THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, MAY, 1905 DEALING IN NAVIES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLII, Issue 12859, 6 May 1905, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, MA Y, 1905 DEALING IN NAVIES.

The reported purchase by Russia of the Argentine and Chilian-navies is well within the bounds of probability. It must have occurred to shrewd American speculators that warships would br at a premium the moment their delivery to either of the present conbatants became possible, and the hie. would immediately be acted upon. Subsequent operations would be simple enough to a syndicate that could command millions of dollars. An '! option" would be obtained from Governments possessing warships with which they were ready to part upon advantageous terms, and this >' option" would be eagerly acquired by the Government of St. Petersburg. This is apparently what has happened. But, while neither the Chilian nor the Argentine authorities can he thought of as scrupulous in the maintenance of neutrality obligations, it is hardly conceivable that the United States will look on while considerable naval reinforcements are secured by either of the belligerents from within the sphere covered by the Monroe Doctrine. If Chili and Argentina were literally, as well as nominally, independent States such a transaction might lead to international complications, but could hardly be considered to call for the special interposition of the Washington Government. But the Monroe Doctrine, to have any just and equitable basis, must cut both ways. By insisting that the various States of the North and South American continents shall be exempt from territorial aggression or political domination by any foreign Power the United States, if it is to act intelligibly and consistently, must assume the duty of I preventing them from grossly violating the recognised law of nations against any foreign Power. We may rest assured that , the strongest influence which Washington can exert over the Chilian and Argentine Governments will be brought into play in order to prevent the delivery of the fleets in question until after peace has been concluded. Even such delayed delivery would be of enormous advantage to Russia, While some of then protected cruisers are practically worthless, the great majority of the ships in the Argentine-Chilian navies are comparatively recent acquisitions, built in famous shipbuilding yards, and quite equal to the sunken Russian vessels they would replace. The naval expenditure of these States during the past ten years was excited by the very serious ill-feeling between them on the Andean boundary question, latterly submitted to arbitration. It was, therefore, largely directed to coastal defence, and embraced a considerable number of tor-pedo-boats of modern construction. The securing of such fleets by Russia, immediately the war closed— and we assume they would not be delivered before —would make her once more a dangerous antagonist to Japan should hostilities be afterwards renewed. As far as Russia's policy can be defined it is apparently to make v. -peace which would really be a truce, and, by a renewal of the struggle, possibly several times repeated, to wring advantageous terms from the Mikado. Her enormous wealth and almost illimitable resources rendei such a policy reasonable provided internal dissensions do not cripple the autocracy. It is therefore to her advantage to have the South American navies at her call, even though they should take no part in the present war. If the fleets are delivered in j defiance of international law and can j be manned by effective crews, mainly cosmopolitan adventurers, it must I be admitted that the, Japanese command of the sea is more imperilled than it lias been since the clash into ! Chemulpo.

Apart from the momentous question as to the delivery of these vessels, ■'. the mere fact of the sale is epoch-making. The keen business instincts of the Americans credited with the organisation of the " deal" is shown in the covering by the transactions of the entire fleets of two bitter rivals. ' Chili and Argentina have long striven against one another for the leadership of the American republics that lie south of the equator—Peru. Bolivia. Paraguay, Chili. Argentina, Uruguay. Brazil. Urged by this ambition, rather than by any intrinsic value in the desolate mountain country involved in their boundary dispute, they have spent money, lavishly upon warships and naval maintenance. It must long have been evident to them, however, that neither of them could hope to stand alone at sea against any first-class European Power and that the Monroe Doctrine offered them a surei defence against any foreign attack than any maritime resistance they could make themselves. Their fleets were therefore kept afloat, in order to attack. or defend themselves against, one another, and the last Congressional Speech of Mr. Roosevelt contained a hardly veiled warning that they would not be allowed to disturb the peace without American intervention. Out-built by the Great Powers, -overshadowed by the United States, their navies were little else but toys with which to play at sailoring. An opportunity occurred to giv- up the costly game altogether, to quit the race of shipbuilding—and they would have* been extremely foolish not to have taken it. Ir this we have the economic elimination of two minor nations from the international navy list, a process which will sooner 01 later absorb every State in the world tha' is not great enough to maintain r. navy sufficiently strong to affect the balance of maritime dominion. The effect of it must be to narrow the issues of international politics and to leave all maritime questions to be settled between not more than half-a-dozen maritime Powers, whose alliances may ultimately reduce still lower the actual nuinbei of opposing authorities. That this will make for the peace of the world cannot be doubted, for, even though war should arise between two great naval Powers, the others may be able to confine the struggle and thus prevent the unnecessary disturbance of vast commercial interests. With these prospect's in the future, our present colonial policy of assisting to strengthen the imperial navy rather than to indulge in little toy fleets of out own is manifestly sound. No small fleet, acting independently, can hope or expect to make head against modern naval armaments. It is the great navy, the huge naval organisation, that alone has place in the world-wide naval politics of modern times. Isolated, the largest British colony could do no more in matters maritime than Chili or Argentina, while as an integral part of the Empire ancU with our own I colonial sailors training and fighting on board Imperial ships we can stand or fall with the strongest seaPow.f|' on the earth to-day, the ; greatest maritime Empire the world ! has ever known.