THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1884.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXI, Issue 7007, 2 May 1884, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1884.

As " decentralisation" is evidently meant to be the chief hustings cry" of the South at the next general election ; and, as a dissolution is-not unlikely to come sooner than may be generally expected, it is important to see what decentralisation, as expounded in the, proposals of the Otago Constitutional Association, really signifies. "With Mr. Montgomery it simply and bluntly meant the financial separation of the Islands; and Mr. Pish, member for Dunedin South, in addressing his constituents the otheiP day, appears to follow his political chief. The tendency of- this policy, however, is so obviously towards the ultimate political separation of the North and South that, in view of the impracticability thereof, not to speak of the inherent difficulties connected with it, decentralisation in this form is not likely to find much support. Bat in the garb in which it Is paraded by the Otago Constitutional Association it is more captivating; and, though the tendency is still the same, yet the subtlety with which this is kept out of view will secure for it a more general advocacy. Some of the proposals of the above association are certainly of so wild a character that they could never be made "cardinal- points in the policy of any set of politicians hoping to acquire or retain the reins of power. Still these, while they may be taken by all parties only for what they are worth are yet intended to direct public atten' i tion the more keenly to what theOtago Daily Times calls the one strong point o£ decentralisation. Let us look then at this idol which the nation is expected to bow down to and worship.

The draft of a new constitution propounded under the high-sounding title of the "decentralisation of the functions , of Government," ..nob only contains all the -worst features of the I old provincial system, but even presents these in an . aggravated form". One of the chief vices of the former Provincial ■ Governments, the one in fact which mainly contributed to their ultimate abolition, was their borrowing proclivity. That, however, was to some extent held in check by the proviso that any. Loan Bill had to receive.the assent of the Governor in Council. Any difficulty anticipated in this quarter was, it is true, generally got over with comparative ease through a clever use of political influence, but; the very "fact that the assent might be withheld operated to some extent as a drag on what would otherwise have; proved a wholly reckless tendency. TJnder the proposed constitution, however, while provision is made for the local districts borrowing, there is none for the imposing of restraint on the disposition to overleap the limits of prudence. If two-thirds of the voters of any district, voting on the question of a loan, record their consent thereto, the matter is settled without reference to any further or higher authority. The exercise of the borrowing function is no doubt made, subject to a provision for a special tax to' pay interest and sinking fund on the loan raised. But supposing it should turn, out, which is not at' all unlikely, that the district is not able, even-' with a tax, to meet the interest and sinking fund, who in that case are responsible for the obligations ? In such a case it would be found, just as in the old days of provincial borrowing, that the General Government would be held liable to the creditor. The absence of the. authority of the Governor-in-Oouncil would be no plea for relief. The mere fact that the indebtedness was incurred under a provision of the Constitution would make it a colonial liability. The necessity would thus speedily arise for the General Government taking over the liabilities of those local governing bodiea who might be unable

to meet them, precisely as it had to do prior to the abolition of Provincial Government. There is not the slightest reason to hope that, under these new proposals, matters would happen otherwise than they did formerly; and the failure, even in a single instance, of the governmental districts to meet their engagements- would carry with it the same consequence which was witnessed in 1876, namely, the, inevitable - and complete abandonment of the system. But meanwhile, the scheme of government proposed by this political association would, if .once introduced, work very disastrously for the less proraising and sparsely populated districts... These might have .very urgent need for the construction of railways or other public works ; but, unless they agreed to tax themselves to an extent

which would simply be ruinous to th' e ' settlers, each undertakings could nnfc even be attempted. True, the General Government might, in such cases," be ■willing to float a loan for the works required; but, according to this p ro posed' scheme of a constitution, 'thai Government could do so only -with the consent of two-thirds of those voting O n a direct vote throughout the colony Thus the strong governmental districts would have it completely in their power by a simple recording of votes, to p re l vent the weaker ones from securing by any possible means, the execution of works essential to their development and progress. It is idle to say that if a good case were made out, the consent of two-thirds of the voters would not be •withheld. Because, not to speak of the clumsiness of the provision, which of itself is almost, prohibitive of anv attempt to make it available, enouoh is already known of the the strong districts, to expect from them anything bearing the slightest resemblance to generosity. The obvious purpose of the provision is to enable the strong districts to protect themselves, and it may be assumed that the power thus given would unfailingly be exercised with the utmost rigour. It will be seen from what has been stated, that it is not merely the weak districts, but also the General Government itiseif that would thus be placed entirely at the mercy of the strong. local governing bodies. In fact, these bodies would, under the new system of government proposed,. simply become omnipotent. By a combination of any two of them—such as Otago and Canterbury—a two-thirds vote of the dectors might easily be made impossible, and the desire of the General Government to effect a loan for any purpose, even a really national one, might be prevented. This is to reduce tne government of the colony to the merest sham, and practically, to leave th» country without a responsible Government altogether. After depriving the General Government of' the chief portion of their administrative functions, the advocates of this political revolution would make both the Ministry and the Parliament of the.day wholly dependent on a direct numerical vote of the people, which, as we have already seen, means the vote of the stronger districts. If is quite characteristic that the parties who drafted this new constitution for New Zealand should stipulate that after this radical change has been effected there shall be no further changes made save by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Parliament. Should they once manage to gee their heel on the body of the constitution, it is only natural they should wish to keep it there and repress any effort that might be made to recover for the people their constitutional rights. And the means proposed for the perpetuation of that wrong are very effectual. For, practically, a two-thirds vote of both Houses for any amendment of the constitution means that the opposition of the members of any two of the strong districts might render such amendment impossible. In a word, the decentralisation of the functions of government which the newly-fledged association has adopted as its mission would, if carried out according to the programme issued, establish the most thorough-going political tyranny which has ever been witnessed in the history of nations. In contemplating the disastrous effects of its inauguration the only comfort one has springs from the conviction that the country contains too much good sense and independence of spirit to allow this insidious attempt at the subversion of its liberties to approach even the stage of experiment.