THE The New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1886.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIII, Issue 7824, 18 December 1886, Page 4

THE The New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1886.

Nothing is more significant in connection with the situation in Europe than the recently disclosed anxiety of Russia to propitiate Germany. Despite the understanding come to between Prince Bismarck and M. de Giere, the feeling of the people of the two empires has been anything bub cordial. This was largely due to the coquetting with France which Russia has been indulging in. Though the aim of that was rather to embroil Britain with France over the Egyptian question, with a view to enable Russian designs on Bulgaria to be more easily prosecuted, a suspicion of it having a more extended purpose has yet been awakened in Germany. In this country few if any entertain the smallest doubt of there being a secret agreement between Russia and France, and the presumption is that it partakes of the nature of an offensive as well as a defensive alliance. That this is more or less believed in high quarters, appears from the fact that Herr Bronsart, Prussian Minister of War, has informed a secret committee that Russia and France are stronger than Germany and Austria, and that the increasing of the effeotive strength of the German army is, therefore, necessary. The associating thus of Russia and France in connection with a question of military preparation, is suggestive evidence of the belief held in German circles that a struggle between Russia and France on the one side, and Austria and Germany on the other, is not only possible, but also exceedingly probable. In the conflict thus contemplated the armies of Russia might chiefly, if not wholly, be directed against Austria as her competitor for supremacy in the Danubian and Balkan territories, while France would be left without any material help to engage the forces of Germany. But none the less must it enter into the calculations of military men that the exigencies of war might, and almost certainly would, lead to a combination of forces on both sides; and this is the contingency against which Germany is desirous of making timely provision. The refusal the other day of Herr Bronsart to explain the foreign policy of Germany, on the ground that it would imperil the general peace, really means that a distrust of both Russia and France is entertained at Berlin; and that, though diplomatically it would be unwise to say this much even in the vaguest language, it nevertheless correctly represents the state of public feeling in Germany.

Now, it is the perception of this state of things at Berlin that is at present awakening deep concern at St. Petersburg. And the rebuke administered in the Official Messenger to the Russian people for the antiGerman feeling which they have displayed, is intended to propitiate the Berlin authorities, and allay the distrust which exists in both countries. For that this feeling is mutual cannot be denied. It is, indeed, at times openly avowed, especially in Russia, as may be gathered from a recent telegram. The causes to which it is attributable are to some extent different in the two Empires but the outoome is the same in both. In addition to the hereditary aversion whioh is cherished in Russian military circles against Germans, there has been a growing suspicion that, in favouring Russia's advance towards Constantinople, Bismarck has some ulterior object in view, which he carefully avoids disclosing. His abstaining from any attempt to sway the policy of Austria, as also his significant silence respecting the understanding that Austria and Britain appear to have arrived at as to the course to be pursued in the event of Russia occupying Bulgaria, have created the impression that he would be pleased to see Russia involved in war with these two Powers, and is reckoning for his own ends on the issue being unfavourable to his northern neighbour. For in that case no aid could be looked for from France, obliged aa she is to hold herself free for the coming struggle with Germany; and strong as she is, Russia could not alone successfully cope with Austria and Britain united. At all events, the struggle would greatly exhaust her strength and embarrass her finances, and of this condition Bismarck might be tempted to take advantage, and seize some of Russia's Baltic provinces. It is the apprehension of such contingencies that makes Russia hesitate to make a forward movement in the south-east of Europe, and submit to the humiliation of seeing her aggressive policy checked by the insignificant State of Bulgaria, It is this, also, that

has recently intensified the feeling of antagonism against Germany which prevails among the Russian people inclusive of the army. But, for the present, Russia cannot afford to quarrel with Germany, and hence it is expedient to remove, as far as possible, all causes of alienation, even though in so doing she should have wholly to abandon all relations with France. It is therefore given out that Russia and Germany are cemented by a community of interests, that Russia will respect the special interests of Germany, and feels assured that Germany will respect Russia's interests in Bulgaria. In this manifesto there is more than at first appears. It is in fact a bid for an alliance of Northern Europe against the South. It hints at a readjustment of territory agreeable to Germany should that Power aid Russia in the accomplishing her designs on Bulgaria and Stamboul. This is the new departure in European politics which is foreshadowed from St. Petersburgh. It is a bold move on the part of Russia to get rid of the checks which now restrain her movements. But, even if it should prove successful, it would not contribute to the maintenance of peace, though that is the object professedly aimed at. For the very prospect of an alliance, so full of menace for the other nations of Europe, would impel France to a speedy declaration of war against Germany, and for that she seems to be already preparing. The united demand of her War Minister and Minister of Marine for twentytwo millions, is indicative of a growing conviction that, in consequence of the direction Russian policy is now taking, it will be incumbent on France to make an early appeal to force for a settlement of all the questions at present distracting Europe.