THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1914. THE ITALIAN ATTITUDE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15717, 18 September 1914, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1914. THE ITALIAN ATTITUDE.

A vivid explanation of the Italian attitude towards the Triple Alliance " is to lie found in the reported official admission by Austrian authorities that 15,000 soldiers from Adriatic Austria, mostly Italian-speaking, have been killed iu Galician battles fighting in the fust Austrian line. These men vent from districts in ''Unredeemed Italy," being compelled, to serve a cause with which the Italians have no sympathy whatever, and from which they have nationally severed themselves. Being of doubtful allegiance, these alien subjects were placed in the forefront of the battle, and were thus exposed to the first attack of the Russians. It is exceedingly likely that the reluctance of many "Austrian'' regiments, composed of nationalities inimical to Austrian rule, was of great assistance to the Russian armies in their progress westward ; but this consideration will not modify the sympathetic indignation of the Italian people. That German and Magyar-speaking Austrians should 'threaten the Italian frontier while Italian-speaking Austrians fight i Russians in the east may be good 'Austrian policy, but is not calculated to soothe the national susceptibilities of the Kingdom of Italy. llt is probable, however, that Austria has very little hope of retaining Italian friendship if the tide of i defeat runs still more strongly ; against her and her partner. As i long as Germany was potent for agIgression and the strength of Austria was comparatively unimpaired Italian neutrality was a reasonable i expectation in Vienna, no matter ; what disposition was made of the varied nationalities that compose ;the Austrian forces. It is the declining strength of Germany and ; the possible disruption of tin- Aus- ' trian Empire, which threaten to tempt Italy to give practical proof i of her unmistakable sympathies. There is every natural reason why the Italian-speaking provinces of ! .Austria should be ''redeemed." and lit is very certain that the Vienna I Government will not present to 1 Italy as a free gift districts that i Italy ought to be able to seize and '■ occupy.

Recent administrative changes in Italy — changes decidedly antii German in character—indicate that the movement in favour of the i Triple Entente is not being conj fined to popular demonstrations, but is gradually permeating the i Government itself. Should Italy thus intervene, she will bring to the aid of the Allies a military strength upon which the bandit-government of Berlin counted largely in planning its attack on France. How greatly the friendly neutrality of Italy assisted the Allies is to be I seen in the recent victory on the Marne, to which point the. French ">vere able to bring men vftio would otherwise have, been engaged in defending the Italian frontier. Incidentally it is interesting to note that the Swiss mobilisation for maintenance of neutrality similarly euabled the French to leave their Swiss frontier undefended. Thus a concentration against the invaders was possible upon a scale evidently not allowed for in the plans of the Kaiser. Had Italy thrown in her lot with the Triple Alliance the naval situation would hardly have been affected, for even with the i assistance of the German warships now "interned*' at Constantinople I her fleet could not have stood against the combined Mediterranean fleets of France and Britain. She. has : four or five Dreadnoughts afloat, with a number of pre-Dreadnoughts and armoured cruisers, but the naval arrangements between France and Britain gave them a combined superiority over all possible enemies, both in the Xorth Sea and in the Mediterranean. The presence of a strong antagonistic fleet, with convenient bases, might, however, have delayed for some time the transportation of French troops from Algiers, and to that considerable extent would have weakened the defensive power of France. As a military power. Italy is more seriously to be considered, a fact which explains the long and strenuous efforts which have been made by Vienna and Berlin to attach her to their fortunes.

The population of Italy is about 35,000,000. and any nation thus numerically strong is a great military Power under universal and compulsory service. Two years'' service in the permanent, army, or six months' training spread over several years, or a month's service prior to militia training, is the duty of all Italians, according to their classification. The peace strength of the Italian Army is about 300.000 officers and men. It is considered that Italy could place in (he field 400,000 highly-trained men, with 200,000 militia, and could maintain this strength indefinitely from her "supplementary" troops. The organisation of the Italian Army is accounted good, much attention having been paid to the specialised branches : its cavalry, artillery, and engineers have an excellent reputation. The Tripolitan campaign showed that great improvements have been effected sjace the disss-

trous expedition to Abyssinia. If Italy had joined Germany in the attack on France the latter country would have had to defend itselt against at least 500,000 additional enemies. Italian intervention in favour of France might not immediately take the form of such a strenuous display of force. Italy would probably content herself with invading Italian Austria, expelling Austrian troops from the Balkan littoral, and otherwise creating a diversion in south-western Austria. A strong Italian contingent would presumably join the Anglo-French Army as a visible demonstration of unity and cooperation, but- it is unlikely that more would be done in this direction until Austria had sued for terms. In any case, Italian intervention would greatly increase the difficulties of Germany and Austria, and would thus assist in bringing the war to an earlier conclusion.