THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, JUNE 25, 1904. THE MANCHURIAN OUTLOOK.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 12609, 25 June 1904, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, JUNE 25, 1904. THE MANCHURIAN OUTLOOK.

fan extraordinary energy with, which the Japanese are prosecuting the war in Southern Manchuria is probably due to the time limit set oh the campaign by the approaching rainy season. The middle of the northern summer is signalised in Gorea and Manchuria by a tremendous and continuous downpour, which Hoods every creek, converts plains into lagoons, and changes the always bad track* into veritable bogs. So that by the end of July, at the latest, extensive military operations must bo temporarily checked unless the Japanese defy all military opinion, and continue their progress against apparently invincible natural difficulties. AS heavy artillery and the unavoidably cumbersome supplies of modern armies must be moved in a practically roadless country, it is safe to assume that the Japanese have ah objective point at which they are aiming, and which they intend to reach 4 before the setting in of the annual Manchurian deluge. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this objective point is beyond MuKden, the ancient capita! of the province, the occupation of which would not only give them unchallenged possession of all Southern Manchuria outside Port Arthur, but bring to them that prestige of victory which counts for so much in the Asiatic m?iul At the present time, such a conclusion to the initial campaign of the war seems an exceedingly likely one, for the Russians at-* undoubtedly being beaten in a masterly manner by the skill of the Japanese commanders, the bravery of the Japanese troops, and the perfect armament and Unprecedented commissariat of' the Japanese War Office. We may expect to hear within a few days of the capture of Stakleberg's forces, of the surrender of Port Arthur, and of the continued driving back of Kuropatkin. The capture of Mukden and the secure of Vladivostok will not be long delayed unless some unforeseen happenings turn the tide of war. Should these feats be successfully accomplished before the setting in of the rainy season, Japan may proudly claim that in a single campaign, and by an unbroken series of profound naval and military movements, she has broken the domination of Russia in the Far East. And nothing is more likely. These events are, indeed, so extremely probable that we can Well imagine Kuropatkin to be fighting desperately for time, and straining every nerve to prevent a stampede, which would throw not only half but the whole of Manchuria to Japan before he secured breathing time. For the delay which the rainy season will enforce is is a measure advantageous to the Russians. It will allow them to reorganise their shattered forces for the defence of Harbin, and to draw reinforcements and supplies along the thin line of the trans-Siberian railway. With Corea in practically complete possession j

of tiife enemy, .;. with Southern Matt- \ churia lost, and with the open sea 1 closed in their faces, the Russian prospectß trill even then be dreary enough. But they may by now be so crestfallen as to be encouraged if they can cling to Harbin, and avoid being ignominiously expelled from Manchuria by a single sweep of the Japanese sword. \* After the summer rains there ii comparatively little interlude in Northern Manchuria before the setting in of the severe winter This season is generally said to, be favourable to the hardy and accustomed Russians, and, if they can prolong their occupation until snow covers the ground, the task of finally expelling them into their own territory may be left by the Japanese until next year. And if the Government of the Tsar doggedly persists in the struggle, and in the lace of internal dissatisfaction and financial difficulties continues to dribble troops arid supplies along the railway, and to weed out the incompetency and cor* ruption which has helped to bring it to this pass, Kuropatkin will certainly be able to present a stronger front in 1808 than he could possibly do hi 1904. 11l any case* it is around Harbin that we are likely to see the most desperate fighting, lor that commanding point gives to. its possessor the dominion ol Northern Manchuria and the key to both, the Vladivostok and .Port Arthur Aatlways. And if the Japanese prove as determined to wrest the Whole of Manchuria tss& Russia aft their opponents may bo to retain ! even part of the .province, there will be aroiind Harbin sifch a holocaust '-61 human life as may appal the civilised world, aM recall the fearful fields of barbaric Europe. With haif-&-millioh determined men opposed on either side, and able generalSj reckless of human life* striving against each other for national Victory, war will he displayed in all its horrors and with all its terrors. But if the Japanese succeed in driving the Russians from Manchuria, as they seem quite able to do—whether this year or is no great room for doubt as to what will follow. For the Japanese have Officially announced their intentions. They will assert suzerainty over Oorea and restore Manchuria to China. Nor is it necessary for them to wait for the consent of ftussia or for the cessation of hostilities to invite the Chinese Government to resume an' occupation' which it has never officially , surrendered, and which is held to be still in existence by the diplomatic conventions of all civilised countries. It is hardly probable that anything Will be done as long as Russia keeps a looting in the province, for it does not seem to be the Japanese policy to draw China Unnecessarily/ into war. ■ Hut When'".' the Russians . are expelled, Pekin will certainly be invited to resume control. There is no reason why she should hot do SO, and no reason whatever why Japanese officers and instructors should hot train the Manehurifttt army of China to resist invasion, Russian or otherl- - 'We have t&ne the same thiftg': in Egypt, and as we only interfered in figypfc to protect the ; Khedive ; the Japanese only interfered in Manchuria to protect ~ Chinese interests-— incidentally * we: both protested tint" own interests. If Russia persists in attempting to invade Manchuria after beiiag expelled, it will certainly be "an unfriendly act'' to the Chinese Government, which will fee established, ill forma) possession. Nor do we think that any European Power, either Prance or Germany, will wish tfe interfere with $ such a reasonable and foregone , conclusion, in view of the obvious folly Of needlessly putting One's fingers into such a wasp's nest as the Far last has turned out to be; As for Britain and America, it will be a solution entirely to their liking whatever elements of possible future peril it may contain It is enough for our pre- 1 sent concerns that Russia should be effectively turned out of Manchuria, j at somebody else's expense, *p ;