PROFICIENCY IN DRILL AND INEFFICIENCY IN WARFARE.

North Otago Times, Volume VII, Issue 158, 27 November 1866, Page 3

PROFICIENCY IN DRILL AND INEFFICIENCY IN WARFARE.

The " Times" advocates important changes in the existing system, of drill in tlie British army, referring, for illustrations and instances, to the Ne\r Zealand campaign. The drift of the argument may be gathered from the following quotation : — " No New Zealand war, even if reputed successful, over left the natives with a conviction that they had better not go to war again. They rather enjoyed their campaign than not, and only made overtures for peace when fighting had become tedious, or the harvest demanded their attention. Six months afterwards the news came that ' war' had broken out again, and that a body of natives, perhaps 300 in number, had kept the Queen's troops at bay for a month, and then decamped without leaving wounded or prisoners behind them. At last, however, and after humiliating experience, the secret of all this mischief was discovered, or, in other words, recognised. What kept up the New Zealand war was the army which we sent to New Zealand to put it down. Our regular troops, regularly manoeuvred under regular commanders according to the theories of European campaigning, were not the troops for this kind of service. Turned into Volunteers, and relieved of stocks, pipeclay, knapsacks, drill, and science, they would have disposed of the enemy quickly enough, but their natural powers and courage were utterly destroyed by the application of professional tactics to rough bush-fighting. At length the truth was seen. The war was handed over to the colonial levies, with a few regulars, under a really active commander, and in six months the delusion was dispelled for ever. Not only need we never again send an army to New Zealand, but we shall probably never again hear of a New Zealand war. The lesson, however, thus taught us is of wider and general application. The system which disabled our army m New Zealand cannot well be expected to improve it anywhere else. There is no reason, of course, for jumping to the conclusion that) the discipine and tactics which so visibly sutliced for New Zealand Volunteers would suffice, under all circumstances, for the whole British army ; but we believe that it is really true that our system of drill, while it harasses the men and renders the service unpopular, is actually more damaging than advantageous to the efficiency of the troops. An elaborate and complicated system of parade movements, half of which would be utterly useless in the work of a campaign, worries the soldier, puzzles the officer, and forma the staple of military instruction, to the exclusion of far moro important training. It would surely be better to give the soldier more liberty, and to cultivate his intelligence and enlarge his resources while relieving him from the irksomeness of purely mechanical exercise. When fine, brave, and well equipped troops are systematically put at a disadvantage by halfarmed savages, it is clear there must be some impediment to success in the system adopted and the tactics employed. In fact, .the Colonial Volunteers actually took the native redoubts, which our regular soldiers could not, or rather did not, take. The soldiers could have done the work fast enough in Volunteer fashion, but found it impracticable after the fashion prescribed to them. It is evident, not only from this example, but from the enlarged experience of European warfare, that a soldier need not be such a machine as we make him, and that under a more intelligent system he could not only be produced with far greater ease, but be a far better specimen into the bargain. High drill is" by no means identical with perfect efficiency. The knowledge of a few simple movements, combined with expertness, in the use of arms, and, above all, what that muscular training which gives the greatest amount of activity" and enduranco, would form a very good qualification for modern soldiers. We have seen in the last few months that troops should be strong and hardy, able to march well and march long, that they should be so clothed as to retain the freest possible play of limb, and that they should be armed with the most destructive weapon known to scionce. We have seen that beyond this very little proficiency is requirod, and that the rest depends upon the perfection of subsidiary departments, and such general organization as will place troops in the field at the shortest possible notice, and maintain them there in the greatest possible efficiency by good food, good transport, good medical service, good supports, and good reliefs. We should like to see this lesson seriously applied. New Zealand wars are past and gone ; other colonial garrisons may be measured by the experience acquired in New Zealand, and while we thank our countrymen at the antipodes for their service and their example, we should wish to see them liberally rewarded with the honors for which they are anxious, and which they have so gallantly earned. But, besides all this, wo should improve the lesson at home. We seem to be taking such excessive pains in the manufacture of soldiers that the product itself actually suffers in the process. A simpler system, with more useful practice and less drill, more freedom of miud and muscle, and less complexity of exercise and routine, would probably give us at once a better army and make that army a more popular profession."