HEREDITARY MONARCHY VINDICATED.

Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, Volume VIII, Issue VIII, 28 July 1849, Page 85

HEREDITARY MONARCHY VINDICATED.

'By Lord Jbfvkky.

We shall take leave to consider Royalty as being, on the whole, but a human institution, — originating in a view to the general good, and not to the gratification of the individual upon whom the office is conferred; or at least only capable of being justified, or deserving to be retained, where it is found or believed to be 'actually beneficial to the whole society. Now, we think that, generally speaking, it is a highly beneficial institution; and that the benefits which it is calculated to confer art great and obvious. „

From the first moment that men began to associate together, and to act in concert for their general good and protection, it would be found that all of tnem could not take a share in consulting and regulating their operations, snd that the greater part must submit to the direction of certain managers and leaders. Among these, again, some one would naturally assume a pre-eminence; and, in time of war especially, would be allowed to exercise a great authority. Straggles would as necesarily ensue for retaining this poßt of distinction, and for supplanting its actual posessor, and whether there was a general acquiescence in the principle of having one acknowledged chief, or a desire to be guided and advised by a plurality of those who seemed best qualified for the task, there would be equal hazard, or rather certainty, of perpetual strife, tumult, and dissension, from the attempts of ambitious individuals, either to usurp an ascendancy over all their competitors, or to dispute with him who had already obtained it, his right to possession. Every one possessed of any considerable means of influence would thus be tempted to aspire to a precarious sovereignty; and while the inferior persons of the' community would be opposed to each other, as adherents of the respective pretenders, not only would all case of the general good be omitted, but the society would become a prey to perpetual feuds, cabals, and hostilties, subversive of the first principles of its institution.

Among the remedies which would naturally present themselves for this great evil, the most efficacious, though not perhaps at first sight the most obvious, would be to provide some regular and authentic form for the election of one ackovvledged chief, by a fair but pacific competition ; — the term of whose authority would gradually be prolonged to that of his natural life,— and afterwards extended to the lives of his remotest descendants. The advantages which seem to us to be peculiar to this arrangemeut, are, first, to disarm the ambition of dangerous and turbulent individuals, by removing the great prize of supreme authority, at all times, and entirely, from competition; and, secondly, to render this authority itself more manageable and less hazardous, by delivering it over peaceably, and upon expressed or understood conditions, to an hereditary prince ; instead of letting it be seized upon by a fortunate conqueror, who would think himself entitled to use it — as conquerors commonly use their booty — for his own exclusive gratification. The steps, then, by which we are conducted to the justification of hereditary monarchy, are shortly as follows :— Admitting all men to be equal in rights, they can never be equal in natural endowments, — nor long equal in wealth and other acquisitions; — absolute liberty, therefore, or equal participation of power, is altogether out of the question ; and a kind of aristocracy, or disorderly and fluctuating supremacy of the richest and most accomplished, may be considered as the primeval state of society. Now this, even if it could "be supposed to be peaceable and permanent. Is by no means a desirable state for the persons subjected to this multifarious and irregular authority. But it is plain that it could not be peaceable — that even among the rich, and the' accomplished, and the daring, some would be more rich, more daring, and more accomplished than tbe rest ; and that those in the foremost ranks who were most nearly on an equality, would be armed against each other by mutual jealousy and ambition ; while^ those who were a little lower, would combine, out of envy and' resentment, to defeat or resist, by their junction, tbe pretensions of the few who had thus outstripped their original associates. Thus, there would not only be no liberty or security for tbe body of the people, but the whole woujd be exposed to ' the horror tfnd distraction of perpetual intestine contentions. The creation of one sovereign, therefore, whom the whole society would acknowledge as supreme, was a great point gained for tranquillity, as well as individual independence; and in order to avoid the certain evils of perpetual struggles for dominion, and the imminent hazard of falling at last under the absolute will of an exasperated conqueror, nothing could be so wisely devised as to agree upon the nomination of a king; and thus to get rid of a multitude of petty tyrants,, and the risk of military despotism, by the establishment of a legitimate

monarchy. The first king would probably be tbe most popular and powerful individual in. the community; and the first idea would, in all likelihood, be to appoint his successor, on account of the same qualifications. But it would speedily be discovered, that this would give rise at the death of every eovreign — and, indedd, proepectively, long before it— to same fatal competitions 'and dissensions, which had formerly been perpetual; and not only hazard a civil war on evers accession, but bring the successful competitor to the threne, with feelings of extreme hostility towards one half of his subjects, and of extreme partiality to the other. The chances of not .finding' eminent talents for command in the person of the sovereign, therefore would soon be seen to be a far less evil than the sanguinary competition that would ensue, if merit were made the sole ground of preferment ; and a very little reflection, or experience, would also serve to show, that the sort of merit which was most likely to succeed in such a competition, did not promise a more desirable sovereign than might be probably reckoned on, in the common course of hereditary succession. The only safe course, therefore, was to take this great prize altogether out of the lottery of human life— to make the supreme dignity of the (State professedly and altogether independent of merit k or popularity ; and to fix it immutably in a place quite out of the. career of ambition.

This great point, then was gained by the mere institution of monarchy, and by rendering it hereditary* The chief, cause of internal discord was removed, and the most dangerous incentive to ambition placed in a great measure beyond the sphere of its operation ; — and this we have always considered to be the peculiar characteristic advantage of that form of government. A Jpretty (important chapter, however, remains, as to the extent of the powers that ought to be vested in ° the monarch, and the nature of the checks by which the limitation of those powers 'should be rendered effectual. And here it will be readily understood, that, considering, as we do, the chief advantage of monarchy to consist in its taking away the occasions of contention for the first place in the State, and in a manner neutralizing that place by separating it entirely from any notion [of merit or popularity in the possessor — we cannot consistently be for allotting a greater measure of actual power to it than is absolutely necessary for answering this purpose. Our notions of this measure, however, are by no means of a jealous or penurious description. We must give enough of real power, and - distinction, and prerogative, to make it truly and substantially the (first place in the State, and also to make it impossible far the occupiers of inferior places to endanger the general peace by* their contentions ;— for, otherwise, the whole evils which its institution was meant to obviate would recur with accumulated force, and the Bitae fatal competitions 'be renewed among persons of disorderly ambition, for those other situations, by whatever name they might be called, in which, though nominally subordinate to the throne, the actual powers of sovereignty were embodied. But, on the other hand, we would give no powers to the Sovereign, or to any other officer in the community, beyond what were evidently required for the 'public good; and no powers at all, on the exercise of which there was not an efficient control, and for the use of which there was not a substantial responibility. It is in the recbnciling of these two conditions that the whole difficulty of the theory of a perfect monarchy consists. If you do not control your sovereign, he will be in danger of becoming a despot; and if you do control him, there is danger, 'unless you choosegthe depository of this control with singular caution, that you create another power, that is uncontrolled and uncontrollable— to be the prey of audacious leader's and outrageous factions, in spite of tbe hereditary settlement of the nominal sovereignty. Though there is some difficulty, however, in this problem, and though we learn from history, that various errors have been committed in an attempt at its practical solution, yet we do not conceive it as by any means insoluble; and think, indeed, that, with the lights which we may derive from the experience of our own constitution, its demonstration tasty be effected by a very moderate exertion of sagacity. It will be best understood, however, by a short view of the nature of the powers to be controlled, and of the system of checks which have, at different times, been actually resorted to.

In the 'first place, then, we roust beg leave to'remined our readers, however superfluous it may appear, that as kings are generally allowed to be mere mortajf, .they cannot of themselves have any greater powers, either of body or mind, than other individuals, and muetj in fact, be inferior in both respects to very 'many of their subjects. Whatever powers . they have, therefore, must be powers, conferred upon them by the consent of the stronger part of their subjects, and are, in fact, really

and truly the powers of those persons. The most absolute despot accordingly* of whom history furnishes any record, must have governed merely by the free will of those who chose to obey himyin compelling the rest of his subjects to obedience. The Sultan, as Mr. Hume remarks, may (indeed drive tha bulk of his unarmed subjects, like brutes, by mere force ; but be must lead his armed Janissaries like men, by their reason and free will. And so it is in all other governments. The power of the sovereign is nothing else than the power —the actual force of muscle or of mmd — which a certain part of his subjects choose to lend for carrying his orders into effect; and the check or limit to this power is, in all cases, ultimately and in effect, nothing else than their refusal to act any longer as the instruments of his pleasure. The check, therefore, is substantially the same in kind, in all eases whatever, and must necessarily exist in full vigour in every, country in the world, though the likelihood of its beneficial .application depends greatly on the structure of society in each particular nation ; and the possibility of applying it with ease and safety must result wholly from the contrivance that have been adopted to make bear, at once gradually and steadily, on the power it is destined to regulate. It is here accordingly, and here only, that there is any material difference between a good and a bad constitution of' monarchical government. The ultimate, and only real limit to what is called the power of the sovereign, is the refusal of the consent or co-operation of those who possess the substantial power of the community, and who, during their voluntary concert with the sovereign, 1 allow this power of theirs to pass under his name. In considering whether this refusal is likely to be wisely and beneficially interposed, it is material therefore to inquire in whom, in any particular case, the power of interposing it is vested ; or, in other words, in what individuals the actual power of coercing and compelling the submission of the bulk of the community is intrinsically vested. If every individual were equally gifted, and equally situated, the answer would be — in the numerical majority. But as this never can be the case, this power will frequently be found to reside in a very small (proportion of the whole society. la rude times, when there is little intelligence [or means of concert and communication, a very moderate number of armed and disciplined' forces will be able, so long as they keep together, to overawe, and actually overpower, the whole unarmed inhabitants, even of an extensive regional and, accordingly, in such times, the necessity of procuring the good-will and -consent of the soldiery, is the only check upon the power of the sovereign ; or, in other words, the soldiers may dojwhat they choose, and their nominal master can do nothing which they do not choose. Such is the state of the worst despotisms. The check upon the Royal authority is the same in substance as in the best administered monarchies, viz., the refusal of the consent or co-operation of those who possess for the time the natural power of the community I But, from the unfortunate structure of society, which (in the case supposed) vests this substantial power in a few bands of disciplined ruffians, the check will scarcely ever be interposed for the benefit of the nation, and will merely operate to prevent the king from doing anything to the prejudice or the oppression of the soldiery themselves. When civilization has made a little further progress, a mumber of the leaders of the army, or their descendants, acquire landed property, and associate together, not merelyin their military capacity, but as guardians of their new acquisitions and hereditary dignities. Their soldiers become their vassals in time of peace; and the real power of the State is gradually transferred from the hands of detached and mercenary battalions, to those of a feudal nobility. The check on the Royal authority comes then to lie in the refusal of this body to co-operate in such of his measures as do not meet with their approbation ; and the king can now do nothing to the prejudice of the order of nobility. The body of the people fare a little better under the operation of this check ; because their interest is much more identified with that of their feudal lords, than with that of a Btanding army of regular or disorderly forces. As society advances in refinement, and the arts of peace are developed, men of the lower orders assemble, and fortify themselves in towns and cities, and thus come to acquire a power independent of their patrons. Tbeir consent also accordingly becomes necessary to the development of the public authority within their communities; and hence another check to what is called the power of the sovereign. And, finally, to pass over some intermediate stages, when society has attained its full measure of civility and intelligence, and is filled from top to botten with wealth, and industry, and reflection; when everything that is done or felt by any one class, is communicated on the instant to all the rest, and a vast proportion of the whole population takes an interest in tlie fortunes of the country, and possesses a certain intelligence as to the public conduct of its rulers, then the substantial power of the nation may be said to be vested in the nation at large; or at least in those individuals who can habitually command the good-will and support of the greater part of then: ; and the ultimate check to the power of the sovereign comes to consist in the general unwillingness of the people to comply with those orders, which, if at all united in their resolution, they may now effectually disobey ■ud resist. This check, when applied at siu. >U_ likely, of course, to be applied for the

general good; and, thongh the same in substance with those which have been already considered, namely, the refusal of those in whom the real power is vested, to lend it to the monarch for purposes which they do not approve, is yet infinitely more beneficial in its operation, in consequence of the more fortunate postition of those to whom that power now belongs. Thus w« see that kings have no power of their own ; and that, even in the purest); despotisms, they are the mere organs or directors of that power which they who truly possess j the physical and intellectual force of the nation may choose to put at their disposal ; and are at all times, and under every from of monarchy entirely under the control of that only virtual and effective power. There is at bottom, therefore, no such thing as an unlimited monarchy ; or indeed as a monarchy that is potentially either more or less limited than every other. All )kings must act by the consent of that order or portion of the nation which can really command all c the rest, and may generally do whatever these substantial masters do not disapprove of; but as it is their power which is truly exerted in the name of the Sovereign, so it is not so much a necessary consequence as an identical proposition to say, that where they are clearly opposed to the exercise of that power, the king t has no means whatever of asserting the slightest authority. This is the universal law, indeed, of all Government; and though the different constitution of society, in the various stages of its progress, may give a different character .to the controlling power, the principles wh'ch regulate its operation are substantially the same in all. There is no room, therefore, for the question, whether there should be any control on the power of a king, or what that control should he ; because, the power really is not the king's, bat belongs inalienably to the stronger part of the nation itself, whether it derive that strength from discipline, talents, numbers, or situation, it is impossible that it should be exercised at bis instigation, without the concurrence, or acquiescence at least, of those in whom it is substantially vested.

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