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THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1887.

In expressing the opinion which appeared in yesterday's issue, respecting Germany's doings in Samoa, Mr. Bayard, United States Secretary, acts on the maxim which so commonly sways modern statesmen —that it is easier to round a difficulty than to solve it. He says that interference with Germany would be unwarranted, unless American interests in these islands were molested. It might have been anticipated that the United States Government would studiously observe the law of expediency when called upon to challenge the aggressive action of a strong Power. American statesmen are commonly of the Gladstone type, whose policy invariably is, in the case of any dispute arising, to be dictatorial towards a weak nation, but meek and submissive with one of military reputation and resources. Had tho high-handed conduct which Germany has been guilty of in Samoa been resorted to by the Government of such a kingdom as Denmark or Holland, the tone and attitude assumed by the United States' authorities would have been very different from that observed in the pre- 1

sent instance. It is true that the Great Republic is under certain obligations to Germany, whose Emperor, when asked to arbitrate on the rival claims of the Americans and the British to the Island of San Juan in the Straits of De Fuca found it convenient to give his decision in favour of the former. This gracious act of partiality demanded some material recognition in return, and the Samoan episode has furnished an opportunity to the United States Government to pay off a long-standing debt of gratitude. It is unfortunately by such considerations as these that more or less the relations of all extensive States are governed; and, provided their respective interests are not directly imperilled, while difficulties are meanwhile smoothed over, the claims of the weak and the demands of justice are alike shamefully disregarded. Of course, it will be said that America's attitude in this Samoan business is substantially the same with that observed by the British Government, whose instructions to their Consular representative were to abstain from interfering. There is some truth in this averment, and it is certainly not our purpose to oiler an apology for any slackness of action which the British Government have in this, as in other matters in the Pacific, been guilty of. For years past it has been pointed out in these columns that their inertness was creating not only for the mother country, but also, and specially for her Australasian colonies, much future trouble, which wise forethought and decision of purpose might easily have averted. At the same time, it must be admitted that, now the growing commercial importance of the Pacific has quickened in other nations than the British a desire to secure territorial possessions in this quarter, the power of remonstrance is the only means to which, with a regard for peace, Britain can resort in the case of a dispute with any European Power over Pacific questions. So complicated have the political relations in Europe become that Australasian questions are really governed by them and treated as subordinate to them, to the serious injury of both colonial and native interests, which ought to be considered paramount in these waters. .--From this embarrassment, however, to which, as the foremost civilising and peacerespecting nation, Britain is peculiarly subject, the United States are comparatively, if not wholly free. The action of their Government is not hampered by the political entanglements of Europe, and therefore it can with the greater decision and force make its weight felt, in the event of self - aggrandisement being, to the detriment of common interests, attempted in the Pacific by any European Power. Its power might still be only that of remonstrance; but remonstrance, unfettered by the restraints and apprehensions arising out of European complications, and which would, as a rule, be efficacious. There cannot be the slightest i doubt that, if America had promptly and firmly condemned the action of Germany in Samoa, and demanded that matters should revert to the basis previously recognised by treaty on the part of the three Powers interested, Germany would have respected her attitude. But, for Britain to adopt this line of action after Ame - rica had made, as from the outset she must have indicated, signs of concession to Germany, would have been to commit the folly of making such a remonstrance as, if ineffectual, would place before her the alternatives of accepting humiliation or declaring war. It is quite clear that if America and Britain had both shown that they would be united in resisting the action which Germany evidently premeditated, the course pursued by the officials of the latter Power would have been very different. The only possible way of accounting for the sudden and arbitrary proceedings taken by the German Consul at Apia,and by Commander Heusner in declaring war against King Malietoa and subsequently deposing him, is by supposing that at the Washington Conference, around which so much mystery has been designedly thrown, Germany had put forward claims which the American representative was inclined to favour, but to which the British representative was hostile. At all events it would appear that some serious divergence of opinion regarding the control of Samoa required the adjournment of the Conference to enable the representatives to consult their respective Governments. If our assumption, that America was inclined to favour Germany's claim to have the mandatory control of the islands in question, while Britain was averse thereto, this would account for Germany's decision to act during the interval of adjournment. It would also account for the apparent neglect of the British and American Governments to inform their Consular agents of any agreement, such as the German action implied, having been come to, as also for the unprecedented conduct of the German officials in refraining from any attempt to persuade the Consuls of Great Britain and the United States that in all they were about to do they were merely performing a delegated function. On the theory above stated, the anomalies of the case are all capable of an easy explanation. Having satisfied herself that America would offer no objection to the dethronement of Malietoa and the appointment of his rival Tamasese as his successor 3 but, anticipating that Britain, less perhaps on her own account and more on account of the sentiment of the Australasian colonies, would probably offer insuperable resistance, Germany resolved on solving the difficulty to her own satisfaction and in her own interest without waiting for any further consultation. In other words, presuming on the goodwill of America, Germany has grossly violated all international courtesies towards Great Britain, and still more grossly violated international law towards Samoa, taking in the case of tho latter a contemptible advantage of helplessness, and in the case of the former, a mean advantage of an indisposition to quarrel. The assurance has, with a mockery of frankness, been given that the United States and Great Britain being equally with Germany parties to the treaty securing the independence of Samoa, their interests will not be affected by the change of sovereigns. Why then was the change made 1 and why was it gone about in the sneaking furtive way resorted to 1 The British and American residents had no complaints to make against King Malietoa's Government, and the grievances alleged by the Gorman

residents were obviously manufactured with the view of setting up a pretext for the war so craftily declared against the King, and with the farther view of obtaining commercial advantages. Malietoa was no more favourable tolawlessnessthanTamasese, but the former favoured the British and the latter the German, and that made all the difference. The whole affair was, in fact, an underhand attempt to get such a footing in Samoa as would facilitate the ultimate annexation of the group. Hence, having obtained possession of Malietoa's person, the German officials are spiriting him away in the secret manner which lias been so characteristic of all their proceedings. They are evidently afraid that if he were allowed to remain in Samoa, or anywhere in the vicinity of the Australasian colonies, there would be a danger of their puppet King, who now reigns to serve their purposes, being sent about his business. But, though Maiietoa should thus be got rid of, either by his transference to Berlin as the first royal evidence of German power in the Pacific, or to some penal colony specially created for his exile, the memory of the ignoble conduct observed towards him will permanently stain the reputation of Germany in these seas, and ultimately bring the revenge which all such' actions demand.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH18871006.2.17

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIV, Issue 8066, 6 October 1887, Page 4

Word Count
1,447

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1887. New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIV, Issue 8066, 6 October 1887, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1887. New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIV, Issue 8066, 6 October 1887, Page 4