THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1904. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WAR.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 12653, 6 September 1904, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1904. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WAR.

m> < ■■ The forcing of Kuropatkin from his strongly-fortified position at Liaoyang gives to the Japanese comparatively easy approach to the country before Mukden, where we may expect the Russians to make another stand. As ;we pointed out some months ago, the ancient capital of Manchuria is the apparent objective of Japanese strategy for the campaign of 1904. Kuropatkin has made a futile effort to stem their advance on the faitse River, with Liao-yang as his base; having lost that line of j defence he must necessarily continue : his sullen retreat to the carefullyprepared posts which are designed for the protection of Mukden. Owing to the rigid censorship exercised at* the telegraph offices by both Japanese and Russians and to the confusion unavoidably induced by the scanty reports allowed to pass or officially circulated, dealing with extensive military movements in a strange land of insignificant villages, fearfully and wonderfully named, mistaken impressions of what is actually going on are frequently created. But there is reason to conclude that KuropatkiD's line of retreat upon Mukden is still open to him through his grasp upon the railway not being loosed, Kuroki's great flanking movement not having broken that indispensable line of Russian communication. It may be doubted whether the Japanese strategists actually anticipated the precipitation of such a catastrophe upon their desperate enemies, for the. turning of Kuropatkin's eastern flank by Kuroki had the immediate effect of compelling that evacuation of the Liao-yang position which was held by the Russians for a week against the most impressive frontal attack. We may fairly assume that to force this evacuation was the Japanese purpose, since their flanking movement left to Kuropatkin no apparent alternative to retreat than to attempt to cover bis threatened railway as well as to hold Liao-yang with an 1 army barely sufficient for the latter duty. This explains the sudden collapse of the Russian defence of Liao-yang after several days of doubtful—-and therefore, to them, j successful—fighting. To save his j railway communication Kuropatkin had to abandon 9 position he had evidently hoped to hold, for he had prepared it with immense labour and supplied it with abundant military stores which had to be destroyed to prevent their falling into Japanese hands. The Russians can hardly be said to have been outfought at Liaoyang, but they were certainly outgeneralled. Again the Russians.are in retreat with the Japanese pressing upon their rearguard. Probably we shall witness a repetition of the Liaoyang incidence when Kuropatkin reaches Mukden, though before then a series of minor battles will attest the sullenness of the Muscovite retreat and the vigour of the Japanese pursuit. And we must always bear in mind that as the struggle slowly moves along the thin thread of railway, that enables armies to move

more freely amid the boggy roads and swampy fiats ": of Southern Manchuria the Japanese aye tirelessly ■ repairing the damage inflicted by the Russians to way culverts and bridges and making use of this great work of the Russian engineers to keep in easy communication with their bases by means of .their own rolling stock. Their hundreds of great guns will thus follow Kuropatkin from Liaoyang to Mukden and their reinforcements train from the coast to the new scene of strife. From the south the Japanese, from the north the Russians, will bring over this fateful railway guns, men, and munitions of war to the already outlined battle-ground of Mukden. Meanwhile, Port Arthur is important as occupying the attention of a great body of Japanese troops who otherwise would be marshalled to swell the already pronounced numerical superiority of the army that is driving Kuropatkin before it. Its valiant defence is therefore of measureable and very great advantage, and its fall would be severely felt at Mukden. As we have heretofore stated, its resistance has evidently dissippointed the Japanese, who realise to the fullest the necessity for securing the greatest possible results from the season's campaign, but they have won Liao-yang without the aid of its besiegers and may well hope to win Mukden in the same way. With the idea of carrying Port Arthur by assault, picked and veteran Japanese troops were directed against it, so that it may be said to occupy the attention and divert the energies of one of the finest armies that Japan could place in the field. That Port Arthur must fall sooner or later is inevitable, but while it holds out it is entirely justifying, from a strategical point of view, the great expense of its fortification and the self-sacrifice of its garrison. But whatever its immediate fate, there can be no doubt that the Japanese will make exhaustive efforts to occupy Mukden before the coming of winter. They will attempt to force Kuropatkis to evacuate it as they have just forced him to evacuate Liap-yang, by striking at his rear, or they will endeavour to carry it by assault if he determines to allow its investment in the hope of the siege being raised by a rescuing army from Harbin. Foi Mukden is the ancient capital of Manchuria, the seat of authority among a people to whom prestige and authority mean very much more than they do to any Europeans. Its possession is as

the possession of the golden stool to the Ashantees, is the. symbol of sovereignty, the proof of dominion. From Mukden the Japanese can issue decrees which every Manchurian , will instinctively recognise as having weight, can consistently offer to China the restoration of Chinese authority, which means among other things the raising of Manchurian regiments if ifc should be found necessary to resort to that very legitimate device. Granted that Mukden falls, which does not require a very vivid imagination after the many examples given us of Japanese strategy and courage, all Southern Manchuria will have bees wrested from the treacherous occupation of Russia, and only Northern- Manchuria will remain in dispute. Already we have indications of the preparations being made for this northern campaign. The island of Saghalien, really one of the Japanese group, which has been made notorious through its use as a Russian convict station lor criminals of. the worst type—including women who have been wicked enough, in defiance of the Tsar, to teach their fellow creatures how to read and writewill be occupied and used as a base against Vladivostok, from which, port Harbin can be ; reached as easily as from Mukden. It has been openly stated by Japanese officials that the ceding of Sag- J halien by Russia will be one of the conditions of peace, so that its .occupation will have ~ more than strategical significance. But amid all these anticipations we must not overlook the existence of the TransSiberian railway which is training reinforcements and supplies from Russia to, Manchuria as fast as the single line and insufficient rolling stock can carry them. The Japanese themselves never overlook it, as we may see by the energy with which they are driving home their advantage while they can maintain a numerical superiority without draining their internal resources.