THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, APRIL 6, 1907. KUROPATKIN'S REVELATIONS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLIV, Issue 13455, 6 April 1907, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, APRIL 6, 1907. KUROPATKIN'S REVELATIONS.

General Kuropatkin's history of the Manchurian campaign has been suppressed in Russia, where the truth, whatever interests it may affect, is always unpalatable. Its suppression has not. however, prevented the publication in the British press o) intensely interesting summaries of the Russian Commander-in-Chief's frank and vivid account of the causes which contributed to bring about his disastrous campaign. The questions of strategy and tactics which he raises may be passed over as matters which more properly belong to the domain of military experts. The real interest which his history possesses for the general reader lies in the graphic picture which ,he presents of the extraordinary conditions which prevailed in the Russian army. It is safe to say that it lacked every essential necessary to ensure success. Its leaders were for the most part grossly inefficient; it was badly equipped, while the troops, " in consequence of the obscurity which surrounded the objects and causes of the war, were without heart or enthusiasm. The reservists were old, and the bulk of them were "heavy, clumsy, and undersized." Moreover, believing that they had been unjustly called to the colours, while younger men were allowed to remain at theii homes, they came to the war "in a sulky frame of mind." Regiment after regiment! was far short of its complement, both of men and officers, while in the early stages of the campaign there was a lamentable want of transport, horses, and artillery. Everything was in hopeless confusion, and General Kuropatkin admits that had the true state of things been known to the Japanese they might have seized Liao-yang at the beginning of June, 1904. But the most serious defect of all was found in the utter absence of all co-operation and co-ordination among the various commanders themselves. No sooner was a plan of operations agreed upon—though it seems probable that only a few really understood it—than the generals proceeded to render it' futile by flat disobedience of orders, and acting upon their own individual responsibility. This disastrous state of things can only be accounted for by sheer stupidity or a deliberate disregard of the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. But whatever alternative may be favoured, the result was the same. The Russians were forced to abandon position after position. Sometimes they weie prematurely abandoned through cowardice. At first the Russians were inclined to display a disregard for the enemy. After the first collision this contempt, says General Kuropatkin, was unfortunately changed into an almost equally extreme over-estimate of his worth. The consequence was that men and officers wore in an almost constant state of semi-panic. General Maw and . his division "remained with arms folded, while under their eyes the fate of the Russian army was being decided." This general retreated, vacating important, positions without firing a shot, and without even informing his commander. During the fighting the troops kept leaving the ranks, under pretence of • carrying off the wounded, and sometimes without even that excuse. On the Russian side all was chaos and incapacity ; on the Japanese side order and cohesion.

These revelations have an interest for other nations as well as for the Russian people themselves. The lessons which they teach are the same as those which we learned by bitter experience in the South African war. Russia entered upon the struggle with Japan without due preparation. For this no excuse can be pleaded. The war was not forced upon her It did not come like a bolt from the blue. It was a war of her own making. General Kuropakin lets the cat out of the bag when he tells us that the plan of campaign had been drawn up months before the war broke out, and when, it is worth recalling, Russia was assuring the world of her passionate desire for peace. But no one, apparently, knew how utterly unready the Russian army was for war, how rotten and worthless the whole military and naval organisation had become. Not does it appear to have been the business of anyone to find out exactly, how matters stood. General Kuropatkin, who was then Minister for War, appears to have entertained some misgivings in his own mind, but he evidently allowed himself to be overruled by others. The result was that, under the strain of the first practical test, the whole system broke down hopelessly and completely. On the othci hand, the preparations of the Japanese had left no detail, however trifling, overlooked or unprovided for. General Kuropatkin himself bears ungrudging testimony to their thoroughness and efficiency, as well as to their patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice. Their officers were capable and energetic, and the troops were full of ardour. The great lesson which this Russian history of the war teaches is the lesson of preparedness. It. is the lesson which all wars teach. Germany conquered France because of the completeness of her prepara-

ticns. and Japan triumphed oyer Russia for the same reason. And in the future, as in the past, history will be found repeating itself. It is not enough for a nation to be strong. It must always Iv prepared. Eternal readiness is the price of victory.