THE GERMAN ARMY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15717, 18 September 1914, Page 6

THE GERMAN ARMY.

A MILITARY BUBBLE.

CAN BE EASILY PBICKED.

DEFICIENT IN MANY WAYS.

That German military power is a bjgfch, inflated bubble, of bnlliant h u « K? susceptible of being pnckej and bun? because the German soldier is merely an automaton incapable of adapting bSnseh" to circumstances to which ho is ~„„ tomed, is the opinion of •■ Kn S* who contributes an article to the Septet ber issue of the London Magaz.iJ. P *" The writer says he is one who' « nn believer in the invincibility of th, d, Army. " I admit," lie Lv • \t™» paper the German Army .s'n'ot Sf y £ greatest, but the most perfectly or Jailed army in the world; but battles arTS wo by flourishing sheaves of CsS m the enemy's lace, nor is there 7™ sound criterion by which the £J of an army for war can hi judged in time of nenre -.•].„„ be a hundred and one quality whi, ** supposed theoretically to make or eff ■ ency in an armv, "-wr-h as n -4 '' material, discipline, leading, ,"3 training, organisation, and so fiu'h h!l the great deciding factor-ami thole who hav« as much modern battlefield exoeri ence as myself will doubtless agree S me—u the capacity of the individual sol dier to endure hardship, and his individnal determination to win through X ow ,£ Geiman system of life and of milW training is not designed to encourage£ dividual effort, but rather tr, stultffv it and to reduce the individual man or 'unit to the state of a disciplined automation. Organisation Bad. " In most professions and trades such & training is excellent, for by dint of much practice each individual and unit becomes " past perfect "—each learns to fit into his appointed pla c » just as do the component parte of nicely-adjusted pieces of mechanism. The business of an army, however, differs from any other, but 'it cannot be practised in peace-time. What men do at manoeuvres is no criterion whatever of what they will do in war. An armv can never really practice war until it is in the presence of the enemy. The army that has not been proven in war is like the piece of machinery that has never "been pet in motion. Now, the more nicely. adjusted the machine, the move fatal will be the catastrophe when anything unforeseen occurs— (he Titanic as an example— it is common knowledge that it is always the unexpected that does occur in war-time. Wherefore, an army should be as elastic as possible in it's organisation and training. This is precisely what the German Army is not. '' The German Army is obedient to a rule of _ thumb. To the German tactician the science of warfare is cut and dried. Officers and men alike know what they ought to do under a hundred different "conditions; they learn it all by heart, and when thogj conditions arise they act correctly, became they know their 'work by heart. But, supposing, as will invariably happen, other conditions arise, conditions the antidote to which has not been studied, what will happen? Untaught to think or act for themselves, they -will ransack their m* mories for the correct reply. Under modern conditions of warfare, the best soldier is he who knows how to 'muddle through.' and how to 'carry on' when in a tight place, without waiting for instructions. Eradicating Individualism. "The whole training of the German soldier is designed to eradicate individualism, and to reduce soldier.*, battalions, regiments, and brigades to a state of iron, bound automatism. If the enemy's action , could be equally reduced, then Buck training would be perfect; but, as things are, I maintain that it if fatal, for it entirely destroys the personal factor, and it is only the personal factor of each indi vidua! in an army which will carry thai army to victory under modern conditions of warfare. The German officer relies only upon discipline, and he runs the risk of being let down at th© crucial moment. Courage, determination, 'amour propre,' and individual enterprise are all stronger, than the fear of death, but it has yet to be proven that the modern educated man will risk death rather than contravene discipline. Wherefore, I maintain that in out present state of civilisation the German system of organisation and training is fundamentally wrong." Impossible Evolutions. The writer says that seven times a the past 10 years he has been present at th« German grand manoeuvres, but he never saw elsewhere manoeuvres carried out with so little regard to the possibilities of modern fighting. At manoeuvres the German soldier or officer was taught to do things which he could not possibly perform if the enemy were using ball cartridge. Whole brigades of cavalry swept down upon unbroken infantry in most gallant fashion, and the umpires encouraged the sport. It was, perhaps, "magnificent, but it was not war." What would be the mental attitude of poor fellows when they tried those child's tricks in rea. battle against an en«mv. The first result would be a heavy death-roll, and then a dead stop of the machinery whilst the officers reconsidered the position. As regards the soldier, the bolts that held the miiitarv machine together would be loosened the machine would rattle and reins* to work. Technical Weaknesses. The German cavalry w*re to be fees at best wh*m delivering an impossible charge, but tho Oman was neither * ! horseman nor a horremaster: ss a rcollt jhe was beneath contempt. The Herman j infantryman had two great faults: of I was too fat. and tried to carrv too mnca I weicrht on his bark "'Hh the . r- "'l,', '■'*■ I be could neither march far r.or fast. 'When 1 in close formations the work of the infanI try was distinct 1 - rood, and their {drill was splendid, but once the men I got into anything approaching onen order all initiative ceased. The German infantryman lacked th? dn«sh of the French, the dozedness of the Russian, the fatalism of the Turk, or the practical adaptability of hi* British rival. As'regarded the artillery, it was very difficult to speak, but at manoeuvres it was impossible to judge the vital points ot picking up the tacf-t and hitting it., and such statistics as from time to time leaked out were meant for foreign consumption. and were unreliable. ' The German engineer was t~> tb*orctW|. Given W necessary materia! and unlimited time, ne would construct the mo* model works imaginable, but in warfare what was wanted was a man who would contrive the essential out of the most unpromising material, and in the shortest possible space of time. "T have likened the German Armv to a machine" the writ ex adds, "but it is one in which all the parts are I in an everlasting utote of un-oi!ed friction j against each other."