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New Zealand Herald, Volume XXVII, Issue 8285, 18 June 1890, Page 4

Every now and again we hear of France complaining of England still keeping her troops in Egypt, and calling on her to withdraw them, and within the last few days fresh announcements on the subject come by wire. But while so pertinaciously pressing this call, French statesmen are certainly bound to show what satisfactory guarantee England, if she withdraw her troops, is to obtain in these very unsettled times for the safety of her immense commercial interest in the Suez seaway. France made the Hue/. Canal, but when made it best served those who were able to make most use of it, and so it has come to pass that England being the principal maritime and mercantile nation has now as much tonnage passing through it as all the other nations together; and this fact of being so paramountry interested constitutes, it must be acknowledged, a very practical necessity for having the chief hand in the protection ; especially in exceedingly unsettled times when there is such

talk of war and general preparation for it, and when the whole eastern side of the African Continent, to which Suez is the entrance, has become a lively scene of annexation by various European Governments.

Of course the Suez Canal, like every other gate or passage required for the world's commerce and means of communication ought to be, and let us hope eventually will be, under international control— is protected by the aegis of all the nations. And in recognition of the requirements in our engineering and mercantile activity the two canals now partly cut through Central America are, according to their plans, to possess a neutral zone at each side in each of the two oceans they connect, and which all nations making use of the canal will have to join in guaranteeing. But at the present time at any rate, in what practical form can any such guarantee be given about the safety of the route through Suez if international hostilities should occur? And until she can see her way more clearly on the subject, England, in consideration of her huge commerce by the canal, can fairly refuse to withdraw her troops. If she could obtain any such guarantee it would indeed relieve her from very troublesome and onerous work, already seen in the Egyptian mutiny and the Soudan wars, and the tendency to produce European complications. England is not in Egypt as a matter of choice but of necessity. She is not there to dominate the Suez waterway, and it would not be possible in the present day for any one of the Powers to exclusively control it. She is simply there to see that her own rights are not interfered with if any outbreak of war should happen. But if it were otherwise, and if she aimed at domination, exclusive authority, it would be simply what the late French Emperor aimed at there. While the genius of M. de Lesseps cut the isthmus, it was backed up by the Emperor as affording France a short cut to the East, leaving England the roundabout track by the Cape of Good Hope. It then seemed possible enough, which it is not now, for a single Power to control such a gateway, and ! the France of Napoleon the Third was then the most powerful empire of Europe, that is, of the world. Disraeli, when at the head of affairs in England, retaliated by purchasing from the Khedive of Egypt his shares in the Suez Canal, and as they comprised half the shares, the purchase placed England on an equality with France in the canal-holding and its privileges, and out of which grew the dual Egyptian protectorate. To strengthen England's position in the Eastern Mediterranean and in relation to Suez, the same statesman further got hold of the island of Cyprus. It was a good tiling for that beautiful island which, conspicuous in ancient history and mythology, was then in the usual condition of a Turkish everything in rains as well as the antique, and the dwindled population ground by the exactions of the officials besides the taxes of the Government. A change soon came about with equal law for Moslem and Christian, with the opening of roads, the repairing of harbours, forest-plant-ing on the bare mountain sides, and other beneficial touches of civilisation.

And if Franco cannot, with a good grace, complain of England becoming a partner in the canal which so largely concerns her, neither can she complain, with better grace, of England now exclusively holding the Egyptian Protectorate, inasmuch as that change was broughtabout by the blunder of a French Government. It was Gambetta when at the, head of the French Republic who deprived his country of her position in the dual control. Touched with the ambition to create a large Barbary realm, lie proceeded to add Tunis to Algeria, inconsiderate of the bad impression sure to Ik; thus produced on the Mediterranean nations friendly to France. Italy in particular was furious, for it brought a new French frontier within a few miles of her Sicilian shores ; and moreover, it thwarted her own ambition for African colonisation and conquest, commencing on the opposite seaboard. We can all remember the consequent indignation in Italy, and the excitement likewise in Spain and Austria, for it seemed as if a dictatorship of the Mediterranean was contemplated by the Government in Paris. If Napoleon 111. deserved the gratitude of Italy for aiding her liberation with the sword of France in 1859, and again in 18Gb', by obtaining from Austria the concession of Venetia to the newlyestablished Italian kingdom, the stupid Tunis performance of Gambetta wont far on the other hand to transform a grateful friend into an angry foe. The first result was quickly seen in the retirement of France from the Egyptian Protectorate, and England had then to deal alone with the Egyptian mutiny, because the sending of French troops to Egypt would then have made a tempest of the Mediterranean scare, and called up an anti-Gallic league over Southern Europe.