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THE BRITISH NAVY.

DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT.

VIEWS OF LORD CHARLES

BERESFORD.

POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT. SPEECH BY MR. ARNOLD FORSTER. By Telegraph —Press Association.—Copyright, (Received June 22, 5.21 p.m.) London, June 21. In the course of a naval debate in the House of Commons on the Admiralty Estimates Lord Charles Beresford said the Government were doing their utmost to make the Mediterranean fleet one-fourth stronger than in 1901. The number of torpedo-catchers has been doubled, while the stores were 80 per cent, better. The Admiralty system of administration, however, was rotten. The naval reserve amounted to 20,000 instead of 80,000 possessed by one of Britain's enemies. The engineering department was a thousand short. "Without trained stokers boilers were worse than useless. Nobody at the Board of Admiralty was directly responsible for naval efficiency. One Government was ejeotod because there was no cordite. Later they discovered there were no gufts, and in 1901 they were short of coal. What was wanted was some individual or Department responsible for requirements in detail, and to submit demands to those responsible to Parliament. A vigorous debate followed. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman said lie did not believe the First Lord of the Admiralty ever disregarded the views of the first sea lord. Sir Charles Dilke complained of vacillation, instancing the Wei-hai-Wei School of Naval Strategy. Sir John Colomb hoped the colonies would be reminded of their obligations. Mr. E. Robertson (Dundee) recommended Parliamentary Committees of general control. Mr. Arnold-Forster, Secretary to the Admiralty, said the supply of coal was extended proportionately to the means of storing and was not the result of any agitation. Similarly, as regards the fleet, ships were sent to the Mediterranean because they were completed. All the fleets had been strengthened. The Intelligence Department of the navy had been strengthened. It would be disastrous, he said, to refer scientific details to a Parliamentary Committee. He recognised the need of some reinforcement in the intellectual equipment which might direct the enormous forces of the Empire, also the value, even in their present not wholly developed form, of the Intelligence Departments of both services. But ithere were questions outside the purview of either of those bodies acting independently. There was room for a greater amount of preparation in advance. Regarding the defence of the Empire he was not sanguine of the possibility of improvising in a year or even a quinquennium or a decade an organisation enabling them to do all that was desirable. The present Board was aware of the deficiencies of the navy and alert in remedying them. The debate was adjourned. The Times says Mr. Arnold-Fors- j ter's speech was probably the most important declaration of the higher policy of defence since the Duke of Devonshire's announcement that the Government and Admiralty had accepted sea supremacy as the basis of Imperial defence. What was wanted was an organic executive Government to see the problem steadily as a whole, namely, a special department superior to the Admiralty and War Office taking the widest purview. The declaration* committed the Government and Admiralty only to a policy of placing defence on a national and intelligible basis, LORD CHARLES BERESFORD'S NAVAL SCHEME. The following was published some time ago as a summary of Lord Charles Jieresford's naval scheme: — I.—administration. (A) Addition to the Board of Admiralty of a " Naval War Lord," on whom shall devolve the preparation of our organisation for war, and on whom the responsibility for placing the full requirements necessary for efficiency before Parliament shall devolve: by which means real responsibility will be fixed and assurance made positive that our organisation for defence is run on business-like lines. (B) The placing at the heads of the various departments, under this official, of the ablest specialists that the service produces. IT—COAL SUPPLY. The purchase of coalfields, both at Home and in the colonics, by the Government, so that the supplies for the navy shall never be affected by strikes, etc. lII.—ORGANISATION TOR WAR. (A) The keeping of a correct and up-to-date register of all auxiliaries wanted for the fleet, so that the Government shall at any moment be able to place their hand on the number required at any given moment. (B) The keeping of " pattern vessels" of all auxiliaries in commission with service squadrons in peace time. (C) The abolition of all warships useless to fight and vatlleless from lack of speed. RESERVES (A) The keeping of a register of skilled artisans and others, not necessarily sailors by profession, who could on emergency be called on to fill certain ratings in men-of-war. Such men to be duly enlisted as " reservists," and paid a retaining wage. 'B) The introduction of a modified short service system in which all men join for 12 years as now, but a percentage will be allowed to leave after six years' service: such, however, to be a privilege, not a right, exactly as is row the case with men going to coastguard. TRAINING. (A)—To obtain youngei admirals by— 1. Promotion by selection of younger commanders and captains. 2. Increase of Rear-Admirals' list. 3. Retirement of Rear-Admirals (on retired nay of Vice-Admiral) if they have passed thivo years without hoisting their flag. . (Ti) Establishment of exercise squadrons in lieu of useless ships now " showing the flag" on foreign stations, and thus providing squadrons to give captains tactical training. (C) Increase of " combined manoeuvres," and army and navy combined manoeuvres, to be. held vearlv at all naval bases. (D! Seaman gunners who are first-class shots and qualified a» captain of gun to be paid as skilled mechanics. VI.MOBILISATION. At as early a date as possible the whole war fleet lie mobilised ojice to test organisation and discover weak points, on the principle of passing water through the hoses of a fire service to prove its efficiency to act when required.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19020623.2.28

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 11999, 23 June 1902, Page 5

Word Count
970

THE BRITISH NAVY. New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 11999, 23 June 1902, Page 5

THE BRITISH NAVY. New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 11999, 23 June 1902, Page 5