THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1886.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXIII, Issue 7785, 3 November 1886, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1886.

♦ The decision of the Bulgarian Government to release the persons implicated in the arrest and deposition of Prince Alexander may, on the first blush of the question, appear to be a surrender of their independence to Russia. When carefully looked into, however, it may be found capable of quite another construction. All things considered, the probabilities are that, perceiving Russia's determination to fasten a quarrel upon them, they had deemed it their best policy to remove, as far as possible, every cause of complaint, with the view of making it more apparent in the end where the real origin of disturbance existed. They may hope thus to make it plain to Europe that Russia is the inveterate foe of peace and progress, and in fact of 1 everything save its own aggrandisement. And .the concession they have just made has already served in part to demonstrate this. For General Kaulbars, while retracting his threat to withdraw from the country if within three days his demand for the release of the prisoners were not ordered, has evaded the request of the Government that he should supply the names of Russian subjects said to be molested by the supporters of the Regency, and has intimated that it is still his intention to leave the country if the complaints of these so-called Russian subjects are repeated. In other words, he is resolved on finding some occasion for extreme proceedings, and reserves to himself the right of saying when it occurs. The complaints of maltreatment by men whose names he chooses to withhold are very easily conjured up ; and any day this coarse representative of a barbarian policy may, on this mysterious pretext, give the signal for a Russian occupation of the country. That this is , the issue he is working towards is borne out by the reported reinforcement of the Russian men-of-war stationed at Varna, and the massing at Odessa of 40,000 troops ready for embarkation for Bulgaria. With so subtile a cause of war as may be found in the complaints of men wholly unknown, the Bulgarian Government cannot deal, and it would therefore be folly in them to attempt to remove the grounds on which these complaints are imagined to rest. But the release of prisoners whose cause Russia, however unjustifiably, has espoused, is a tangible matter and, as this was insisted on as necessary to the avoidance of war, the Regency in yielding that point will be sustained by the favourable judgment of Europe. The demand was an outrageously unwarrantable one, which the Powers of Europe ought not to have tolerated , but if after having it conceded, Russia should still invade Bulgaria, the conduct of that Power will, with all nations possessing a sense of honour, become a subject of deep execration. Provided therefore the Regency remain loyal to the trust reposed in them, and without compromising the popular movement, avoid pursuing a policy which might be construed into a justification for foreign interference, the moral, and if need be the material, support of some of the European Powers may be reckoned on should their country be wantonly invaded. And that this event will shortly happen may be accepted as certain, no matter what the Bulgarian Government may do or refrain from doing in order to prevent it. As has been observed by the London Times, " the extensive preparations for war that are being made by Russia in a sinister fashion are ominous of her resolve to fight." And the secret of this determination is not the mere question of the union of Roumelia with Bulgaria — for that Russia favours so long as it is under her direction— the development of i the spirit of freedom it has sprung from, and the formation of an independent State in the Balkan region, which that movement foreshadows. That outcome Russia is resolved on preventing at all hazards, and on some pretext or other she is sure very soon to attempt occupying the country for that end, unless the Government and representative Assembly of the country surrender absolutely to her will. And, as will be seen from one of this morning's cable messages, some of the Powers have, apparently, been advising this course ; that the authorities should, by i course that the authorities should, by admitting the situation to be beyond

their control, throw upon the Powers of Europe the responsibility of dealing with it. But it is very doubtful whether this advice will or can now be acted on. To all appearance it comes too late. A good deal will, of course, depend on whence the advice proceeds. If it is from England, then it may be listened to • but if from any other quarter, it is almost certain to be rejected. It is, however, to be remembered that the Government are now practically under the control of the Grand Assembly; and that a large body of men, animated by the spirit of patriotism, will not readily give heed to any proposals that have even the appearance of being humiliating. Remembering the devotion of the people to their late Prince, and the promise that, on his departure from the country, he gave to the principal officers of the army and State, that, in the event of hisbeing re-elected, he would return to the country, it is not at all unlikely that they will again make choice of him as their Sovereign. And should it for politic considerations be deemed inexpedient to adopt this course, the chances are that, rather than elect a Prince who would be a mere subaltern of the Czar, they may proceed to declare a Republic, and elect as its President some one of their number commanding the full confidence of the country. Either of these courses would increase the ire of Russia, and it would be hard to say which would be regarded as the more hateful. And that one or other of them may be taken is, in view of past occurrences and tendencies, by no means an unlikely contingency, for the Roumelian representatives have already given indications of their leanings towards Republicanism. They would gladly vote for Alexander of Battenburg as their Prince, if the Assembly were generally inclined to this line of action but, failing this, they may boldly act on their alternative preference; and, should they do so, the probabilities are that that they would carry the Assembly with them. But. whatever the decision of that Assembly may be, it is certain {to form the acme of the crisis. Upon that the destiny of Bulgaria, and the question of peace or war depend. Should the members of the National Assembly prove subservient to Russia in this matter, and elect a prince who will take his orders from St. Petersburg, the nationality of the Bulgars will then become a dream of the past, and Russia's first step on her march towards Constantinople will have been taken. If, on the other hand, they make choice of a ruler— whether Monarchical or Republican it matters not—who will be in supreme sympathy with the national aspiration, and become the leader of that popular movement towards independence which has brought on the present crisis, the active hostility of Russia will forthwith be incurred. That Power will then be no longer restrained from entering on the execution of a long-cherished purpose—of transforming the Balkans into an impregnable fortress, from which she could menace the Continental Powers of Europe, and descend upon Constantinople so soon as it suited her convenience. But she is not yet there, and she may find it less easy to get there than she thinks. By her determination to stick to Egypt, despite the murmurings of the French, and by the reported selection of Thasos, on the iEgean coast, as a base of possible operations, Britain shows that she is preparing for the strife, and taking such precautions as will not only aid the Bulgarians in maintaining their ground, but also prevent Russia from obtaining possession of Stamboul.