on August 12—15 I days after his assumption of command at i .Metz of the "Army of the Rhine"— he resigned the ollice in favour of Marshal . Bazaine. From this time on the story of Prussian advance is practically an unbroken record. Pressed back upon Metz, the commander was unable to retrieve the errors and hesitations of the Emperor ; and only further entangled his men in what is referred to as "that dreadful labyrinth- the Prooes Bazaine." German decision determined the battle at Sedan; a new element of interference had arrived with de Wimpj fen from Pans; he intervened to stop the j retreat.' 'The army in three hours had j three successive commanders, and within : four and twenty hours this latest one's ; conceit suffered extinction bv his being j obliged to sign the capitulation of Sedan. ! He tried to resign; there was no one to take his place. The Emperor unfurled the white flag, and sent this letter to Kin" William : — i "Monsieur, my Brother,—Not having i been able to die in the midst of my j troops, nothing remains for me but to j place my sword in your Majesty's hands." ; Unlv one half-hour earlier had informaI tion been brought to the Prussians that j the Emperor was in Sedan ! i .So with bickering amongst the French I generals did the war begin to end. De j Wimpl'en tried to bluster to von Moltke. j " You do not know the topography of the country about Sedan." was "von Moltke's true and crushing answer. On September 6— count the days and compare them with those of 1914". 'Hie Emperor of France telegraphed — "The army is defeated and captive; I myself am a prisoner." What a lamentable tragedy of errors! J and what a-slujjy la contrasts!