THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1887.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIV, Issue 8916, 3 December 1887, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1887.

An apparent mystery hangs over those forged despatches, which are said to have been sent to the Czar for the purpose of making him believe that Germany was secretly antagonistic to Russia's action in Bulgaria. Nor is the mystery likely to be solved by the discovery of the authorship of the alleged documents. And this is tantamount to saying that it is very questionable whether any such despatches ever really existed. At all events, the theory that such communications were necessary to enable the Czar to discern the drift of Bismarck's policy, or that, supposing them to have had a genuine existence, the effect of them was such as to make the Ozar deviate from the course which he would otherwise have pursued towards Bulgaria, is simply untenable. The Czar could see quite as clearly as most people what Bismarck's game was when he astonished Europe by suddenly announcing that, so far as Germany was concerned, Russia might do as she pleased with Bulgaria, or, for the matter of that, with Constantinople as well. That no doubt was meant to encourage Russia in the carrying out of her proposed intervention in Bulgaria; aud the want of unity amonv the Powers was depended on to convey the impression to the Court of St. Petersburg that, when Germany stood clear of the business, no other Power would be likely to interfere. That was the light in which it was expected Russia would regard Bismarck's announcement, and it was only natural that she should further infer that German neutrality would command the policy of Austria, while Britain, with her aversion to war, would content herself with holding her fleet in readiness against any hostile advance towards Constantinople. But, while, from viewing the matter thus, Russia might have easily yielded to the temptation of occupying the Balkan Principality, and awaited there the dedevelopment of events, Bismarck: reckoned that this would prove for her ] a more serious business than she imagined, would in fact involve her in a war with England. Knowing as he does that it is the destiny of Germany to be before long engaged in a deadly struggle with Russia, as well as with France, his policy has for some time back been to so shape European politics as to induce Russia first of all to enter on a course which would eventually engage j her in an exhaustive conflict with the British Empire. It is a continuance, in fact, of the policy which committed Russia to her last war with Turkey, and which all but involved her in war with Great Britain. The ultimate object which Bismarck had then in view was to weaken Russia, and render her power less menacing to Germany, and that is precisely what he has been, and is still aiming at in the present European crisis. His game, however,

was somewhat unexpectedly interfered with by the distrust of Germany, and the hostile feeling towards Russia which the late announcement of his policy aroused in the Austro-Hungariaii Empire. This he had not reckoned on though he admitted that the advance of Russia towards the Balkans, which ha encouraged, would probably be the cause of hostilities between these two Powers Bismarck, however, could not, in the present condition of the Continent, afford to quarrel with Austria. ]j e felt it necessary, in short, to assure her that, if she were in danger, Germany would come to her rescue; and this coupled with th net that a community of interests had laid the foundation of an alliance between England and Austria for preventing a Russian occupation of Bulgaria, dispelled any i illusion which the Czar and his advisers had at first been placed under by Bismarck's celebrated manifesto It required no forged letters then to mislead the Czar into the belief that Bismarck was opposed to Russia's contemplated action in Bulgaria. • Ho wag by that time thoroughly aware that it was Bismarck's desire that she should move in that direction, and for the reason that her doing so would involve her in peril, while it would be greatly to Germany's advantage.

Wherein, then, it may be asked would lie the necessity for sending to the Czar the forged despatches which are now attracting such notice, or wherein would be the advantage of them, supposing them to be of the nature described 1 If their object had been to warn the Czar against being tempted by Prince Bismarck's seeming friendliness or apparent indifference to embark on a perilous expedition, their existence might have been credited, though even then they would only have supplied further evidence of that which the Czar was already convinced of. But to suppose that their object was to persuade the Czar that Bismarck was opposed to Russia's intention respecting Bulgaria, while every statesman at St. Petersburg must have seen that Bismarck's aim was to induce Russia to carry out these intentions, credits the Czar with a simplicity which his character and history wholly belie. Even on the hypothesis that these despatches had been forged by the mother of Prince Ferdinand, for the purpose of securing for her son a breathing time to establish himself in Bulgaria, her object, it is clear, would have been served much more effectually by suggesting the suspicion, or confirming the belief that Bismarck's object was to entrap Russia into a position which would involve that power in disaster. The theory of these forged despatches must, therefore, be regarded as mythical, and that it has been resorted to in order to account in a plausible way for the strained relations which, for some time past, have existed between Germany and Russia, and for their apparent return to the entente cordiale, which has recently, for some political reason, been established. Some such explanation of so marked a change was called for, and to the Cologne Gazette, which is at the service of Prince Bismarck, was assigned the task of satisfying the outside world. The fact that copies of the alleged despatches are said to have been forwarded by the Czar to Prince Bismarck is, of course, a necessary part of the device; but it may be safely assumed that the originals will be, for obvious reasons, withheld from the public. None the less, however, may this device be regarded as tending to further the plana of Prince Bismarck. The Triple Alliance which he has completed has not [ failed to make the desired impression | at St. Petersburg, and the accentuating at this time of Bismarck's willingness that Russia may consult her own wishes respecting Bulgaria, will have the effect of moderating her antipathy to Germany while it weakens her sympathy with France. It will suit his purpose to thus turn Russia's aggressive ambition once more in the direction of the Balkans, for it is only by this means that he reckons on being able to reserve the unbroken strength of Germany for contingencies which may sooner or later be expected on the Rhine or the Vistula. His plan of thus involving the Muscovite armies in that quarter in a conflict with England, Austria, and now Italy also, may yet prove successful : and, eventually, he may be able to congratulate himself on being in a position to strike in towards the close of the conflict and dictate the terms of settlement for Europe.