THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1904. THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 12624, 3 August 1904, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1904. THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

The Fall of Port Arthur—'which may be announced at any moment cannot fail to enormously affect the immediate progress of the RussoJapanese War. For although the great stronghold has been practically invested for weeks, it has held the attention of not less than 80,000 Japanese troops and of the roost powerful squadron of the Japanese fleet. Its defence was therefore of great strategical importance to the Russians, for Kuropatkin was thereby relieved from the pressure of the large army required to invest it and Vladivostok similarly secured from the attack of the co-operating Japanese squadron. A garrison that stayed from the field an investing army of quadruple its own number and a fleet markedly stronger than the vessels that sheltered under its guns was obviously in exceedingly active service, and would continue to be an invaluable factor in Russian strategy as long as it could hold out. It was not enough for the Japanese generals to sit quietly down and wait until Port Arthur was starved into surrender. To release their own superior forces and fleet they were compelled to adopt the more costly but more expeditious method of persistent attack. The Fall of Port Arthur means that the frontal movement upon Mukden will be strengthened by the addition of 80,000 seasoned and victorious troops, who can be speedily pushed to the scene of operations along the railway line already in Japanese hands. Anticipating this, the Russians are in full retreat, for, according to General Kuropatkin's own account, a desperate rearguard action was fought on Sunday last, which resulted in the rearguard itself being forced back upon Haicheng. It is evident from this that the Russian retirement northward, along the railway, is being hastened, obviously to escape from a position in which its flanks are being constantly threatened and in which it might be trapped when the Japanese are able to bring their investing army to the assistance of the field army that has already shown itself more than a match for the Russians. But the clear gain to the Japanese of 80,000 veteran troops is only a part of the cdvantage which the Fall of Port Arthur will bring to them. They will either capture or find destroyed the considerable remnant of a very fine fleet, and they will come into possession of a base which is of exceptional value as long as they hold command of the sea. It has a secure harbour, modern facilities and direct connection with the railway along which the campaign is now being fought. It provides them with an ideal sea-door to the theatre of war, which in victory simplifies their arrangements and in defeat, secures their retreat—as long as they command the sea. From the naval point of view the Japanese have as much to gain by the Fall of Port Arthur as from the military. There would seem to be little doubt that among the minor ! incidents in which they have been disappointed in their expectations we may count the comparative failure to " bottle up" Port Arthur, I / ' 1

This has prevented them from making any effective attack upon Vladivostok, which still remains an open Russian port. For Port Arthur has not only required continuous matching from the sea by a superior squadron to that which it has sheltered, but the work of escorting troopships has- been greatly increased owing to the seas not having been completely freed from hostile fleets or from, the possibility of the sudden appearance of hostile fleets. By the Fall of Port Arthur the Japanese fleets will be strengthened even more effectively than the Japanese land forces, for ships cannot be multiplied as easily as armies. The closing of Vladivostok will certainly be the next important naval movement, accompanied by the hunting down of every Russian ship in the Pacific, a consummation devoutly to be wished in the interests of neutral commerce. It is safe to assume that the operations against Vladivostok will be similar in kind, though smaller in degree, to those which have been directed against the much more important station of Port Arthur. The landing of troops to cut the line that runs from Vladivostok to junction with the Port Arthur system at Harbin, followed by a simultaneous attack with land and sea forces, is the obvious plan. Nor can the issue be doubtful. Within a month after the Fall of Port Arthur we may see.the northern port also in Japanese hands, and hear of the. commencement of another great " flanking movement" from the latter base. Unless Kuropatkin can check such a Japanese advance westward from Vladivostok it will be of no avail for him to make a successful stand at Mukden, which otherwise would be his necessary aim. For a. victorious Japanese advance upon Harbin by either route endangers Russian communications on the other route, the branching railways forming the sides of a right angle with their junction at Harbin. Regard for this danger originated the Kuropatkin plan of retiring upon Harbin itself, where a united front can be presented to any Japanese attack unless the attacking army leaves the railway and strikes across country. Bearing it in mind we can perceive the great advantage which the command of the sea gives to the Mikado. Twenty troopships can convey fifty thousand men from a home port to Vladivostok or to Port Arthur with equal ease, or from one base to the other, while the Russians can only move slowly and in sections over the single-lined railways with their limited rolling stock. So that when Vladivostok becomes a Japanese base- Kuropatkin cannot venture to concentrate his forces towards Mukden until he has sufficient reinforcements to keep the Harbin-Vladivostok railway against any possible "flanking movement." Which brings us again to the fact that the Russians are struggling desperately to gain time and that the Japanese are straining every nerve to make the most of this season's campaign.