NOTES AND COMMENTS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XL, Issue 12212, 6 March 1903, Page 4

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

THE KING AND HIS MINISTERS. - In connection with the statement cabled from the London Daily Mail recently, to the effect that the King was exercising no inconsiderable influence on questions of Imperial policy, the following extract from a letter from Mr. Sidney Lee, the able and learned biographer of Queen Victoria, will be read with interest :—■'? There is no ground for the suspicion that any revolutionary change in the relation of the Sovereign with his Ministers has taken place during the last two years. The King is perfectly familiar with the limitations which binding usage sets on the exertion of Royal influence in politics. The Prime Minister has been trained in a school which identifies his office with practically absolute political power. The coil of tradition which now encircles the Prime Minister's office is far too heavy to permit him suddenly to surrender any essential part of his power or influence to the Sovereign. The current gossip in effect assumes that in the negotiations with Germany the Prime Minister has exchanged iris place in the Constitution with the King. Such an assumption is a bubble that cannot be pricked, too quickly. Every schoolboy knows that the Sovereign has long since been deprived by statute or binding precedent of personal power in all the important spheres of government. Although a very small knowledge of the conversation or correspondence that was constantly passing between the late Queen and ner Ministers is sufficient to prove the point, it does not seem to be equally well understood that Royal influence can only work along well-defined and very restricted lines. : The Sovereign can under the Constitution ho more initiate a policy for Ministers to follow, or impose upon them by the urgency of his appeal a policy of his own devising, than he can by his sole authority promulgate a new law. In the domain of foreign affairs especially custom requires the Ministers to acquaint the Sovereign with the intentions of the Government before definitely ■ committing the country to any specific course of action. v .That is the sole;obligation which an unalterable tradition imposes : on„ the Minister in his relations with the Sovereign as far as foreign affairs are concerned.V' s The Sovereign on his part solely enjoys the right of .criticising' the ] Minister's • proposal' '" But

usage forbids the Minister to attach tc"tt»Royal criticisms any paramount force. '':;«'?' the Minister deems those criticisms to be of '% any value, he has it in his power to atfopb '" them; but, in accordance with admitted cus '1 torn, he invariably treats them MUna u , i thoritative suggestions, and is entitled to ''' : ignore them altogether, without in any way ' prejudicing his relations with the Sovereign. J In no conceivable circumstances can the Go'. vernmenf s action in high matters o.f politics originate suddenly and unprovokedly with 1 the King. The Sovereign is debarred by ' usage from offering formal advice to '- the Minister on any political question. No authentic knowledge of political affairs is at ? his disposal until the Ministerial decision M communicated to him in its " completeness. In his private capacity the Sovereign naturally forms his own opinion of passing events. Informally he may express a hope that a certain course may be followed by his Ministers before he receives from them any official intimation of the position of affairs. But , tradition compels him to express his personal views, when they are unsolicited, in » tentative and interrogative form of words which barely raises them above the level of. an irresponsible suggestion, and certainly robs them of anything approaching the character of an authoritative command or pro- ' nouncement. No trace of subservience has been suffered to survive in the Minister manner of correspondence with the Sover- ~ eign. The uninvited recommendation of the Crown is treated by the Minister in much ' the same style as a recommendation coming to him from a private,subject. Tho reply • ordinarily takes the form of a simple non possumus. Custom prohibits' the Minister from allowing his final decision to be controlled effectively by the Royal wishes pr hopes." ,

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION. Dr. Stoyan Michailowski, the general chairman of the Macedonian Committees, and a late member of the Sobranje, and professor at the University of Sofia, has drawn ' up the following summary of the Macedonian .case, which will enable those who read it to form a more intelligent conception of the question : —"The indifference or distrust shown by the Western Powers, who alone are in a position to act effectually, towards the Macedonian population arises chiefly from a misconception of both the Turkish attitude and our own. It is absurd to regard the Macedonian bands as 1 brigands. They could not have existed for a quarter of a century without possessing the sympathies of the populace. It would be equally absurd for the border States to prevent their entering Turkey, for they ara Turkish subjects, and for political offences committed on Turkish territory they cannot be prosecuted outside. Besides, the Macedonians in the border States number some 200,000, and 01 these some 5000 or 6000, in Bulgaria for instance, belong to the leading professional classes. These form the nucleus of those constitutional committees which direct the general movement. The revolutionary committees in Macedonia are the subordinate executive, and the vanguard of their forces and staff are veterans - of the Bulgarian wars. The obstinate refusal of the Porte to grant us the promised reforms is practically founded on its adroit comprehension of the divergencies and jealousies existing among the Powers, but a fai more deeply rooted psychological cause is to be found in the racial and religious prejudice of the Moslem against progress in any sphere. The 'Capitulations' extorted by the Powers by force oi arms will never be recognised as such by the Mussulman. > From his point of view the ' infidels' have no rights. The Sultan, as head of the Believers* may .grant them temporary favours and ' privileges,' but these are only of value so long as Islam is not the stronger materially. Thus the implied reforms could never be considered as permanently guaranteed, and the weakness of the European Concert prevents their being carried into effect, even for a time. Macedonia has no alternative resource against the Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Slavism is as yet out a word af d ft theory. Besides, the Macedonians have no desire to exchange one form of absolutism for another, although any Government would be more acceptable than the present. A Russian move towards the ' Young Slavfl' <W the Balkans would imply a corresponding move towards the Slav population of Aus-tria-Hungary. Such a move would be im- ! mediately checked by the latter Empire* whose action would receive the impatient support of Germany in her anxiety to lay! the foundations of a new dominion in the East before the era of a political awakening and the establishment of a Pan-Slav Empire. Tims the neighbouring Powers are paralysed the one by the other, and neither will allow the other to make a bid for the gratitude of the 'Young Slavs.' Only those Westers Powers who have no territorial or racial interests at stake can solve the Macedonian question, and thereby settle the Balkans question consonantly with their own in-< terests.' Macedonia once provided with I local government and allowed free and unfettered development, the petty jealousies of the various States, each bent on self* advancement, would' disappear along witll the opportunity of gratifying their covetousness, and would be succeeded by a general understanding with regard to . the muchdesired Confederation. Confederation in turn an accomplished lact, the new Empire* embracing a population, of fifteen to twenty millions, would be strong enough to resist) foreign influence and foreign aggression; l the possibility of friction between the two great neighbouring States would be removed,, and the result would make for the peace of Europe." . - •