THE New Zealand Herald AMD DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FBI DAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1911. PUBLICITY AND WAR.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLVIII, Issue 147690, 8 September 1911, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AMD DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FBI DAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1911. PUBLICITY AND WAR.

The world-wide publicity now given to international problems is of the greatest possible value in the maintenance of peace among civilised nations. It acts as a restraining influence upon all statesmen and diplomatists who have to justify their doings in the court of public opinion. For while every great Western nation is acutely conscious of the danger of being caught unprepared by a watchful enemy and responds readily to urgent and intelligible pleas for military and naval preparations the same consciousness makes it reluctant to accept unnecessarily the stupendous risks of doubtful conflict. The day has' gone by when international questions were settled in the Cabinets of kings or in the secret conferences of diplomatists, and when the solutions offered were accepted blindly by ignorant and submissive millions. The press publishes abroad all possible information of the progress of events, and this publication calls into activity a previously impotent factor in international affairs. It is frequently charged that this publicity excites the public mind and fans into a flame the passions and prejudices of the multitude, but it would be far more correct to say that while publicity encourages precautionary measures it equally prevents great nations from being plunged into suicidal wars at the will of adventurous Ministers. There is all the difference in the world between a nation being strong enough to secure the respect of other nations and a nation being prepared to stake its national prosperity in a conflict which may be honourably avoided. Not that modern nations will not fight and fight with fury if they conceive themselves imposed upon or if their self-respect is outraged and violated, but that a knowledge of what may happen if reckless statescraft is permitted develops the same instinct of self-preservation as that which induces them to be ready for war in order to secure peace. History teaches us that as the press becomes a more customary feature of the popular life war becomes more and more infrequent, and the compromising of international disputes more usual. Democracy has marched to war in the past, and is likely to march to war in the future, but it does not throw down the gauntlet as readily as autocracy, for the simple reason that those who suffer most from war have under democracy a voice in State affairs which under autocracy they lack. The Tsar and the Mikado, with their immediate councillors and the comparatively small number of their respective peoples who influence their decisions, made the Ru&so-Japanese War ani the Portsmouth Treaty; a vastly greater number have to be taken into account when war involves the national prosperity of Britain, Germany and France.

When war is declared and hostilities commenced it is more than difficult to reopen negotiations. Internal dissension is swept aside by the imperative necessity, for national assertion, and there is no possibility of domestic protest doing more than weaken the energies of the nation. Victorious nations are never troubled by uprising and rebellion, but beaten nations have always to expect a reaction against those held responsible for their plight. The fall of the Second Empire and the rise of the Commune followed closely upon the surrender at Sedan and the humiliating peace of Versailles. The Russian upheaval was sequential to the loss of Manchuria. Who shall say what might not happen in any European country whose rulers carried it into» disastrous war which might have been avoided 1 ? Such considerations never troubled Frederick . the Great or Louis the Fourteenth but they cannot be overlooked by any modern Government, which knows itself critically watched by the argus-eyed populace informed .through the press of the develop-

menfc of events. It is very certain j that no Cabinet in Europe will lightly j enter upon a struggle in which the prospects are not wholly in its favour, and the existing situation is distinctly one of well-balanced possibilities. Germany, Austria, Italy and, possibly, Spain may be ranged against France, Russia and Britain; nor is it conceivable that such a struggle could be short and decisive. All Europe would be flung into the melting-pot; but it might easily be recast politically into unexpected shapes. This cannot but be realised by the great mass of the peoples who are so directly interested, for the press permeates the whole of Western Europe. The directing of German antagonism against Britain is evidently due to a recognition that British support has made it impossible for France to be attacked with comparative impunity, and is itself a hopeful sign of a peaceful outcome. For nations like men make all sorts of rash statements when disappointed and angry, thus giving vent to their temper in words instead of deeds. But if the war-clouds blow over—as they appear to be doing in spite of much thundering— may be surmised that they will not leave the European world exactly as it was before. The nations must realise that although they have all bent beneath the burden of armamenture none of them is one whit nearer supreme dominion. The balance of power will still exist; the doubling of their burdens could not affect it, as they will be quick to learn from the universal modern publicity. A general reaction against armaments is therefore exceedingly likely to follow the pacific settlement of existing differences.