THE WORLD WAR.

North Otago Times, Volume CV, Issue 13859, 20 April 1917, Page 2

THE WORLD WAR.

MAY END THIS .SUMMER, OPINION IN FRANCE AND v GERMANY. DECISIVE ACTION LOOKED FOR ,IN JULY. ' ; • One of the most constant and overwhelming feelings one has in attempting to keep in touch with' even the main outlines of the war is the extreme difficulty of reaching.a Bafe.conclusion, on. the most significant points. I have', always believed in the untrustworthiMas ;>of human testimony (writes Norman Hapgood from London, on March 3rd to the New York' Evening Post), but tnat belief, strong, as it was, has been, increased. Consider the most important military . question of the moment—the strength of the German line, in Franco; on which .depends , the-, outcome of the contemplated great push. I have just come from a conversation with a man who is much more able to think than most men are, and whose official position gives him exceptional advantages, He had been at the German headquarters in Fiance recently, and in the first line German trenches, and had made up his mind that the German lines were impregnable. He then came to England, and after lie had been here two weeks he was of the opinion, that the British and French would be able to smash through this spring, The general impression counts for a great deal in one's conclusion, and the impression is inevitably coloured by one's environment. It is also extremely difficult to get at more definite facts, as, for example, at the moral of the German troops, We know that a certain number surreiuled voluntarily, more than they did before, but the numbers are not large, and it is dangerous to draw too sweeping conclusions,

If They Get -Through. Again, we know that the British have' become excellent at ordinary trench lighting and raids, but we have no way of knowing how well they can manavavre if ever they get through on a large scale. "Let them get through," some German officers said to a friend of mine, "we ask nothing better than to light them in the open, In this trench warfare there is no difference to speak tof bet ween the skilful and the stupid, but once the fighting gets beyond the trenches our military superiority will be decisive." That sounds well, but it may be added that if the Germans believe it they do .not take steps to lure the British and French beyond their trenches into the open. Also it in fair lo say that many of the best experts lir-liovc that a sudden break through several miles, with the consequent capture of the heavy guns, will be d<-'-. i.itsive. The Supremo Command. !u connection with this question of skill and its relation to the spring campaign, a certain report about the Prime .Minister is interesting. It is narrated io me by one who ought, to know that i!r l.loyd George was in favour of coordinating the work of the Went by having the whole British Army act under general directions from the French supreme command.

Lord Nbrthcliffc was among those who. opposed the measure. 1 asked what the opposition was founded on, and the answer was, "Lord Northclift'e believes that Sir Douglas liaig is a very great military genius, and is throughly convinced that he will accomplish marvels in the spring drive, One is tempted to add that these differences of opinion about policies, and the crucial dements of the situation, would be likely to be removed when we find out how the spring drive gets on, except that experience earlier in the war gives one pause, When, I was at the front in France in 1915, I was given such exact information by French officers and French statesmen in charge of munitions about what was going to happen one month and two months hence that I am now wavy of drawing any conclusions about the decisiveness of the next few months. All that can be reported positively is that it is the preponderance of opinion here, in France, and in Germnny that the war, if not actually finished, will be decided to all intents and purposes by July. The rood question.

Besides the weight of. the spring drive the two factors that will do must to bring the situation to a head are, of course, the situation in Germany regarding food and .certain raw materials necessary to the'' manufacture' of munitions, and, secondly, the food situation in England, which is comfortable now and will remain comfortable unless the new German submarine campaign is unexpectedly successful. I have the best of opportunities of getting information about the food situation in Germany, that is as thorough as can be procured, and is also impartial, What cannot be told, however, by anybody until the ,teat comes, is the psychology of the German people. That the distribution of fooij has failed in its object of equalising the burden is unmistakable. I have already cabled, that the poor, being nimble to buy the meat for which they ,lmve tickets, -are selling their meat tickets to the vicli. You might naturally : ask .why the tickets are not so made out that they pan be used only by the persons to 'whom ihey .are-issued,-instead of being usable by the holder, as they actually .ire. The answer is that the attempt to control the ultimate destination of the food is recognised as hopeless, aiid that it is believed, and rightly belioved, that the result would be more- demoralising if the transfer were more .secret' and attended -with more risk, If you stdpped. a man from selling his ticket, you could not-atop 1 him .from selling tlio meat after lie. had obtained it,.,

i Th" .aperioiice hv Belgium lias! been .'lacuy the name. The more difficult is made the sale of food - tho .xorse hnn ltec'ii the result. :■ The sale lias sibl', been decreased, lint the do*' moralisation' lias been greater. Thesame principle lias applied to a large oxtont; both in Belgium and in Belgium to maxinnim' pi ices, It is impossible .to. maintain them absolutely,'but-thov ItiillllilSWl®

can .be more nearly > maintained when t^od'iickettiifire'(raii«fei'iil)ler. '■ > Ju Rumania. The Germans are hoping much 'from the Rumanian liarveßt,■ Thev ' hnve sent one of . the ablest men in the Empire, a general from .the Weston froiit, to Rumania, and nuder his direction the planting' has been oi the very finest order. They have taken equally effective steps in Serbia, Nevertheless, it is extremely probable that even if- they tide 1 over the time between, now and September they will not be much more comfortable after the new crops come in than in the meantime, because of the terrific strain of the shortage in so many important . .lirections. If Germany feels the ways to Southern- States felt in the last part of 'the Civil War, it is the best opinion'that she can go on for two or three >ycars, by gradually retiring, and by being prepared to wear herself out completely. If, however, her spirit is different, and she would rather yield as soon as her people are widely convinced that they are doomed to defeat and in danger of prostration, then ; much the most probable time for that conviction is next summer or autumn, if in the meantime the submarine campaign proves insufficient to make England anything like as uncomfortable ?.s Germany is. ■ Effect of Suffering and Sacrifice. Ouo of the" results of warfare that have interested mo most is the effect of suffering and sacrifice on the heart that bears them, and here again we come against the qualities of getting our quantities right, There was a fire in one of the factories of England some time ago. It was not jt big fire, but the workers in the factory were naturally excited. One very old woman worked ahead, never paying the slightest attention to the commotion, After it was over someone spoke to her and asked her if she had not knoWn there was a lire. She indicated, in bitter words that have escaped my memory, that she had noticed it, but that it could make no difference to her. She had lost three sons—all her sons—and she was doing her little bit towards manufacturing material to punish those who had slain them. Blind hate was all that remained in her, A conflagration around her meant nothing, Life itself meant nothing, except revenge.

I told this story to one of the most distinguished men in contemporary literature, who himself had lost a son, "No," was his comment, "that story is not fair; it is not those who have loßt sons who hate the Germans, We feel too deeply. We know that the Germans hnvo also lost sons. Hatred is expressed by those who sit around tlio feasting table in the fashionable restaurants, not by those who reach down into the realities,"

I desired fb believe this, and carried it around with me. A while later the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced that the British colonies would keep the trritoriea they had conquered. This was a startling speech. The Premiers of the colonies had already been invited to London to talk over' all the large questions, and Great Britain also was bound to talk tliein over with' her allies, when the time for making peace terms. should come. So 1 tried to find out what was flu' explanation of this aberration liv Mr Long, and tlio prevailing explanation wan that he had lost his son two dav3 before,

A man who knows the personnel of the House of Commons perhaps as well as anybody in it, told me that the members who were most relentless in their attitude towards peace terms and toward Germany were those whose 30113 had been killed, I called his attention to the fact that Mr Asqiiith's son had been killed, I have heard Mr Asquith speak in the House since that loss, and been struck with the gentleness of his voice and manner.

"Mr Asquith," was the reply, "is a big man, It does not affect the big men that way, but it does so affect the large l majority." I am not bigoted enough to think I can answer this question, of whetliev suffering tlio loss of those near to us more often softens or hardens the heart, but I want to mention one case I know of—that of a man , who was not a pacifist before he lost his son, and has become one since. "Nationality."

A word that everybody is using just now is the word "Nationality." We are supposed to do everything on nationalistic lines, That conception is put to the front in most of the great geographical and political changes that the Allies plan, That it :.t an extremely important fact to consider I do not doubt, but like other facts it cannot usefully be considered alone, and it is easy to exaggerate it, We know, for example, that there is. a jgreat outburst of nationalistic feeling in Russia. We know that it is so strong, notably in the Army, that it keeps the country from going in the direction of a separate peace, and also that it is the explanation of the vacillation in /the Capitql about the composition of the Cabinet, the machine putting in one man'after another because he is, or is supposed to be, sympathetic with their point of view, and then speedily throwing him out because they ave alarmed at the indigmition caused in the nation by his inefficiency. ;

This increase of nationalism in Russia is unmistakably one of the biggest developments of the war, and yet it would be a great failure in imagination to conceive the Russian people as being wholly made over in three years, •

The year 1917 and probably the year 1918 are going to be spent in .making the world over., The task for any one country of carrying on its share merely in conducting the war, seems .superhuman. The.task of conducting the war and keeping open one's mind and heart is still more superhuman. In addition', we have the immense difficulties of' obtaining real knowledge. Against nil those obstacles, what kind of a record is going to be made by tho little race of man? Imperfect at the c.best. Better, let us hope, because of our own participation. At least all Liberals over here bolievo it will be.better because of us. Every day I feel overwhelmed by the big--11088 of the problems and the shortness of liuninii vision, and . yet every, day.: as I think, of what will sopn fall on a few men, J, still cling to the -belief that, it (is possible to make out of.the. settlement something good enough to pay for its cost.- 'l'o. realise, all the difficulties and the imperfections of our information is not to be discouraged, It\s to bp prepared. , 'K -n 1