THE MEN AND THEIR METHODS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15730, 3 October 1914, Page 4 (Supplement)

THE MEN AND THEIR METHODS.

nniTl>H OFFICER'S REVIEW. j .A\ i xt:Kor.linarily interesting e impurison ; l'i'.wi'iMi i' i Fiench anil Unman armies I •■ .{~ iciin'.iv made by ;i Tlritish officer — . ' iphin luis.v. of :'nr 9tii l.'urklia Hilles, ' ■::■• ii.--. i'i-t rcii rno'l ti> India after de- ' \..:ing .■•: i c>ii i« to tin' study of l""iench ' . ■■;! i Ji-i-iii.ir military 0114.1nis.1t tot and' :ri:ii.i! ii.-tli.il-. At 11 gathering of <-ihr.-is it. -in.il I-,,, -luted his ex peri- , lines ,i".l imp-cssimis of the two great; . linn's ..' •] tin-ii |.i -pi-i 1 i f pitted against 1 •in li I.t" •-, .1 war- Those, whit Ii are. s'iniin Piisi'il below, will bo found of great' ii,ti'i'e<t .1 1 lit- present time. explaining ; ;.- il-..i\ .... ilu- methods of waifare now j being '..nr.ed mi. \\ iiri: iip gioat \\.<r comes, lie said, al-| :r.-si everything \* ill depend on the. f|'ir;t 111 win. Ii no French enter upon thai campaign. If they lielie\e in their leaders ami are . onHdeiit "I victory Oiey have all | r\. e'V'iit . linn, -. if they are doubtful "f sii., e... iliv nil) certainly Ins,-. So far as arinaniei;: mill naming are concerned, t.ip I .ah ... ■ is icn.inilv in favmn of tierlraiiv . hi! mix ale is of even higher import,m c than these. I lie nation that goes 10 uai in .1 good cause, anxious to fight, hating the en.my mil longing to crush him. .tart- with an enormous advantage. That the l-'ivmh me keen and still want \engeame tor 1870 is indisputable. The <li 1 mans* on tiie other hand, have no particular animosity against the French; the feeling is rather one of contempt, their hatred hem; mainly directed against Ureat Jiritam. That the latter would ?i i.d an expeditionaiy force of at least ISO.OOO men is certain, and their intervention might well decide the issue of the campaign, for it would luive a tremendous influence on the Freiuli morale. Botii Intend to Attack. The keystone of both Herman and : French tactics is the cult of the offensive. Ail teaching has this object in view: throughout the army and the nation this . doctrine is preached as the only hope of success. pint the methods of the two 1

tuitions are different. The German theory j <«t battle is simple- to advance on a wido front, making use of all road?, to deploy ; early, to attack tin? enemy as soon &j he ! is met, to attack him everywhere, and , to geek Ins flanks. These methods re- | quire little manoeuvring skill and com- I paratively slight information, except a» to i the general area occupied by the enemy- I Their success depends mainly on numbers, ! vigour, and energy, hard-hitting and mutual co-operation. The plan aims at. j envelopment, since the Germans are of • •pinion that a frontal attack is most difti- j cult arid mw costly against modern fire-I arms. The Germans also hope by this I method of attack to impose their will J upon the enemy and to the initiative, j All the Commander-in-Chief can do is to make tip his mind from the information: at, bis disposal where the enemy is and. to set his army in motion. Haviug done. so. anil liaving no powerful reserves at j his disposal,, he is no longer in a position j to exercise a complete control' over the i battle, the initiative soon passing into the lauds of hi.'! subordinates. Even if fresh ! ;,iul valuable infoimalioii be received, he i.in do but iillle to alter his disposition, | fcud is no longer able to change his plana j one his army has been launched against j the enemy. This plan presents certain sot ions objections, but, on the other hand, ii is absolutely simple, and simplicity has always be the suiest road to success in v. ar.

Clear Difference in Tactics.

The "French theories differ from the Geirnan in certain important respectsThe main point is that the French wish to bo able to manccuvie after receipt of valuable- information and to keep the control of the battle iu tho hands of the Com-mander-in-Chief as long as possible. With this object in view they avoid premature : deployment, maintain a strong general re- ■ serve, and keep their forces in a foinia- i lion that will enable them to strike an i overwhelming blow at, some vulnerable point in the hostile line of battle. For I the successful execution of thus plan, good . and early information is indispensable, i The cavalry and aircraft are relied upon ' to supply thfs information. the gieat ! advantage of the French theory is that i if his miormatioii is good, the Commander- I in-Chief, having retained contiol, is ui a j position to deal a crushing blow ; his | plans are made with full knowledge and' there should be no chance of their lading. i Their Respective Infantry. j The infantry of both nations aie fine : and efficient, but in quite different ways. •' hey are trained to fight against each' other in such a way as to make the best j possible use ol their national cliaracter- , jhtics. The German infar-Myman is solid j and heavy, but by no means kicks dash i and energy. The Frenchman is mure alert and enterprising, but is also more i impulsive- Both are trained for fighting ' in large masses, solely for European warfare. In the matter of infantry tactics; the Germans favour the use of successive j lines in attack, usually with considerable ' depth. A few years ago extensions were : very slight; rarely more than two or three. I paces, now they are often four, five, or j six paces, and the general appearance of ' an attack resembles that commonly seen ' a' British manoeuvres. The attack, how-, ever, is rather wooden and mechanical.! There is little doubling forward and cover | is pot well utilised, whilst covering fire ! is neglected. There appears to be too ' lunch desire for regularity and good align- . mi-lit, not enough dash and initiative. I A Fiem.li atta<k is veiy diffeient. , 'Mine appe.iis to he little cohesion; tiieie . am wide gaps between various portions "i the, firing line; the. formations are all different in the early stages—squads and Motions dotted about", utilising cove.i, aid \ commanders of units seeming to go as tlr.v ' please. These methods Slice,'-! too much : iiie/uiaiilv. almost , ~nln,i.m lint thi.-. is not so. they may faiily arnirate'v be compared v. it'll tie, of a well trained Inotball team, eeinbinin- well and with perfect niideislaiidini;. y( [opting in, : fixed lilies 01 iegu'iai• t «y-.(,m. Cenminl in! .nit i leitamlv lark the a.- i.,mpaied . with Fiem It. but in r-pim .it tin, a 1;,., ■ man attack is very impies-ive. , In leg n-d to niu.-ki in, the tleiin'r-s ' »■•• probably steadier 'ban the Fiemli. as 1 Ins latter ale in'lined to rune ex, fled. As a large propoition 01 the men in both ; aimies belong to idle dubs beioie thev join the le-iilai-, the general standaid .it marksmanship i- i liily liiurli. There is little firing by intantry in i-iihei auuv ...,cr 1000 incurs, and judging distance is a fine art willi tln-ni. The Kennaii l ile is the better ol the two. anil its siiiiiiunit ion is supeiioi. both in having an ixlleinelv il.il tiajectoiv at, slmit ranges, and because the bullet has a most deadh effect, almost, like that of an expanding bullet. Marching di.«. ipline is excellent in both armies, but the French are faster and have great power of endurance, French Natural Horsemen. Both the French and German _ eavahy pre well mounted, and the training of their horses is splendid. The Frenchman is a finer natural horseman than the German. and. despite his shorter period of service, always looks better on a horse. Both manoeuvre well in large bodies, the French, if anything, having the advantage. In loth armies vigorous and energetic methods are advocated, and the great maxim is that cavalry is made for action and everything is excusable except 1 :r action, which is unpaidonabla in a cavalry leader."

In artillery the Germans ate superior I numerically, ' but the French claim | ■superiority in everything else except , weight of the guns. Both employ direct hie at the commencement of an action, and both believe that the main object of aatillery is to enable their own infantry to gain the victory. Both ate likely to come out into the open in the final stages of a battle, in order to use direct fire. Tins French practice is to tell oh* some of their batteries as infantry battel ies, under the orders of infantry commanders: some, called counter-batteries, to deal with the hostile artillery, and a few in reserve to put in where necessary. The French gun a*, piesent is the best in existence, and it is well handled. Fieneh methods aie rapid and their keynote is simplicity of action. They do not believe in lire at long ranges, fixing the normal firing ranee in European warfaie at from 2000 to 4000 yards. They do not iely on mechanical ; methods of finding the range, nor do they aim at extreme accuracy of fne. They believe in •rafales." holding that these sudden, violent, but short outbursts of file, are the most efficient method of destroying the morale of an enemy. Batteries aic very quick at coining into action, and very quick at opening fire. German artillery tactics have impioved considerably during the last few years, but are not up to the French. The inferiority of their field-guns, however, is to a great extent counter-balanced by their superior rumber* and by their extensive use of bcwitze.rs. which they use much like ordinary field-guns. Officers and Their Men. The Gentian General Staff possess meat power in the army: the members are i vaiiablv llmioiiglily ahle men. and, oil; ll.i- whole, ai .' superior to the French. In tin- field their staff work is more thoioiigb. although the standard of intelligence, in the French is very high. A wide gull exists between Gel man officers and (her men. the existence of this g„|f being considered essential for tic maintei,.i». e id' discipline. "Villi the 1-Tcmh the main difference lies in the fait lint the} fad theii men where the <lei nvns dine 'hem. Th *. of course, alls for iiiou- intelligence. 1 The ihai.clei' .if the averse man 1 ie. niit is mild and docile He has an linnill ■ i! ri intense inspect l<u eve: vthing :i the shape „! authority, md fervent ; lovaltv .m.i devotion to 'the Faliierland. The laid •.■.ink and 1u,,.,h Imminent to which he I- Sll'nje, led do not seem to alter lis out Ion 1 ; His phv.-icpie is good, be is •1 -I'd and end...me. and an exeelleii'. I imi'-.-liM He his a stiong sense of duly : and i., imbued with a .spun id implici't '.mil nun u'ng obedience to ciders. F.vni 'if lie ; - a ■" ial d"n,.,rt it l.i. «,„ ; ; ,|j Mll \<:l! not pievei i him In m hailing well. ' He - ,i f'.eiiiiati Inst, a so iali.-l ~,,,.. . i wauls. He is a brave and plucky lighter. | and all hough be does not snow m'ui 1," dash ; or- in lividualitv. he is l.y <», means a I ma. bine. The Fieiah soldier, on the : otl.'i- hand, is mote active both in body land mind, is intelligent and energetic. ! sol er and abstemious, a splendid marcher ! and a keen fighter. He is of independent character and critical nature. When lie respects his superiors he is capable of :-ie;it filings: when be doubts their military efficiency lie has a tendency to become sullen, oven insubordinate. His physique i- not up to that of the German: but French infantry have in the I past performed wonderful feats of endurance, and will do so again, piovided they arc. we'll fed. At. the, same time they have wonderful capacity for doing a hard [ day's work on a little food.