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New Zealand Herald, Volume XXII, Issue 7269, 6 March 1885, Page 4

As the only approach to a regular military force which we possess is the Small body of Armed Constabulary, the Pcfence Minister judiciously desires to retain the services of the men after they leave the force, by affording them facilities to become military or semi-military settlers. At present on ceasing to belong to the body, it seems that they generally go away to some of the other colonies, and it is not well, especially in these days, to lose men who have anything like the training of regular soldiers. So Mr. Ballance would offer them inducements to settle on the land, and would locate them along the forthcoming lines of railway, with, as the report says, " a certain quantity of rations, for which some light duties will be expected in return." It is added, that " he hopes before long to extend the system to a civil force," and that, we imagine, would be also desirable. It is a good thing to increase the number of the cultivators of the soil, and it will be also a good thing to initiate at the same time a local militia composed of ex-members of the Armed Constabulary, and men who have acquired as much training as the volunteer enrolment is able to confer. Their efficiency might then be maintained or improved by periodical drill, under circumstances neither irksome to the men nor burdensome to the public. All that is good so far as it goes; but what about the protection of our ports, which, after all, is • the paramount and really pressing requirement nowadays in any plan of colonial defences 1 Even if such companies of militia in occasional rural districts were within easy call of the ports, artillerists and engineers would be required for the service of the batteries, torpedoes, <kc.—delicate work, for which militiamen, in the ordinary sense of the word, would not suffice. For our coast defences to have a practical character a regular standing force is necessary, properly organised and trained, and sufficiently numerous. It is difficult to see how that is to be got at present; but, certainly, until the way to get it is visible, we had better not throw money away on any expensive system of fortification. The works would be useless without the skilled men, and to fortify without possessing the defenders, or knowing where to find them, would be putting the car before the horse. Professional authorities fresh from Europe do not comprehend the difficulty of the colonies in this way. They only know the colonies to be rich and to want defences, and accordingly there has been no stint of advice for forts and batteries, and gunboats and big guns. It was build and buy, and buy and build. Any amount of money was thus wasted in Melbourne during the last twenty-five years, and sometimes the works raised at one period were, under new advice, pulled down at another. People fresh from the old country are not aware that it is exactly because the colonies are rich, are new , countries and gold countries, that it would be impossible—except at enormous expense—to maintain regular military and naval enrolments numerous enough for the requirement. We have occasionally ventured to suggest that the difficulty might be overcome a few years hence by establishing out here the English system of a naval reserve through the timely development of our fine fisheries, and by adopting the Swiss system of a military training for all boys at school, a plan recently introduced in France also. But all that could only provide for the defences a few years hence ; so to really meet the want at present it has been sometimes proposed to subHidise the home Government to send out the needful garrisons. But is this arrangement available? Certainly just npw England would not spare such a well-trained body of men, military or naval.

Our judgment in the matter must not be obscured by the fact that the colonies are this moment sending, or offering to send, a contingent of troops to co-operate with those of the mother country in the Soudan. New South Wales has sent 700, Victoria proposes to send as many, and other colonies—New Zealand as well as South Australia and Queensland —are ready to despatch a few hundred each. It is a right exhibition of feeling, and it is appreciated in the old land. It shows that the Empire divided by the ocean is one in heart as in name, and the sentiment thus evinced and evoked may accelerate the creation of that federal bond which has been so long spoken of. But, even if the two thousand men thus sent or proffered by the Australasian communities belo'nged to New Zealand alone, and even if they were all already well-disciplined troops, they woald not be sufficient in the times we are now entering on, for the suitable defence of these islands, with their many harbours and ports, unlike the coastline of an Australian colony. This question of defences is at last coming upon our attention in a hard practical way. We really do nob know how we stand at present; that is, we cannot now foresee from day to day whether the Empire to which we belong is at war or peace. Bones of contention have strangely multiplied of late—indeed, several arising from occurrences in our own neighbourhood, and concerning our immediate interest. Even within the experience of this generation war is not always an event which casts its shadow before. Even when preceded by the usual formal declaration, the news has sometimes dropped like a stone upon us. A war often breaks out without being formally declared. A little book just published on the subject in England shows us how repeatedly this happened in the last century, and in the Bonaparte period; bow the Battle of Copenhagen, in 1801, and of Navarino, in 1827, were not preceded by any declaration of war ; and how, at the present moment, tbSe French are operating against the the Chinese in Formosa, and on the mainland ooast, without any preliminary announcement of hostilities.

England's credit if the withdkwtlX *° troops to the position* f OS* by them i 8 not firmly insist*? lt t?* ' this is done the English member, J?"? Commission for the defining of 2£ ( **« line cannot resume their mission tk* I**1** senting to this while the Rneeian f ° <m ' continued to hold the etrate<rf e J?* 1 which they have seized in Afeh.R? would be construed into » n weakness, and an encouragement ? Russia to encroach yet further With v usual adroitness. Russia once more fesses the moat peaceful intention/, h that is a mere device, manifestly »&! J,"! to in the hope that England will thSk again be lolled into security, and fS disposed to acquiesce in the eii.ti position or matters. But this strata 0 * will,. hardly succeed this time \v ! the Government of Mr. Gladstone *!* be guilty of condoning Russia's offend their tenure of office would not be wch* an hour's purchase ; and the simpler evinced by such a course would not on provoke a smile from the Russian co manders, bat also lower the preati ee 01 ? England in the eyes of all Asiatic tribe Such, results, however, are not at di likely to happen. The spirit of EnUnJ will not just now brook any trifling vj her Ministry must needs either demand the recall of the Russian troops or offer ti alternative of war. That the Gorernm ! are prepared to assert this position nu legitimately be inferred from the oficuj approval they have giTen to the actionrf Sir Peter. Lumaden in advising the if j gbans to resist the Russian eciran That the Afghan troops will at present be eager to oppose the invader may be con eluded from a variety of circumstance** Among these may be cited the fact of Sir Peter Lumsden's entrusting himself and the other British commissioners to their protection in Herat, and also from the fact of the interview now being arranged for between the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Viceroy of India. These, taken together show that a friendly feeling prevails on the pan, of the Afghans towards the British alliance, and seem to give a pledge that in the war which must come soon, if it do not come now, they will be fonnd side by side with the British troops fighting against the Muscovite aggressors. Hence the in. structions from St. Petersburg to the Russian commanders to avoid any conflict with the natives. The policy of Russia U to seek to ingratiate herself with the inhabitants of-the country, at the same time she strives to lull the suspicions and feari of England. A few days will suffice to bring us the information of the euccesi or failure which she has experienced ia either or both of these directions.