THE LATEST NEWS FROM EGYPT.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXII, Issue 7269, 6 March 1885, Page 5

THE LATEST NEWS FROM EGYPT.

THE RETREAT TO KORTI. The dearth of news during the put ten days has been most painfully felt by all who have scanned the telegrams each day, hoping to hear of some event which would give them an insight into the present position of General Wolseley'a army. It is true that we have learned of Sir Redvere Buller's retrograde movement from the Nile to Gakdul, and we were also aware that the forces stationed on the Abuklea Wells were being surrounded by the forces of the Mahdi. Later on we learned that Colonel Brackenbury's column was forcing its way on towards Berber, at which place it was supposed they would make a stand, and await the relieving army supposed to be ooming via Suakim. All these hopes are now rudely disposed of, and the telegrams give us the information that Colonel Brackenbury's column has been ordered to fall back on Korti, at which place the Commander-iu-Chief is concentrating his forces. However humiliating it may be, it is nevertheless true that an English army, composed of some 5000 odd men, has been forced to retreat before a foe which one man has been able to hold in check during the past twelve months. It has been adverted to in previous letters that the accumulation of artillery, arms, and stores, which had fallen into the hands of the Mahdi through General Gordon's death at Khartoum, would necessitate a recast of the entire plans of operations of Lord Wolseley's army, but even the worst fears would not allow of a retirement across the desert, to cross which had cost the country so mauy valuable live 3, and so much treasure. It is, therefore, only natural for us to ask ourselves the question, how comes it ? Why has our army retreated to Korti, leaving Berber in the hands of the enemy, which town would be essentially necessary to the well-being of the relief army now on its route to Egypt, aud of which a detachment, consisting of some 800 men, started but yesterday from Sydney. There remain.! now no doubt that the expedition via !-uakim has been countermanded, it having been foand that it could not arrive in time to cross the desert during anything like the cool season of the year. That being the case, we must naturally aesume that the General in command has had to fake into his serious consideration the position of his army, and what would eventuate in the case of any contretemps happening to one of the three corps into which hi 9 army had been divided. First the corps of the late General Earle, which had been sent to chastise the tribes in the neighbourhood of Abu Hamad, for the murder of Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power, was isolated from the main body by a stretch of desert of some 150 miles—consequently no assistance could be sent to it in time, in the event of its being unable to accomplish its fiual object, viz., the occupation of Berber. The second corps, which had advanced to the Nile above El Metammeh, had to leave detachments at Abuklea and Gakdul in order to guard the wolls, which were the main support of the army either in its advance or retirement. The third corps remained at Korti under Lord Wolsoley's personal command, and seems to have been formed by the various detachments coming piecemeal up the Nile.

The order has now been ianued for all of them to fall back on Korti.' There is no fear but what this will be successfully accomplished ; —but again we ask, why has Korti been chosen instead of Berber? To elucidate the meaning and necessity of this, we can but look back to the time and labour it has eoet to bring up this army to its present position, and we shall tind that there are assembled at Korti over 900 boats, —and it is by these boats alone that onr army could retreat at this season of the year to Upper Egypt. The loss of them in case of disaster means the annihilation of the entire army. It must, therefore, be assumed that it is Lord Wolseley's object to prevent any such occurrence, which can be frustrated by intrenching his army at Korti, and waiting there until his relief is enabled to take the field. That these plans have been well con* sidered and matured is self evident, and that they are taken solely on account of the immense amount of material in the Mahdi'e hands, must be inferred frem the fact that at present we are unable to cope with the enemy away from the base of our operations. istill more disquieting is the news of the surrender of Kaesala, and the slaughter of its garrison. Kassala is a frontier town on an affluent of the Atbara, and was garrisoned by au Egyptian force, in order to hold in cheek the marauding tribes of the Abyssinian froutier. It was well supplied, according to Sir Samuel Baker, with Krupp guns and Remington rifles. Here, again, i* an additional force added to the strength of the enemy, which shows us that each day our position, even at Korti, becomes more precarious, as we are unable to assist our army for some months to come owing to the approaching hot season. Sphinx.