THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MARCH 16, 1905. PROSPECTS OF PEACE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLII, Issue 12817, 17 March 1905, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MARCH 16, 1905. PROSPECTS OF PEACE.

To say that there are prospects of a peace being arranged between Japan and Russia is but to say that Manchuria is already practically lost to the Tsar. Although the unhappy autocrat is reported to be determined to continue the struggle, the only intelligent course open to him is prompt and immediate capitulation. For even if Kuropatkin could reorganise the remnant of his army, this would still leave him without sufficient strength to withstand the victorious march of the Japanese upon Harbin, and it is not possible to reinforce him to any appreciable extent while reinforcements can help him, supposing the Russian Government to have men available in European Russia. Japan has a united and enthusiastic population, from which any number of eager soldiers can be at once obtained to make good the losses sustained by Oyama and his colleagues. Drafts can be freely shipped from Japanese ports to Port Arthur or Niuchwang, and forwarded without difficulty to the front. Whereas Russia cannot bring her revolting populace to the colours, and has found the TransSiberian an utterly insufficient, means of communication. The forces now at Kuropatkin's disposition in the whole of the Far East cannot now exceed 200,000 men, of whom 40,000 are in garrison at Vladivostok, and the remainder have lost all hope. He is reported to have no stores south of Harbin, and must have lost to the enemy a great part of his railway rolling stock as well as most of his guns. If he attempts to hold Vladivostok his army will thus be cut in two the moment the Japanese reach the Harbir>Vladivostok line, and if he abandons the northern port and concentrates all his available strength for the dcdefence of Harbin he. would still not be in sufficient force to prevent the investment of his headquarters. Under these circumstances, a prolongation of the war, which can only add to slaughter without affecting the inevitable result, must be regarded as an inexcusable act of criminal folly, and if determined upon by the Tsar cannot fail to excite to fever-heat the protest being made throughout European Russia. With a contented people at home, with every national nerve strained to amend the disaster, with every Russian soldier prepared to impede the progress of the Japanese with his life, it might be possible for the Tsar to save half of Manchuria and the fortress of Vladivostok. But with revolution knocking at the gatesof the palace in which the great autocrat finds himself a fear-kept prisoner, and with the anti-war party already dominating country, though not its Government, the Tsar's attitude can only react upon himself. The French bankers are evidently of this opinion, and are no longer ready to risk their money in Russian loans. From Washington, the source of much authentic news concerning the Far East, has come the report that a secret treaty between the combatants may be expected which will bring the war to a sudden termination.

Speaking ot the general authenticity of Washington reports, it should be understood that the American Government is not likely to be any better informed than the British, the French, or the German. But while in the European capitals, the intelligence received by the respective Foreign Offices is usually kept secret, in Washington the highest officials do not appear to have any hesitation in making public what they " think' may happen, these opinions being necessarily based on the latest official intelligence. We may. therefore, consider

it exceedingly probable that the opposition of the Tsar is not directed go* much against the idea of corning to terms as . against the nature of terras upon which the Japanese Government has indirectly informed him she will insist, and which his advisers urge him to _ accept. Why terms which emphasise the complete and unchallenged victory of Japan should be kept, "secret" is, easily understood. To some extent it would save the dignity of Russia, for though the text of any treaty would have to be communicated to the respective allies and friends of the contracting Powers— Japan to England and America, by Russia to France and Germany could be communicated in confidence and publicity be avoided. The world in general and the Russian people in particular could thus be kept in ignorance of what had actually been agreed upon, a concession of great importance to the Russian Government, and not in any way distasteful to Japan. For Japan, beings Asiatic, is inclined to be secretive, and in this case would not miss any of the prestige of victory. It is possible, of course, that conditions might be insisted upon which would place France and Germany in an unenviable position. After the war of 1893 between Japan and China, France, Germany, and Russia combined to prevent Japan from reaping in Corea the fruits of her victory. France is no Jonger prepared to make common cause with Russia in the Far East, and Germany lias maintained a masterly silence since the Japanese gave convincing proof of their ability to take care of themselves. Both in Paris and in Berlin they may prefer to wink at a nominally " secret" treaty rather than have it publicly known that their diplomacy had taken fright. Nor is it now a question of Corea. Manchuria is also in Japanese hands, and although we may assume that it: will be restored to the suzerainty of China it is unreasonable to expect that Japan will not take steps to secure it against the possibility of another Russian seizure. This would be easier for all the Powers to admit, if done with their tacit consent. For various reasons, therefore, an unpublished treaty would be the simplest and most satisfactory escape from the entanglement that, resulted from Russia's ill-starred adventure in the Far East, and from the countenance and support given to her by both France and Germany.