THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXII, Issue 7271, 9 March 1885, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS.

When the Prime Minister of England announces in the House of Commons that a question of the greatest delicacy is pending with another of the leading Powers of Europe, and deprecates any enquiries on the subject, it may be concluded that very grave issues are at stake. The meaning of the statement is that diplomacy is strained to the highest point of tension, and that an unguarded comment on the situation might defeat the probability of a peaceful settlement and render war inevitable. And this precisely is the state of the relations between Russia and England as represented in the intimation made on the sth instant by Mr. Gladstone to the Imperial Parliament. To those who have carefully followed the rapid progress of events in Central Asia, conveyed in recent telegrams, this position of affairs will occasion no surprise. Seeing no probability of the . Anglo - Russian Commission agreeing ; on the admission of her claim to have the Hindu Kush recognised as the military frontier of the two Empires, Russia, without any formal notice, moved her troops into the Afghan territory, and, seizing two important strategic positions, -revealed her intention to take by force what she could not obtain by concession. This proceeding vas an obvious breach of international relations, besides being an insult to British hoaour as represented on the Commisson, and in itself constituted a casus belli. The British Government, however, instead of regarding the matter in this light and at once putting their Indian forces in motion, as they might and ought to have done, contented themselves with protesting against the action of Russia, and demanding that her troops be ordered 1 to halt. This demand" the Russian authorities were politic enough to lister to, and the question now relegated to diplomacy for settlement, if settled thus it can be, is whether, pending further negotiations, the forces of Russia are to be allowed to retain the positions they have seized, or be obliged to return to those from whence they cane? As we already pointed out, it would be a degradation to Britain in the eyes of all nations, and \ especially of Asiatic tribes, to concede the forner of these alternatives; and, oil the other hand, it would bring substantially the same loss of prestige to Ru ssiaif she were to accept the latter. Thfi-t ihis is the difficulty with. which both jar ties are confronted is clear from (the language employed by the Premier in describing it. It involves, as ho a aid, a question of the greatest delicack and his language has the greatest /iguificance from the fact that it washu'.de shortly after an interview between t.he British Foreign Secretary and the 3j,!ussian. Ambassador, during

which the. above difficulty would inevitably present itself. It is obvious that one or other of the two disputants must yield, and the question is, which of them is it to be or is such a compromise possible as will meantime I stave off the coming conflict? i In these circumstances secrecy in the conduct of the negotiations may be necessary; but, on the other hand, it must be admitted that, in depre- ! eating all enquiries as to the proposed ' solution of the question, Mr. Gladstone is making a heavy demand on the English Parliament and people. He is, in truth, stipulating for a measure of confidence to which his Ministry are not entitled. The people of England have not forgotten that, on several recent occasions, the trust which was reposed in them had been pitiably abused. They have still a vivid recollection of the circumstances attending the special negotiations with France which took place prior to the London Conference on Egyptian affairs. Under the assurance that the nature of these would prove satisfactory, the public consented to remain in trustful ignorance, but were amazed afterwards to find them such as seriously to compromise the nation, and experienced a great sense of relief when, owing to the ; insatiable vanity and ambition of the | French delegates which tempted them ! to demand further concessions, the Conference came to a sudden end. And ; that is only one of many instances in ; which, behind the privacy alleged to be | necessary for the public interests, the | influence and reputation of the British Empire have been prostituted before peace-at-any-price considerations. What i assurance, therefore, have the British public that the same lamentable result Will'. not happen new 1 There is not the slightest guarantee furnished by the diplomatic antecedents of the Ministry that, in the present critical relations with Russia, they can safely be allowed to do as they please, and inform the people of what they have done only after it is irrevocable. On the contrary, there are startling incidents connected with this very question which point to a wholly opposite conclusion. It is certainly not creditable to their statesmanship that the British Ministry should have been in ignorance of the fact that two Russian armies had started from two different points on a march which must at the least have occupied a week, or, if aware of it, that they should have neglected to adopt counteractive measures. That they should have been either surprised in their political slumber, or found incapable of that energy which the emergency called for, is far from being* a reason why absolute and unquestioning confidence should now be placed in them. If they have thus allowed themselves to be outwitted in respect of movements which might have been anticipated and were performed in open day, is it not warrantable to infer that in the dim recesses of diplomacy they will prove no match for their antagonists. That is the line of reflection and self-interrogation which at the present ! time the mind of the British public is f certain to pursue, and it will without fail have a considerable bearing on the negotiations with the Russian authorities in which the British Government are now engaged. The issues at stake are too momentous to admit of any proposal being finally assented to without being first submitted to Parliament. • That the negotiations should be conducted with official reserve is reasonable enough, but it is too much to expect that a Ministry, with such a record of failures in the Asiatic field of diplomacy as the Ministry of Mr. Gladstone has written, should be allowed to keep the nation in the dark respecting its decision on the present dispute until it is beyond recall. The question to be now discussed will, as we have said, have to be settled sooner or later by an appeal to arms. The present attitude of Russia shows that plainly enough. Her wanton invasion of the Afghan territory, which the British are bound by treaty to protect, means that and only that. Unless, indeed, we are to suppose that she expects the British Ministers to be such poltroons as to accept the present situation on condition that the Russian forces will advance no further. And herein precisely lies the danger of these Ministers having power to bind the Empire by a feeble arrangement secretly arrived at. The people have a title to demand 'at thi3 crisis in the Asiatic question, that there shall be no compromise, and to say with a firmness which cannot be mistaken that, as the admitting of Russia's present position means simply ' a postponement of war and, ultimately, the making of it under serious disadvantage, it is better at once to cross the Rubicon and dispose of the issues on the field of battle. Should the British Ministry be required by the strength of public feeling to accept this position it will obviate the risk of the nation being befooled through vacillating diplomacy, and very largely diminish the eventual loss of blood and treasure. The determination to increase the army seems an indication that they mean to be firm, but past experience shows that they require to be kept up to the mark by; the known >J resoluteness of the national will.