SIR C. DILKE ON THE ARMY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXV, Issue 9064, 26 May 1888, Page 2 (Supplement)

SIR C. DILKE ON THE ARMY.

HOW IT SHOULD BE REORGANISED. Sir Charles Dilke's series of magazine articles on the British army has not been of a congratulatory character. The inquiry has been searching ruid the criticism severe. It will be readily admitted that many of the hard sayings, if not all, have been justified by the facts. Our army is a veiy expensive and comparatively small and inefficient machine. Its bone and sinew may be as good as ever ; its lighting power, man for man, may be as great; its strategic genius in the higher ranks may be as brilliant; its weapons may be better than at any previous period in our history; but tho brains that direct its organisation, its mobilisation, and its equipment are evidently too light for such a heavy task. The blundering in tho equipment and provisioning of the forces engaged in the Egyptian and Soudan campaigns was inexcusably stupid. If there was such a deplorable want of readiness for those " littlo wars," how much time M'ould be required to prepare for a great war ? Other nations can put enormous armies in tho field at a fortnight's notice, but our War Oilice could not be trusted to do much in that way in less than three months. Yet wo pay more for our army, in proportion to its numerical strength, than any other country. The cost per head of the principal European armies in time of peace is as follows : French, £35 17s ; Garman, £33 15a , Italian, £31 I'M ; Russian, 19s; Austrian, £'22 18s; and the cost of the British army in time of peace is £105 per head. A difference so tremendous can hardly be believed to bo nothing more than the necessary difference between the voluntary system and conscription. Surely when we pay so heavily we should get something approaching perfect efficiency. On this subject destructive criticism is easy—mnch too easy ; and Sir Charles Dilko has not boon sparing in that respect. In his latest article, however, lie lias reached the constructive part of his undertaking, and has not failed to formulate a largo scheme of reorganisation, which indicates and deserves serious thought, lie would divide the active Army into two jwirUs —the one a short-service force, and the other a long-service force for India and the colonies. The Indian army would rest upon its own depots, and not be constantly disarranging the homo battalions by its calls on them for drafts. The colonies would for the most part provide their own carrisons, commanded by trained officers. For the home army the period of service would be three years, and the men would then pass into "the reserve for more than the present full term. This short service would gradually give us either a larger force —active army and reserves together—or a force equal to the present at a loss cost; the argument being that tho larger tho proportion of reserves to the active army the cheaper must be tho organisation for any jriven number of men. Recruits would have the choice of short or long service. Tho First Army Corps would be kept as ready as tho British troops in India ; and the Second Army Corps, which would be built up chietly out of the First-class Reserve, would always have its equipment in readiness. Such are, brictly stated, Sir Charles Dilke's main proposals for tho two great divisions of the army. There are also some bold suggestions regarding tho militia and volunteers. To these forces the army reserves will bo affiliated. Sir Charles would take power to call out the militia for foreign service whenever the First-class Reserve might be called out for the same purpose, and would employ the militia as a second line, or as garrisons for our great fortresses across the sea, thus freeing all the regular troops for active operations. On the First-class Reserve being summoned to tho colours, and the militia taken out of the country, the volunteers would be called up for permanent service in home defence. These would be serious changes, intended to meet serious emergencies. They may appear repulsive in time of peace, but they might be necessary in time of war. The question is, therefore, whether or not they ought to be

carried out as precautionary measures, so that the machinery might bo ready to our hands if it were required in the last resort. It is not a question to be hastily decided, but it is undoubtedly one to bo carefully considered, without any needless delay. On one point we entirely agree with Sir Charles Dilke—namely, that at all our maritime fortresses and coaling stations obsolete guns must be replaced by artillery that will be a match for ships armed with guns of the longest range. Our important stations and ports are parctically defenceless against, powerful ships of war, and no time should be lost in providing them with proper means of defence. There must be no entrance on a game of brag with other nations in respect of a display of military power, but sufficient defensive preparations must not be neglected. It i.s pleasing to pee Sir Charles Dilke devoting his time and ability to this important question. By his exposure of our military weakness, and his suggestion of remedial measures, he has brought the question to the front, and in doing so has done a public service.