MAORI MARRIAGES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLV, Issue 13927, 8 December 1908, Page 6

MAORI MARRIAGES.

THEIR VALIDITY IN ' LAW.

INTERESTING COMPENSATION CLAIM. ■:

Tub Arbitration Court lias delivered judgment in the case where John Puhi Matthews claimed compensation from Gibson and Fyfield, sawmillers, :at Manunui, in respect of the death ; of his son Harry, while in respondents' employ. The claimant alleged that he and the other members of his family were partially dependent on the earnings of the deceased, and he claimed £200 as compensation. Respondents disputed their liability on the ground that the claimant was not the father of the deceased within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation for Accidents Act.

The facts of the cose, which was heard in Auckland some two months ago, were that claimant, in or about the year 1889, took as [ his wife one Orewa, who is a, Maori, and a member of the Ngatihuri tribe. The union was arranged in accordance with Maori custom, but there was nothing in the; nature of a marriage ceremony. Claimant and Orewa have lived together since as husband and wife. The deceased, Heary Puhi Matthews, was the eldest of the children. On November 13, 1896, a ceremony of marriage between claimant and Orewa was performed, without any license under the Marriage Acts, by the Rev. Taimona Hapimana, a duly ordained clergyman of the Church of England. • Thei application for arbitration was filed in the present case on September 29 last. On October 23, the case was partly heard and then adjourned. . On October 27, and before the hearing was resumed, the claimant registered the birth of his deceased eon under the provisions of the Legitimation Act, 1894. The question that arose on these facts was whether the claimant is the father of the deceased, Harry Puhi Matthews, for the purposes of the Workers' Compensation for Accidents Act.

It was clear, the Court considered, that, as the union contracted by the claimant with Orewa in 1889 was not solemnised before any Christian minister, it could not be regarded as a valid marriage, and 'it followed that all the children born of that union were illegitimate. It was also clear that the marriage solemnised between claimant and Orewa in 1896 was a valid common law marriage. This, indeed, was not disputed by' Mr. McVeagii, who argued the case for the respondents. There was thus a marriage of the parents of Harry Puhi Matthews within the meaning of eection 2 of the Legitimation Act, 1894, now replaced by the Legitimation Act, 1908, and the question to be determined wee what was the effect of the registration of the birth of Harry Puhi Matthews in accordance with the provisions of that Act. "The Act provides expressly, iii section 5, that the registration may take place whether the child is alive or dead," the judgment proceeded. Section 2 provides that any child born before the marriage of his or her parents, whoso "parentis shall intermarry, shall bo deemed, on the registration of such child as mentioned in the Act, to have been legitimated by such marriage from birth, and shall ha entitled to all the rights of a child born in wedlock, including the right to such real and personal property lis might have been claimed by such child ii born in wedlock, and also to any real and personal property on the succession of any other person which might have been claimed through the : parent by a child born in wedlock. >

"Now the language of the section taken literally is wide enough to include a case like the present one. Mr. McVeagh contended, however, that in construing the statute tho Coyrt must look at the purpose for which it was passed, viz., to remove the disability of bastards to succeed to property, and that an illegitimate child should be treated as legitimated for the purposes only of succession to property. The immediate purpose of the Legislature, doubtless, was. to provide for such legitimation in connection with the succession to property, and the Act was passed in the interests, primarily, of bastards, and not with the idea of vonferring benefits on other persons. In effecting that purpose the Legislature lias used language that is wide enough to cover cases other than those in which the succession to property is involved, and in which legitimation may have the effect of conferring advantages on persons other than the bastards who are legitimated Is there then any reason why effect should not be given to that language, although the Legislature may not have had exprersly in view the purpose of benefiting such other persons? There is nothing, we think, in tho context of the words under consideration that affords a ground for restricting their meaning in tho way suggested. Nor i«; there any reason, independently of the context, for so restricting them. But, although the restricted construction contended lor should, in our opinion, bo rejected, it is not necessary to say that the Act has made a bastard legitimate for all purposes whatsoever. There may be cases in which strong grounds exist for saying that it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to extend legitimation to such cases. There is, however, no ground derived from the context or from reason for saying that tho language hero used should not have its ordinary meaning, and bo held to legitimate bastards for all purposes in connection with questions of dependency under the Workers' Compensation for. Accidents Act. We hold, therefore, that the claimant should be treated as the father of tho deceased for the purposes of these Acts. "It was not disputed that a dependency in fact has been established on the claimant's evidence, and the claimant is entitled to compensation. We have fixed the amount at £130, which includes £30 for funeral expenses. J We do not,allow the claimant any costs. His richt to compensation was acquired after the proceedings had been commenced, and it was only by the grace of the respondents, in waiving any objection on that ground, that he was enabled to recover on the present application. We order the respondents to pay £130 to th*» Public Trustee: to; be applied by him as follows:—(a) In payment of the costs-incurred by the claimant in connection with the present case, (b) In payment of the deceased's funeral expenses, including tlio expenses of the tamri. (ci The balance to be invested, and tlio capital and income apnlied by the Public Trustee ns ho. in his discretion, shall think proper for the maintenance and benefit of the claimant and his family. Leave is reserved to the Public Trustee to applv to the Court ex parte for advice and directions," Mr. Kari appeared for claimant and Mr. McVeagh for respondents.