The North Otago Times TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1916. RUSSIA'S RECOVERY.

North Otago Times, Volume CIV, Issue 13723, 14 November 1916, Page 4

The North Otago Times TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1916. RUSSIA'S RECOVERY.

In "Les Miscrables," Victor Hugo maintains that Napoleon was broitglft 'lb'Wat Waterloo' not by' Bhicltel''s 'timely- arrival, not ib,y the fighting valour of-the British and' Prussians or the brilliant strategy of Wellington, but because Providence had decreed the downfall of the tyrant and the hour had struck for the triumph of the legions fighting on the side 'of 'Right, Has the brilliant French writer been proved wrong? Unusual but decisive factors played their part before the historic battle was fought, and very few

historians have attempted to interpret them; that is to say: Napoleon's unusual irritability and amazing and unaccountable indecision; the heavy fall of rain which delayed the opening of the battle; the answer the guide gave Napoleon; and the inexplicable delay of Marshal Ney in carrying, out Napoleon's order to seize Quatre;Bras and then turn eastwards and crush Blucher's army, especially as the Emperor added to his order the historic message: "The fate of France is in your hands." These were contributing factors; indeed, they

were factors that decided the fate of the -world and made possible the deliverance of civilisation from the menace of the overlordship of Napoleon. Perhaps Hugo read the signs aright, The story of the Napoleonic hid for -world, dominion is enthralling and perplexing, but it has receded into history. To-day the world war holds the stage and the. whole of Christendom are the auditors. Thoughtful men are finding in the- great struggle a never-ending theme for study, and again and again the question, is being asked: Why does not Providence intervene and bring defeat to the. Germans ? Many close ol> servers of the military operations; indeed, some of the leading, miliary critics are quite unable to explain certain acts of omission on the part of the enemy. Some writers hva , confident that the German General Staff made a fatal blunder when it was decided to make n spectacular rush upon Paris instead of swarming upon the channel coast and occupying Calais and Boulogne. Leading military.■'• writers claim with remarkable emphasis that when Germany decided, at the beginning of winter last year, to transfer the offensive from the East to the West, they knew Germany had lost the Avar. In the dark hour when the.-Tsar became commander-in-chief, the Russian troops were being terribly mauled. How dark were those days few knew. ; The Russians, were fight-, irig tlie'' numberless and 'well-' iequipped, legions of Germans, with one rifle against three, and one shell, against ten, and there was absolutely no possibility that Russia 'could "become adequately armecl'beforethe'following spring. One writer-'describes the danger-ousvsituation-.ou the Eastern-front ■■j'Manjrthjjught

that "the operations round Yilnu would see the hastily-gathered Russian levies in I lie north cut oil: ■by the German thrust at Svcn-, tsiany from their friends, arid ,other good judges supposed that Germany would resume her, adranee when the ground and the rivers and the snow.froze hard ind take Petrograd in a winter campaign, with all,'the munition factories at the capital and'all the ice-bound fleet, We v knew well enough that the Russian patient would recover if he could survive the winter, but the winter seemed likely to be inclement, and the patient's pulse was very weak. It was a period'of-most horrible anxiety and those best informed feared the most, and not military dangers atone.'' Why did Germany halt 1 By masterly strategy the trusted General Alexeieff pulled the Russian armies out of the Vilna trap—his infantry fighting with all their old glorious obstinacy, with rifles when they could get them, and if not, with sticks

and stones. Russia had lost hundreds of big guns, thousands of rifles,/and whole battalions of brave men, while the Germans had not only an immense accumulation of their own artillery, but also the guns which had been captured—, for example, 1200 at Novb'G'edrgievsk and "827 at Kovno. Without rifles, guns and shells an army of the most valorous men is of small service. Why did Germany lialt 1 : There is but one explanation, It was certainly not want of troops, as the Verdun operations soon showed. "With the Russians," admits one of the leadnig military writers, "we must piously attribute the decision to a higher power which prevented the German command from accomplishing its'ends." The fate of Germany was sealed with her decision to halt on the Eastern front, Russia is herself again, and ,as General Brusiloft 1 reminds lis, it is merely a question of time for her to bring all her great armies into effective use and the Allies to make good her fast-diminishing inferiority in artillery, then to smash to pieces our obstinate Teutonic enemy.