THE MILLION UNIT

North Otago Times, Volume C, Issue 13147, 31 August 1914, Page 3

THE MILLION UNIT

, | 1 \ VASTNESB OF WAfl.\ *_ i QIIE&TION 'Oil 1 ijNDI/BAIfCJ]. J (JAN ANY NATION &TANI) IT? J (J3y Adam M'Cay, in tlicfcjduey Bun.) 1 The um,j; ot nuniboi foi the aimy ' of n gieat inililaiji nlitiou today is J the million. Lpolc though the libl of ' men lU.iikibloloi wai in Euiopeau coim f tiies,,and jou v \\\tt bee the iollomng 1 figuios: Oounaijiy, 0,000,000, 1 '1,000,000, Buwi,i, b,000,000, Austn.l, 1 <1,000,000; Hal), (1,000,000. liieatluaaL 1 this is a gioat piopoition of the aide- 1 bodied maiihoodj of tho nation., ,'Jhc quostipii arises, how long can any people,, . endure the vvithdiawal of all those ■ men from its .-ordinary industrial ma- ■ chine, fiom tho woik of feeding and clothing theii depoiidents, and of supplying tho country with the coinmor,cial activity which is its life I ' t Along 200 miles ot cojmtryan,prance ■ and Belgium, two' million, mou are -estimated to be eutoiing into maitial ac tion. These make uji tho actual fight iiig'liu?9, aud their ,numboi is .hugely increased by the othei annics behind tlieiji, oiigftgcd in supply and-tiauspoit. Nothing like. this lias eypi,. happened before. Two armies of ,(pli. a :i sizo, liavo never • fought; Tho -foice of a million men which is supposed, to June come fi-om Persia against ancient Gieeco certainly did .not contain - the nuniber of men which' history and tradition havo ascribed to it. - ; ' Napoleoil'D SjnaE Armies., At no time did Napoleon-have on foot in Europe many more, tlian 600,000 armed men; and this number, which today is small,- was' not concentrated for a; single great collision. Tlie conscriptions made by Napoleon cfcrtainly 'indicated armies'of. grcjitci"., magnitude; but those conscriptions, though in fact of startling size for Europe of a hundred years ago,'.were not tr\ilv us wide and grand as,the EniperoV -])Wtejided. The edict for a hugo ,conscription always contained.bluff as one of its motives. Napoleon's purpose was partly served if the Powers lighting' against him believed him lo possess those great forces. To deceive the enemy as to his strength was-found by this brilliant genius of war to ; be useful in strategy as well as in tactics. ; Jt was alsd ot advantage tu tho morale of the I'rciich ariny to have it believed that the reserves available for it were of a size which in tlioso days seemed practically inexhaustible. lu tho height of his power Napoleon ruled over an Empire containing a population of more than 40,000,000. Out of that great rcMuitiiig-grpiiiid 'he drew an army to cover all Europe, never more than about half the size of the one German army on the Eroncli frontier to-day. And it exhausted tho lield, France, which furnished most of tlie levies, gasped with fatigue as the years went on; and.in the end the old lighting force went out of the country. Resources Compared, Possibly in those days -tlie resources of ut country were not iio great as they are now. But, on the other hand, tho requirements of an army Avere not so exacting. The speed of strategic movement was not so high. AVar material Was not so costly, and it was not dissipated with such a tremendous explosion of energy as that which attends ut battle nowadays. Tho rate at which ammunition is .or can bp'expended in niodorii war, and the cost which it involves, as. compared. Avith the speed and expense, of times when soldiers opened lire at 1100 yards with the ojd brown Bess, afford? a typical comparison .of tlm conditions, of- war to-day lyitli those of a century /ago. Thus it'may bp assumed that if si nation to-day puts only ojie-sixtieth of its total population into, the lield,. as Napoleon did, strain will be no legs than' 'it was then, What is to bo said of llussia,'Prance, and Germany, all of whom propose to use at least oue-iiflecnth' of the population for war'? Comparatively shaking, they wear out their resourcea-four times as faat as NapoleoiV-did.,. ,'. , Million on Million. Say that a million' Oermaiis are waiting for, or engaging in, battle on each frontier. This is quit'e a modest estimate. These two million men must .have about half a million more behind them, looking after supplies of food, of ammunition, and of clothing for them. Thus two and a half millions of the people'are taken'out of the industry of the country. They were | farmers or bootmakei's or tailors or labourers or factory operatives or work--1 men of some other sort; and now they ' are worse than unproductive; they are destructive. : In | add,ition ( |they are i making exorbitant 'deiWands on the rest of the population.. 'JPqod, garments, am- ' munition, have'to be manufactured and sent to them, always at costly speed, and with an expense in distribution

which occurs only in war. They drain the country's productive power to a dreadful degree at the same time as they remove theijrown; service from industry. llow: long can this last ! Novor Tried Before. ' Also,'how long can it'lie effectively done? No arniv lias iver < tried, in peace mamcuvres, 1 to-, go through a weekV'campaigii avjlli a million men making the demands of war. In the clockwork' expennieiits of peace training hall' a million men have here and there been vwitli supply and transport' carefully arranged lor them, Tho derniaiiS-hlivi! even conducted in:tprcßtiiig; tosts" of the capacity of. soldiers to/''live on tljo country. 1 ' 1 But in. peace, msliuinivres the headquarters ctarf decides what the eventualities ol battle are to be, and no demands arc made, upon the/system which, h;(vc not been prearranged, and provided for, The task becomes infinitely, harder vvljmi it-is'the eucjiiv who complicates tilt plans, and forces the heroic effort updji the array stop. The .diffcrdiitc is like llio dilkrcnec between beating yoursell' al; a(|d.beatmg an.opponent Both are interesting -and instructive .n'f . (•uj(:ll;iuii's,'"l.iut everybody luiinvs Vyhicli is the more'puzzling.. .. • i of Fatigue, . f \ ' fatigue liTav iall upon a 1 nation a? : well as upon a man; ami upon a mi . tinn because it falls on men. Then

jtiii'jflneLliug biains fOl the Cci in an wai ( 1 'ti^'stoiu.' They mo li.ibJo to giow lveaiy c The men in the Held giow we.uy. The t 'dircJtors are harassed,ami : tiled when ' plans 'miscarry, aiul .mfcui'iito, ipuz/|ei) i liUvo - to 'bo \intanglod hi a. lute with \ Hint' 1 /Clio men 111 tlio held know notli- J jijg of high sliulcgy, J - <uul Iheybhuulei , painfully in oiloi-ts >.iui- which tlicy see no favourable results. As boon as this ' fatigue falls 011 an aimy the btiani 1 upon tlio nutloii supporting, it.ia evci } so-much groalor. They have to. cany 1 tlio extra burden created by tho army's 1 languor. or- despondency. - The; moie 1 that disoraiigisiition spieads the gieatoi ( is llio tost system. This is 1 truo m every business. It is paiticu- ! larlv truo iu war. "When this desperate weariness' falls also upon the nation which; is niauitam- • ing tho army, Jiow.'cau it continue the. I ■war? '• • ' . : Oliqivp. Staudiug, Annies. Earlier'.wars did not so soon come • to an.end through exhaustion, In Na-' poleon's time tlio. European nations sup'ported standing armies, but they were , small in comparison with the general populace. Often they wore hired from abroad. ' Louis XlY.'s army of -100,000 j did . not deplete the ranks of French ' iiiiluatiy.' The Icings of, Europe used | to' pay their armies out of taxes, in the imposition of which the people had little .voice,' Rapid ; surrenders before the arrival of complete weariness, and revivals. of,'fighting strength, were the rule for other countries than France in their struggles with the Corsicau. Since then Europe lias known only one firstclass war, namely, tho conflict of. 1870 between France and Germany. If the Austro-Prussiau war be admitted, into tho same class it does not disturb, the main contention, for it was rapidly over, before, exhaustion could come to either combatant. ; The Franco-Prussian war afforded no evidence that even in IS7O a great wa; could be waged by a European Power without ruinous weariness to its people. That war 'was a. light in which the French side was licked immediately through poor preparation and bad strategy. A paper army met a real army, and was routed. But' the position is different to-day. Slow Results of Strategy. , Great battles to-day ca.nnolj be woit by swift tactics. Skilful moves iu attack, clever outflanking devices, brave charges and assaults will not suffice to drive out of a position of advantage a vast force of a million men, An army council or a commander-in-chief must look lirst and last for strategic results, The fact that Germany's ■policy is dominated in greater degree by this principle makes the Germans appear to have great hope' of success in the .land war in Europe. But the consideration, of the nation's capacity for endurance here again comes into play. Strategy may give its results slowly. Can Germany beat Franco'/ 4s oniy one question. Other questions to be asked are: Can Germany beat Franco swiftly'? Can Germany beat France so swiftly that she will be able to complete the victory before the hour of exhaustion overtakes her? . Tlio Onc-Battlc War. The enormous strain of war, becoming greater (we do not yet know how much greater) with the' passage of every Meek, even every day, is one reason lor the evolving in European military circles of the doctrino that the Power which gains the first big victory over another will be able to end and win the- war. This is not a universally accepted doctrine, J.u France it is combated as strenuously as it is advocated. Maybe those who believe and disbelieve, this theory are really on* common ground; for the decisiveness ol an engagement for the whole war will pi'o- ■ liably depend upon the completeness of 1 victory or defeat. The'best hope I'or the world, if it is to be a world-con-demning war, is that France and Gcr- ' many may during the next few days ; or weeks light a great battle which will 1 be indecisive of the fate of the two i nations in tho war. If on the Eusso--1 German frontier a similar deadlock should occur, there will be an obvious moral for the •'Continent which has for • a generation devoted its vital energy i. to the task of preparing for this Titanic ■ combat. It will then be shown that ;■ war is utterly futile. ■ With two na--1 tions armed for mutual slaughter, the , best result in the interests of future > jWce would be that tli'ey should both i realise-'that after all their huge pre- ! parations, they are both ' so well pre- ; pared, and prepared on so vast a scale, that the exhaustion of'- their.capacity - for fighting must come before either can gain the decisive victory. ' 3 What is', to Follow? i The popular estimate of the cost of t war, iu terms of cash, is that Europe - is spending about £10,000,000 a day. 1 That is more likely to be too modest , than to be exaggerated. ' The £600,-. i 000,000 iu the war chests of Europe will i be exhausted in less thau GO days at i the present pace of effort. s 'When the first grandiose assault of • arms has out the strength of tho nations, supposing neither the Alliance nor tho. Entenle to have decisively won, y whak'is to follow 1 ' A frightful possiii bjlity is that war may coiUinue on a a scale less magnificent iu its devastation, n with the impoverished nations struge gjing on for years in the midst oi| their [• misery. 'But surely human wisdom and d niercy could not tolerate this iniquity; d nor would the nations which bear tho i, awful cost persist in the futile horror, I- Germany's Position. I- It is at the present'moment hard to ft see Jiow Germany and Austria' can be / defeliteii save, by exhaustion. ■ Placed if by political boundaries in the dominant 'c middle position between their two it strong military opponents (France and r. Russia), and with other strategic a|ln vantages iu thliir favour in the geo--10 grapliy of the German-frontiers,''they n' present- almost in'supeVable" difficulties ;c. to;coiu|ucst by inyasioii,, Those people i':' wiio : ,expect;' to, see; '.'tlossiicks on .the i; v Dliiiie:." a!'e< unusually- optimistic. $ On the otlierlia'iid, if the resistance h in; Belgium and Northern' I'Vniini can ;. ljiit prevent Germany from stabbing fi : : the -heart iby.yictoj-i----ts' ous' desceiit 1 upon Paris, it'is equally t- diflicnlt tojeo how Gormany can, tlion •o avoid failure bv exhaustion, ; (Failure

will be'as salutary, a loßßoa.as, actli(»] ' defeat, fox the cost in money ami roiseiy to llio (lonium lmtioii lull in that cnßij bo onoimous. Deleid of llio Geimuil fleet by llio I!ijlis|i navy luiaten, perhaps make inevitable, Goimuny's collap&e. * Trtsoiit Signs. .There aro as yet no truo sigua of mid lasbitude oi (Icimans at Liege, tlw ■ill-fitting'.boots, :tho\ short. Biipplies r .tliQ rumoured - discontents: anil desertions, aro not oHtual: significance. Tho fust attack .on Liogo was obviously a bold, preliminary stroke that did- not , succeed. The defeat was. a , lebult <to Germany, and a moat viiluublo. gain m. tnno and morale, to Frauco; but it was not a conclusive encounter, Ex-; haustion is not to bo prophesied from tho encounter of arnncs jumboicd by the ten-thousand, or tho hnnilied-thou-sjiud; but liutiuiuil. futiguu may come frdin thecollisions of; moil in millions., If these speculations bo wrong, and Germany, or any bo able tc support through a protracted war an army in which the, million is tho unit in counting, ,tho outlook for tho world is terrible. It would mean nothing less than keeping Europe,as-it has been, an armod camp, wherein the ambition of .the strongest' group of / nations to exercise fierce domination by,the sword will be gratified. ' ■■ ■ ■ .