NORTH versus MIDDLE ISLAND INTERESTS.

Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, Volume XX, 12 September 1861, Page 4

NORTH versus MIDDLE ISLAND INTERESTS.

[From the Nelson Examiner, August 21. ] With whatever feelings we may look upon the return of Sir George Grey to take upon him the government of New Zealand, indifference is not among the number. We all feel that, whether for good or for evil, his presence, among us is destined to have a marked influence upon the probable course of events. He comes with a reputation for ability in dealing with Bavage or half civilized peoples, which his success with the Caffres and their kindred tribes bordering on the Cape colony has confirmed and increased; but it is singular that, with all our knowledge of his previous career, no one ventures to form a decided opinion as to the line of policy he will ultimately adopt in New Zealand. The two rumours which have lately been current rather amusingly show the great discrepancy of men's ideas on this subject ; one report being that he was to be accompanied by 5,000 men ; and the other, that his first act on accepting his appointment, had been to charter five vessels with, cargoes of sugar, flour, and blankets. We, for our parts, are inclined to attach some credit to both reports; or rather to that which is intended or meant by them ; to the probability that his conduct will be shaped with a view to the possible necessity of having recourse to both these measures ; and whilst we have no doubt that he will go as far as he safely can go in the path of conciliation, and endeavour to make it the interest of the natives to keep on good terms with us, yet, that in case his concessions should only make them more confident and overbearing, he will not scruple to resort to other measures, or to call for whatever force may be necessary, in his judgment, to carry his point. We cannot doubt that he will be armed with full powers to adopt either alternative ; that he will have an ample command of funds ; a promise of whatever military force he may, on examination, deem requisite ; and full powers for carrying out whatever measures he may determine upon ; even to the extent, in the last resort, of suspending the Constitution Act. In olden times, the Romans were accustomed, when threatened with imminent perils, to suspend the laws and appoint a Dictator. With iis, who form but an insignificant fraction of the British Empire, no such power exists •, nor indeed does it in any authority known to the Constitution save that which gave us the powers of sell-government which we now exercise, namely, the united will of Queen, Lords, and Commons ; and any assumption of such extraordinary powers, even if sanctioned by the full consent of the Privy Council of Great Britain, would be clearly illegal, and would leave the Governor responsible for his acts in any of the Courts of Law, unless protected from the consequences by a Bill of Indemnity. The proclamation of martial law is no exception to this rule, although it is sometimes so considered ; it is in fact an extreme instance of that assumption of absolute or dictatorial power which we refer to •, being, as the great Duke of Wellington once defined it, no law at all, but the will of the commander, without limit or control. Nothing but the actual impossibility of carrying out the law, or the presence of some immediate or overwhelming danger which could not otherwise be met, would justify such a stretch of power, or save any one who authorized or acted under it from the consequences of his illegal acts. We have, therefore, but little reason to fear that any such extreme assumption of power will be attempted ; but we think it very possible that Sir George Grey may find himself rather hampered by the restrictions which the Constitution Act may place in his way, and still more by those which the present state of relations between the Governor and his Executive, based upon official memoranda and carried out very fully in practice, may interpose to his full liberty of action. - We do not think that he will allow either of these considerations to influence him much; the Constitution Act expressly reserves the management of native affairs for the Governor ; and he may not consider himself bound by what might be looked upon as a mere private or

personal arrangement between those who came after him and the Executive for the time being ; and it is in this direction that we think the vigilance of our representatives will have to be exercised in looking after the interests of their constituents. If he is what we once knew him, he will look less for independent coadjutors than for willing subordinates ; and the Prime Minister who talked of being entrusted with the conduct of the war, would soon find himself engaged in a preliminary contest of a very different description. But we trust that, whoever may be in power, or rather in office, the, opportunity which will assuredly present itsell will be taken advantage of to bring affairs to a very different issue. The cardinal vice of the present system is that the sole management of the Natives is left to the Governor, and the entire control of the funds which are required to administer this power with effect is in the hands of the settlers. Now the power of the purse really involves and includes all others ; and our responsible Ministers, even if they had not declared that they looked upon it as their bounden duty to undertake the task of civilizing the Maoris, would in numberless ways have had it forced upon their consideration. But the consequence has been that their efforts have been misrepresented and their motives misunderstood. Colonel Gore Browne has been reproached, we believe most untruly, for following their advice instead of his own judgment ; the war is said to be the result of their counsels ; and has been termed emphatically " a settlers' war," as being caused by the pressure from without, which they were unable to resist, and in which they sympathized. The situation is essentially a false one, from which we should extricate ourselves without delay. If we do not, we run great risk of being called upon to involve ourselves in debt, and cripple ourselves for years to come for purposes of which we had no previous cognizance, to carry out designs in which we had no voice, and to try experiments in whose success we have no confidence.

There is nothing perhaps that produces a greater glow of self satisfaction at a cheaper rate than the exercise of vicarious liberality. The generosity of churchwardens has passed into a proverb; which might with equal truth be applied to all public men and public bodies up to representative Councils and Ministers of State. Let them manfully resist the temptation, great as we acknowledge it to be ; and withdraw from the pretence of directing where they have no real power of carrying out their views, and where their interference has been made the occasion for impugning their motives, and for throwing upon them the whole moral responsibility, and an undue share of the positive burdens, of all the after events.

The settlers of New Zealand are the frontiersmen of the British Empire. Through them she has extended her dominion over a country which in the hands of any other power would have constituted an ever menacing danger to her other colonies in these seas of no small magnitude. She has reserved to herself the management of the half civilized tribes we are brought necessarily into contact with. If she takes advantage of our position, either mediately through the Governor she sends to us, or immediately by peremptory despatches prohibiting her troops from acting when required, unless under guarantees which we feel to be excessive or unjust, we must decline to give them, or undertake such responsibilities. It would be as reasonable to charge the county rates of Hampshire with the expenses of resisting a French attack on the Isle of Wight. Finally, should an Auckland and Wellington Ministry seek to drag us into engagements which we disapprove and repudiate, we must withdraw from the connection altogether. We, the settlers in the Middle Island, have no personal interest in the dispute ; or any other feelings respecting it, although our nearness to the scene of action may make them more lively, which we do not entertain in common with the colonists of Tasmania, or the Cape of Good Hope; and we could not prove this more effectually to the somewhat obtuse perceptions of those at a distance than by 1 moving for a separation.