COLONIAL DEFENCES.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXVII, Issue 8360, 13 September 1890, Page 5

COLONIAL DEFENCES.

[BY TELEGRAPH.— SPECIAL IMPORTER.]

Wellington, Friday. A very important report maio by the Imperial Committee on colopal defences, having special reference to (en. Edwards' recommendations, was presented to Parliament by command this evenug. The Imperial Committee »y, at the outset, on account of thoir, geographical position, and of the novi considerable population in all these ebonies, except Western Australia, there is n> British territory so little liable to aggresion as that of Australasia. In view of the armed forces maintained, and the strong spirit which animates them, territorial aggression, except on a large scale, is onto: the question. The endeavour to place sirdl bodios of troops on shore would be to curt disaster, with consequent injury 0 the prestige of any Power whidi attempted such a policy. Any force destined for aggression, oven if saoly landed, must be of a strength sufficient to conquer and hold cither an important stragetic point or a. considerable portion of territory, under the certah condition of losing its communications ry sea transport, for a large expeditionary foco could not be prepared in any of the aivanced bases of any Power without the fart being known, when a corresponding redistribution, if neewsary, of the British navy would be made. Such an expedition, whether despatched from an alvanced base, or from Europe, could not hope to reach its destination untl the British navy had been definitely vorstod. Even then the difficulties and the risks would be so considerable, that in viewof other enterprises of a more hopeful nattre, it is almost inconceivable that the attempt would bo made. History affords no parallel of such difficulties successfully ivercome. An attack upon the Australia! littoral thus reduces itself to raids b an enemy's cruisers, based upon his defended ports. Such raids might bo undertaken to obtain coal which might bo urgently required, or with the object of attempting to extort an indemnity under threat of bombardment. Coal, if on shore, could not be seized even in a port possessing no coast defences, without landing men, and in view of the small crews carried by cruisers, this proceeding would be extremely dangerous. In the face of armed and organised resistance it is inconceivable that any Australasian town would consent to pay blackmail, which the British race have not submitted to for upwards of a thousand years. Moreover, in view of the difficulty of obtaining fresh supplies of ammunition, and the fact that the expenditure of the whole of the shell carried by a squadron of cruisers would fail to work serious destruction upon any large town, and that such a proceeding would inevitably provoke severe reprisals, it is in the last degree improbable that a bombardment would be attempted. Finally, although raids are not absolutely barred by the presence in the Australasian waters of a superior force, the risks they entail are thus greatly increased, and the temptation to undertake them is definitely lessened. The naval force of Great Britain is far superior in the Australian waters to that of any other Power, or combination of Powers, and its strength can, if it were necessary, be increased more rapidly than that of any other Power. The above conditions appear to the Colonial Defence Committee to supply a solid basis upon which the standard of the armaments of the Australasian colonies may safely rest, but although they have been setforth at various times, there has been an evident tendency to ignore them, as pointed out in the Colonial Defence Committee's remarks on Major-General Schaw's report on the defences of New South Wales. It is unfortunate that these principles have not been more widely grasped, since their realisation would unquestionably have prevented the great exaggeration of danger, and the erroneous conception of what is really to be upprehonded, which have from time to time been manifested. Unobstructed routes for the transport of their products are of vital importance to the Australasian colonies, and the most probable danger lies neither in territorial aggression, nor, so long as efficient land forces arc maintained, in raids upon colonial ports, but in the loss of mercantile ships in the neighbourhood of the ports. One of the principal results of the large supercession of sailing vessels by steamers for tho purposes of the mercantile marine is that ordinary peace routes need not be adhered to in ocean passages, so that the capture of vessels on the high seas becomes largely a matter of chance, and the performances of the Alabama could not now be repeated. On tho other hand, this new condition increases the danger to trade at the points of necessary convergence, and in the vicinity of ports defence against dangers of this nature can only be provided by naval means. With these considerations before them, the Colonial Defence Committee are unable to concur with Major-General Edwards in his expression of opinion that it is necessary to complete the concentration of a force of 30,000 or 40,000 men for defence against territorial aggression. This appears to be a contingency so extremely improbable that it need not be taken into account, as one of the requirements of Australian defence. The military preparations of these colonies should, in the opinion of the committee, be based on other grounds. Australia and New Zealand possess an enormous coast line, with dp nerous points, against which such raids as have been referred to might possibly be directed. In the absence of any organised force on shore even a small number of men landed for a short time would be able to inflict grave damage. To meet these requirements it appears to be essential to provide an adequate force well organised, or capable of being rapidly mobilised, since it is at the outset of war that the probability of a raid is greatest. For the purpose of dealing with the class of vessels winch alone will be found in Australasian waters, the 0-inch gun will amply suffice by its great. untidiness and speed of tire, and will prove more effective than those of a heavier calibre. The cost of armaments and implacements rapidly rise as calibres increase, and by restricting-the size of their guns in future the colonies will secure eeonomy.

With reference to tho land forces gene, rally, tho committee consider that the basi of the organisation should be a nucleus o permanent troops, and a " partiallyforce capable of expansion, and it appears most desirable that the conditions of service and training, and, if it can bo arranged, the rates of pay, should be common to all the colonies, and that the same general standard of efficiency should be maintained. The principal of a small cadre battalion, proposed by MajorGeneral Edwards, appears sound, but the committee are unable to regard the rifle companies as at present fulfilling the conditions of a reserve, for while it is undoubtedly most desirable to encourage proficiency in rifle shooting by means of these companies, they appear in some cases to be only private associations, assisted by the colonial Governments, and not under a general obligation to servo in the ranks.- In case of need it would be a doubtful expedient to flood the small battalions with untrained men at tho outset of war, and rifle companies can only be looked upon as a practicable reserve on condition of receiving some drill and training, possessing uniforms, and being accustomed to discipline. The committee consider that all the mounted forces should bo organised, and the probable conditions under which any Australian force would be employed. The general assimilation of uniform, as proposed by Major General Edwards, is most desirable, and a sevice dress should bo adopted. The decision as to pattern is a matter for joint consideration, but the committee agree with Major-General Edwards in deprecating the choice of red as the colour. The adoption of smokeless powder, which will certainly shortly take place, renders it more than ever necessary that troops should not be clothed in a dress of conspicuous colour. The following reference is made to this colony:—" The Colonial Defence Committee have dealt with the defence of New Zealand. In the remarks of the 10th April, 1888, upon Major-General Schaw's report. While generally concurring in Major - General Edwards' recommendations they deprecate the transference of more than half the Naval Artillery. It appears, judging from its numbers, to be a popular force in the colony, and any reduction should be gradual. It would be advisable to introduce the partially-paid system as calculated to give a higher standard of efficiency than as provided by a purely

volunteer force. On account of the distance (1200 miles) which separates New Zealand from Continental Australia, the Colonial Defence Committee consider that the defence of New Zealand must be dealt with independently, and they doubt whether any advantage would be gained by amalgamating the permanent artillery, and submarine force of this colony with those of the remaining colonies. They are of opinion that it is desirable to provide a better weapon than the Snider, but they consider that a total stand of 8000, instead of the 16,000 recommended, would amply suffice."