AMERICA.

New Zealander, Volume XVIII, Issue 1741, 12 November 1862, Page 5

AMERICA.

[From the “ Times,” August 23.]

Our correspondent at New York, reflecting at this crisis of the American struggle on the sights and sounds around him, asks in his last letter a most significant question. “If, ’says he, “the war be not popular, can it last throe months ?” Certainly the replysoemsobvious. II the people ot the North will not support the war, by whose support will it be carried on? If the South is resolved to quit the Union, and the North will not fight to retain it, where are we to find either the means°or the motives for prosecuting the contest ? These rcflec-

tions appear conclusive, and yet the inference is upset by the actual state of things. At this very moment, if the orders ot Government have been punctually executed, the tree citizens of the Northern States arc coerced into coercing their brethern of the South. The

15th of this month was their last day of liberty. After that date the conscription was to commence and the work is probably now in hand. We may ask, then, whose wishes or decisions Mr. Stanton represents when he thus puts the screw on the whole national constituency. It is clear enough that the conscription is thought abominable, but still it is not resisted, and ihere is apparently power enough at the command of the Government to enforce the President’s decrees i i the teeth of the popular will. Here is an example, then, of whatjjmay be done in this direction. 'Eho South fights to the death against the Union, and the North has not the least desire to fight for it; but for all this, Mr. Lincoln and bis colleagues can drive the North into

the field against the South. The truth is that the war at this minute is neither popular nor unpopular, or rather it is both one and the other according to the point of view from which it is regarded. The Northerners have lost their stomach for fighting, but they have not yet got any appetite for peace. They are not prepared to forego the struggle and retire from the contest on the terms of a separation from the South. They cannot make up their minds to a dissolu*ion of the Union, and therefore, as a necessary consequence, they cannot object to the prosecution of the war. In this sense the war is still popular, because peace on the oidy terms possible would he unpopular. But though the people of the Federal States still desire to l)e belligerents, they have not the least desire individually to be soldiers. The war regarded as a struggle producing demands on their personal services is unpopular in the extreme. The very people who declare that the Union must be indivisible are prepared to turn their backs on it altogether rather than fight for its indivisiblity, and are now rushing by thousands to tiie colonies ot Britain as preferable homes. Mr. Stanton, however, lias got his eye upon the fugitives, and is stopping every outlet before he throws his net. The bulk of the class liable to military service will be driven into a corner. They must either light, or rebel, or find the heart to say what has not been said yet—that the war must cease, and the South may go. There is, indeed, a party in the Northern States which hasadistinctand, asit believes, anall-powcrful principle still in view. The Abolitionists assert that if the President would but declare for immediate and uncondi-

tional emancipation, the war would at once assume a new and hopeful complexion. The North, they say, convinced hy this declaration that compromise and misprision were at an end, would rush enthusiastically into what would have become a holy war, while the liberated slaves would bring to their benefactors the aid of a million arms. The views of this party may be seen in

the extravagant piece of declamation on which Mr. Wendell Phillips recently ventured; but, though the Abolitionists are both sincere and active, their policy could never he successfully enforced. Their strength lies in their principles only, and it is by no means certain that even these principles would be carried to the length of personal enlistment. Mr. Phillips assumes that if the war were made an anti-slavery war, volunteers would be forthcoming to the utmost extent of the demand; but the result has yet to he established. Admitting that half of the whole fighting class ot the. North still remains unexpended, we do not think it follows that a cry of emancipation would bring any great numbers of these men into the field. The Abolitionists are by no means so numerous as the Democrats, and the Democrats would be alienated by an anti-slavery cry in exactly the same proportion as the Abolitionists mi'dit be encouraged. It would not be a hopeful policy to offend three men for the sake ol conciliating two. Probably the result of such a step would be to array all the Border States, as well as the Southern States, against a mere fragment of the Union. President Lincoln sees all this clearly enough, and, thouo-h he may allow Mr. Seward to talk of emancipation as an irresistible weapon which the North holds in reserve, both President and Secretary well know the hopelessness of such a policy. The whole body of Americans inhabiting the recently United States may be considered, in an estimate of this question, as divided in three parties—the Democrats, the Abolitionists, and the Seceders. The first desire the Union as it was, the second desire it as it ought to be (t. <?., without slavery), while the third desire no Union at all. Now the difficulty is to get out of these materials an overpowering combination of force against the particular principle of the Seceders. The Democrats and the Abolitionists both wish to preserve the Union, but on conditions totally different. If the Government adopts, as it has hitherto done, tiic conditions of the Democratic party, and professes only the restoration ol the old Union, pure and simple, the Abolitionists charge it with political impotence and moral heresy. If, again, the conditions of the Abolitionist party were to be proclaimed at Washington, the Democrats would thunder against the violation of the old Constitution. Mr. Lincoln cannot close with either of these parties, and it is because l.e cannot that his speech at the great “War Meeting was so meaningless and void. By his own personal convictions he is probably an Abolitionist, hut he knows that the Constitution gives him power to abolish slavery, and thouMi he n'ay derive the requisite authority perhaps from the rights of war, he sees clearly that he would he none the forwarder for the proceeding. He did his best to sound the Border States the other day, and they let him know their mind. I hey would not hear of peaceable emancipation even in their own territories ; still less would they think ol kindling a servile warinthe South ....... , Hitherto the Union sentiment in the North has been strong enough, in the absence of any severe tna , to produce a practical unanimity in the prosecution of the war The federate believed themselves power!ul enough to put down the Confederates in thirty days or so. They knew they were twenty millions against ten, and they had the monoply of commerce by the command of the sea. So for a time it was North against South, —-Government against rebels, —without much intermixture of deeper principles. The first thing was to restore the Union and reconstruct the United States m the eyes of the world; after which it would be time enough to debate the question arising out ol the war. The war, therefore, was popular, hut the period ol its popularity is now over. The subjection ot the South is seen to be something very different from the mere suppression of a local insurrection by the forces of Government. It is a work calling for efforts whic.i nothing hut deep convictions can dictate, and which, according to every probability, would he impracticable after all. The Abolitionists entertain these convictions, no doubt, hut whether they would show them by act u ally taking arms in a war ot extermination is another question altogether. The Democrats have no principle loftier than that of political union for the sake of political strength, and it is doubtful whether they would maintain even this principle on the terms ol slave emancipation. So, as the loose population ol the States has already been absorbed and expended m the first year’s campaigns, as the best half of the Militia has taken the field already, as the remainder has declined to volunteer, and so no principle is at work to crea-e enthusiasm, Mr. Lincoln is proceeding to coerce tl e j South hy the coerced service of the North. \ his m d>cs

the war unpopular; but peace, as yet, is unpopular also, and so the Government can work its will, ilow long such anomalies can lust u simply the next question to be decided.

In the long I'st of American telegrams which have just been received, there is but a single item of intelligence favourable to the Fedcrals. The new iron ram Arkansas—the Mcrrimac of the Mississippi—is_ said to have been blown up, but, as the siege of Vicksburg, for the relief of which she was designed, has been finally abandoned, the Confederates can well afford the loss. For the rest, the report tolls or nothing but gloom and confussion, increasing difficulties and impending dissolution. The small conquests effected hv the Fedcrals in the spring are apparently slipping out of their hands. General Butler himself is in danger at New Orleans. The garrison at Milton Head is expecting an attack. The very fleet of the Northerners below Savannah is on the alert from similar apprehensions. But those are small matters compared with the threatened disorganization in the Stages themselves. Kentucky, already, perhaps, more then half Confederate in feeling, is in imminent risk of a Confederate invasion, and Ohio itself is hardily reputed safe. What is worse than all, the North-west has shown symptoms of disaffection, and proceedings are reported from Indiana which amount to nothing less than resolutions of secession on the part of those engaged. When the Californians again hear that their fellow citizens have been arrested on ships’ decks lest they should escape the conscription, they arc not likely to look with much favour on a Union which renders them mere food for powder. All this while, the desperate Government of Washington is pressing soldiers in the armies With unscrupulous rigor. The very approach of the conscription lias driven thousands into flight, and it seems as if Mr. Stanton would have to capture his recruits by police officers and carry off them at the point of the bayonet. The war, too, is assuming, meanwhile, a character of shocking ferocity, and the ominous cry ol “reprisals’’has been officially sounded. On all sides the political horizon grows blacker and blacker, nor can any chance of peace he discovered, except in the exhaustion or impotence of a belligerent. If the Fedcrals were not blind with fury, they would now see what all Europe has seen from the beginning. Looking at the contest from a distance, wc cannot so much as imagine on what calculations the President’s government can now expect to accomplish its objects, or on what grounds they can justify their prosecution of the war. Twelve months ago they commenced, not in haste, but with great deliberation, and after a rude and costly lesson, their preparations for the realities of the struggle before them. What litis st, .iggle implied they first learnt from their defeat at Bull Run. That reverse taught them that the suppression of the “ rebellion” was not the work of a week or two fir an army of ignorant volunteers. They saw what the war would require, arid they made no secret of their convctions. They acknowledge openly that the subjections of the South would demand the organization of powerful forces, and these forces they proceeded to raise and discipline. They called for hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and in those days ilie soldiers came. Picsidont Lincoln got every man and gnu that ho asked for, and these immense levies were placed under the command of a popular and promising general to tram at his leisure. How little M'Clel'an was hurr'ed in his overations wc need not say. Nobody can have forgotten the months they spent, probably with great prudent", on the dri’l and dicipline which might impact to his new levies the qualities of an army. ITic best part of a passed before be could be induced to leave his parade ground, and began the work on which lie Inis set. At last he did move, and what we beg our leaders to remember is that the army with which he than advanced was the real grand army of the North. It is curious, indeed to reflect how very little we know of those forces which fought the battles of the West. We lost heard of dcsultary combats in Kentucky and Tcnnescc, then of more extensive operations on the Missouri, border and finally of tw > large armies mamemving against each oilier on the Mississipi. But the Federal army which was so severely handled at Co; huh never seemed to draw for either men or munitions on the immediate resources of the Federal Government. The troops were raised in the NorthWestern States, and supplied from that part of the* country in apparent independence ol Washington. A 1 the efforts of the Government, of the New E igland States, of the Atlantic cities, and, in a word, of America proper, were concentrated on M Clellan’s army, and on the navy by which it was to be supported, It was on the perfection of this great machine that the President and his secretaries were incessantly at work. For this Mr. Chase manufactured his paper money, and Mr. Stanton his bulletins. For this the government foundries turned out battery after halcry, till the army of the Potomac was believed to bo irresistible in artillery alone. The force led by M‘Clcllan into Virginia represented what ihe North could really accomplish after a year's preparation and with unexhausted resources ; nor was the result discreditable. After allowing for all tiie expenditure on minor expeditions, wc cannot doubt that M'Clcllan had with him from first to last upwards of 150,00 troops, all, under the circumstances, well organised and disciplined, admirably equipped, and excellently supplied. Now, what has been the fate of this representative army ? It has failed more completely than any other Federal force in the field, great or small, It has literally done nothing.' Though the scene of its operations was close at home, and it was never exhausted by laborious marches, it lias not won a single battle, and, alter struggling with difficulty up to the walls of Richmond, it was suddenly beaten back with dreadful Joss,

This being the case, can it, let us ask, be reasonably anticipated that a second venture on the same terms will be more successful than ibe first? Wcwill assume for argument’s sake, that the President obtains the 600,000 now levies for which lie is now calling. This, however, will only put him in the position Irom which he started twelve months ago, when he had 700,000, and of a far belter quality. He may begin anew to organise these levies, to tin a recruits into soldiers, to cast fresh, cannon, and, in a word, to equip, and cstabl’sli a new army of the Potomac. He may even gain a little advantage, and, it M‘Clellau can succeed in maintaining bis present position, he may start from that point, instead of Washington, on the conquest of Virginia. But, considering what the quality of the troops must be, and the impressions likely to he left on both sides by the experience of the past year, is it probable that the new army will do any better than the old ? The North has thrown its whole strength into a blow, which has failed. It can repeat the blow, doubtless, but only with less force and less chance of effect.

It is useless to argue that M'Clellau may be irresistibly reinforced. It is any thing but clear that he can preserve his position or save his army from destruction. If lie should be so far susccessful, he can only receive his share of the succours which he now draughts may provide. There are others as clamorus for assistance as he, and, besides New' Orleans and the other coast garrisons, it is evident that some of the inland States will require large armies to keep them from secession. The army of Virginia lias always had the lion’s share of supplies, and the result, it was said in Congress, was a force of 158,000 men. Of these it was not pretended that above 70,000 or 80,000 remained effective after the battles on the Cbickahoniiny, and on that remnant two months of beat and malaria have since done their fatal work. Will the pressed men, the rcfactory conscripts, and the claimed deserters, now to be despatched to M'Clellan’s aid give him a better army than before a and, if not, will a worse army succeed where a better one lias failed ? These are questions which nobody will have any difficulty in answering on this side of Atlantic, but the truth, it seems, has yet to dawn if not on the people, at any rate on the Government of the Federal States.