THE TACTICS OF THE FUTURE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIX, Issue 9028, 5 November 1892, Page 10 (Supplement)

THE TACTICS OF THE FUTURE.

At a time when the subject of tactics is en

gaging so much attention throughout the Continent of Europe it may bo well to review an article by Bronsart von Schellendorff. The author of the pamphlet before us, who died recently, held many high and responsible positions on the Gorman General Staff, and gained for himself a reputation as a profound thinker, as well as an able and practical leader of men in the field. The scope of the treatise under notice is defined as being restricted solely " to the considera-

tion of certain questions arising from the issue of the new 4 Drill Regulations ami Musketry Instructions,' which have been so much discussed in Germany.'' The idea in England was until lately—i.e., until the German military students took steps to upset the reasoningthat cavalry were more or less effete and useless. It must be satisfactory, therefore, to all chose interested in the mounted service to find such an authority as Von Schellendorff ranging himself on their side and condemning the arguments against them in language which is at once forcible and conclusive. "No one," the German author goes on to say, " now expects cavalry to undertake without further ado such a role as that played by it in the time of Frederick 11. on the battlefields of the Silesian War. The unfavourable condition alone that has arisen in regard to its numbers as compared with infantry forbids this.'' The proportion during the Thirty Years' War was, cavalry to infantry, 1 *1A ; in tlie Seven Years' War it was 1"24 ; in the Napoleonic it was 15. It is now l'lO, and even less in most cases. This, of course, makes a great difference as to its capacity for carrying out the work really assigned to

it. Its tactics, therefore, must be modified to meet the exigencies of the hour. "Our cavalry," writes Von Schellendorff, "must drive away the enemy's horsoinen everywhere, provide thoroughly for the duty of reconnaissance, and choose well the moment for its attack on the other arms—i.e., benefit by the surprise and the tactical disorder of the enemy. It cannot then be prevented acting decisively in the fight and gaining a victory." But as long as this power is vested in it, as long as it remains with a well-led force of cavalry to ride on to the scone of action and decide the issues of infantry struggles, it can scarcely be said with any degree of justification, as has been said so many times in England, that the days of cavalry are past anil gone.

And as to infantry, what says Von Schellendorff under this head? " Now, as before, it will be required to drive the enemy from their position, if necessary by a hand-to-hand struggle. To do this even forty years ago with smooth-boro muskets and smooth-bore guns a fire zone had to be crossed, extending, in the case of artillery, from 1640 to 1310 yards, and of infantry from 330 to 220 yards. In fact, the fire of both artillery and infantry has increased in its effect; threefold, therefore the effect of fire to be borne by the troops is very much more deadly than formerly. The effect of their own fire has increased equally, it is true, and that of the artillery supporting them. Bub their advantages to the assailant are not fully utilised, for a skilfullyposted defender only allows a very small mark in the front line, and those further retired can be withdrawn more or less from the enemy's fire by making use of the features of the grounds. In all circumstances it must be admitted that the infantry in the next big war will have a task the solution of which is fraught with great difficulties." The German author holds that " besides skilful leading and judicious training a specially solid discipline will be necessary.'" In order to secure this discipline " the swarm of firing men," it is maintained, is the only fighting formation for infantry. But are these lines to be thin or thick? Ib is argued that the advocates of both are in error.

Thin lines afford, of course, more protection, it has to be remembered, against their own losses ; but, on the other hand, thick ones are calculated to cause greater loss to the enemy by reason of the increased number of rifles which they bring into play. What says the German authority on this subject? We will quote his words :—" Had we nob to follow the old Prussian maxim, 'effect comes before shelter,' we might, once for all, acknowledge ourselves to be adherents of the thin line. And in a similar way one might always employ dense lines were it nob that there are phases in the fight in which it is judicious to spare troops, and the first place must be given to shelter. It is necessary, therefore, in each individual case, to decide upon the employment of one or the other form. The question must bo asked, Shall I acb decisively by fire action ? Then enough rifles cannot be placed in action simultaneously. The firing line musb be brought up to the maximum of fire power, and maintained at it. Or shall I only enter on an introductory or a retaining fire action ? Then it is of less importance to inflict losses on the enemy than it is to keep one's own troops in the best possible condition for the latter decision. With this one's own shelter comes into greater prominence, which is to bo sought not only in the use of the ground, but also in the employment of appropriate formations, as in the thin firing lines. From the introductory or retaining action one pauses to a decisive fight, the thin lines will be brought up to the required degree of density by reinforcement, by which, in the offensive, every new reinforcement will, as a rule, give impulse for a fresh advance."

The whole matter seems to be clenched by Von Schellondorff in the following words:—"Though the swarm of riflemen has become the main fighting formation for infantry, still troops in close formation cannot be dispensed with, and will not be precluded from moving or halting temporarily under effective hostile fire. Otherwise they would nob be able to fulfil their object, for there also effect comes before shelter. YVhab have troop 3 in close formations to do on the battlefield?—and magazine rifles and smokeless powder do not change the situation materially. To begin with, they have to constantly support the advanced and already extended lines in order to maintain the wished-for degree of fire. They have also to guard the flanks of the .advanced lines, and finally to carry through the decisive fight or to secure the success gained," —Army and Navy Gazette