THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1902. SECOND CHAMBERS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 12066, 9 September 1902, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDA Y, SEPTEMBER 9, 1902. SECOND CHAMBERS.

Those who regard second chambers as doomed, owing to the glaring anomaly presented in a democratic, community by such a body as inLegislative Council, may find much food for reflection in the stand which has been made in Federal legislation by the Australian Senate. The occasion has been the Tariff. Although considerable effort has been made to deprecate the conten- | ti'on that a constitutional question | has arisen, it is clearly to be seen, i from this impartial distance, that the I " Upper House" has set itself per- ! sistently and logically to assert its j co-ordinate power in money bills. The Commonwealth Constitution declares that the Senate may not originate money bills- It further enacts that the Senate may not amend proposed laws imposing taxation. But, in this relation, the Sen- | ate is empowered to '' request" omisI sions. or amendments to be made, i which " requests" the House of ."Representatives may attend to '"'it it thinks fit." Thus stands the Constitution. In dealing with the Tariff, which is a money bill in every sense of the word, the Senate discussed it item by item and embodied its findings in a long series of "requests," in some of which the House of Representatives concurred, deny- | ing others. But the Senate "ini sisted." Again the House demurred. ! Again the Senate insisted." If we have not here a. very pretty constitutional question it is hard to say what a constitutional question is. The Commonwealth Constitution is ; largely the child of Sir Samuel I Griffith, now Chief Justice of Queensland, who has said, apropos of just such differences as that which has arisen: "A strong Senate will compel attention to its suggestions ; a weak one would not insist on its amendments." The present Australian Senate is undoubtedly a strong one, and all the stronger because its reductions in various tariff items will appeal to a host of sympathisers if resort has to be made to the elec- , tors. The question is to be again I considered to-day, in Melbourne, and the result will be looked for with the deepest interest by all who take an interest in. the evolution of legislative methods. In our own colony such a contention by our Legislative Council as that advanced by the Australian Senate would be impossible. But our councillors represent nobody but themselves and the Government, while the Commonwealth Senators represent the people of the Austrai lian States, as States. Ib is very | true that the House of Representaj tives is more proportionately representative of the people of Australia, the proportions of population in the j various States being:—New South Wales, 36; Victoria, 33; Queenslaud, 12 ; South Australia, 10 ; "West Australia, 5 ; Tasmania, 4. But the moral weight which this might give to the House, as against that attaching to a Senate in which the States are represented equally, is offset by very potent influences. . In the first place, the two great States arc divided against one another on the fiscal issue, and in the smaller States the balance is very nicely adjusted, so much so that without the Labour support the Barton Administration could not hold office and was easily defeated in the House a few days ago owing to the temporary secession of that doubtful vote. And in the second place, the strongest politicians in Australia being in the Commonwealth Senate its influence upon the country at large must be exceedingly great if a constitutional struggle took place upon a question in which hundreds of thousands of voters would heartily support them. We can the better realise the situation if we imagine our Legislative Councillors, instead of being the mere nominees of Mr. Seddon, being representative of the provinces and • elected by a provincial vote, each province having equal representation. Such a second chamber might , well hold its own against the lower , house, all the more so as it would inevitably draw to itself the stronger ' and more provincial }y prominent ' politicians. Speaking of second chambers, it is to be remarked that so far from modern democracy exhibiting any : tendency to eliminate them, they ■ everywhere renew their strength and , vigour by being made represenfca- i tive. The British House of Commons 1 i

has completely overshadowed the House of Lords, and has absolutely seized the reins of Imperial power. In every colony where nominee appointment continues the sauie paralysis has crept over the second chamber. But in France, as in the United States, the Senate is the superior body, the most influential, the most reputable, the most powerful. And if the Referendum were adopted in either of these eountiies it would very probably still further diminish the power and prestige of the other chamber while, leaving the Senate hardly a&ected. This process will almost certainly he found repeated ha the Commonwealth. The broad constituency of a Senate limits the choice of a senator to the comparatively few men who are known throughout the whole of it and exclude-' the great number of those who might; hope for success within the much narrower electorate of a member of a House of Representatives. In the United Slates, of course, senators are elected—two from each State— the State legislatures, but If. is doubtful if this method attains noticeably different resumes to what would happen if Senatorial elections were taken direct, pari in by the electors of the State. At any rate, no weakness has arisen from any popular beliefs that the United States Senate is not fully representative. If it lie the experience of other democratic communities that a. second chamber, elected upon a common franchise, but from wider electorates, has a useful place in modern democracy, it would be well for us to consider such a- reform in this colony. For our present Legislative Council has no apparent place in our political system. The Australian House of Representatives has very evidently a restraining force "in another place;" our New Zealand House of Representatives lias none—so long as it does the bidding of the present Administration.