PEARL HARBOUR

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 31 August 1945, Page 5

PEARL HARBOUR

DISASTER OF 1941 OFFICIAL FINDINGS GENERAL MARSHALL PARTLY RESPONSIBLE Washington August 29. The Army Chief of Staff, General G. G\ Marshall, was held partly responsible for the Pearl Harbour disaster by the Army Board of Inquiry but President Truman, in releasing the report, said that the criticism was entirely unjustified. The report sharply criticised Rear-Admiral Kimmel, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Stark, and MajorGeneral Short, Commander of the Hawaiian Department.

President Truman told a press conference that he supported Mr Stim.on j in rejecting the findings regarding Geni eral Marshall. The President added that Mr Stimson (Secretary of State for War) took sharp issue with General Marshall’s critics and considered General Marshall had acted throughout with his usual skill, energy and efficiency. “I associated myself wholeheartedly with Mr Stimson’s expression. Indeed. 1 have full confidence .’n the skill, energy and efficiency of all our war leaders. Army and Navy.” Mr Forrestal (Secretary of the Naw) in a report directed that Rear-Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark should n< t hold positions requiring the exercise ol superior judgment. The Army Board report found two causes for disaster, firstly failure of Major-General Short, to adequately alert his command for war, secondly, failure of the War De partment, knowing the type of alert taken by Major-General Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert. The board further asserted —(1) that the action of Mr Cordell Hull in delivering counter proposals on November 26th. 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal for the attack on Pearl Harbour and to the extent that this hastened the attack it was in conflict with the War and Navy departments’ efforts to gain* time for preparations for war. However. war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of the irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Government. <2) General Marshal* failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department because he did not keep the commanding general fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, which indicated the increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Major-Gen-eral Short had little. Further, General Marshall did not send additional instructions to the commanding geneial on Nov. 28. 1941. when evidently he failed to realise that Major-General Short had misunderstood or misconstrued the message of Nov. 27 1941 and had not adequately alerted his command foi war. General Marshall further failed to get to Major-General Short on the evening of Dec. 4. 1941 and early on the morning of Dec. 7. 1941 critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to accomplish this, and he had not investigated or determined the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between Nov. 27 and Dec 7. 1941 despite the impending threat of war. _ The Board charged that Major-Gen-eral Short failed to place his command in a state of readiness for war by adopting alert against sabotage, but added that the information he had was incomplete and confusing but was sufficient to warn him that hostilities might momentarily be expected. Major-Gen-eral Short further failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy. ARMY’S DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY The Navy Board considers Pearl Harbour defence was the Army s direct re. ponsibility. The defence should have been such as to function effectively and independently of the Fleet in view of the fundamental requirements that the Fleet’s strategic freedom of action must be assured. The Board considers that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment but recommends no further proceedings be taken against the officers. , Admiral King sent a memorandum to the Navy Secretary, that he considered Rear-Admiral Kimmel should have judged the gravity of the danger to which Hawaii was exposed. He could have used patrol planes for reconnaissance and could have rotated periods in port for ships with less routine, making it impossible for the Japanese to piediet when there would be vessels in port. Admiral Stark’s and Rear-Admiral Kimmel’s derelictions were faults ot omission rather than of commission. A court-martial was unwarranted but both I officers should be relegated to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors. WAR W ARNING The Navy Board report says RearAdmiral Kimmel on Nov. 27. received the following dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations: ‘"This dispatch is to be considered as a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilisation of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops, also the organisation of naval task forces, indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand or the Kra Peninsula. or possibly Borneo. Execute appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned. Inform district and Army auth» orities that a similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Continental districts in Guam and Samoa are directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.” A dispatch was also sent to the Com-mander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet. Rear-Admiral Kimmel. On the morning after receiving the dispatch he discussed the contents with Major-General Short. Fleet flag officers and members of his staff. After much further study RearAdmiral Kimmel and his advisers interpreted the warning to mean the war was imminent and readintss to undertake active operations expected. They were unable to read into it any indication that an attack against Hawaiian areas was to be expected, particular attention having been directed to Japanese activities in the Far East with objectives in that area specifically mentioned. From time to time during this critical period of the war. Navy departments received certain other important information bearing on the situation. This information was not transmitted to Rear-Admiral Kimmel or Major-Gen eral Short, No facilities were available to them either in the Fleet or in the Hawaiian which would enable them to obtain information direct. They depended solely on Washington for such information. The stand taken by the Chief of Nava! Operations was that the war warning message on Nov 27th completely covered the situation. The fact remain, however, that this message standing alone, could not convey to the commanders in the field the picture as it was seen in Washington. ARMY REPORT ENDORSED Mr Stimson. endorsing the Army report. found Major-General Short was amply warned for the performance, his paramount duty being aler* against a surprise air attack. His failure contributed measureably to the disaster’s extent. Failure resulted not from indo-

lence, indifference or wilful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, the underlying cause of which was Major-General Shorts confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbour. It must be pointed out in fairness that this belief was shared by almost everyone concerned, including his superiors in the War Department at Washington. Mr Stimson considered no further action beyond relieving Major-General Short of his command should be taken. Defending General Marshall. Mr Stimson said the Army Board was led to criticise General Marshall as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of his staff. “Scattered and individual errors cannot in fairness be attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary I believe he acted throughout this matter with his usual great skill, energy and efficiency.” The Associated Press of America points out that the reports contain no criticism of President Roosevelt. President Truman reserved his decision but indicated the publication of the reports would wind up the affair. ‘STRONG JAPANESE FORCE The official report disclosed that the Navy would probably have taken a beating if it had .intercepted the Japanese task force because of the great enemy air superiority. One or more Japanese submarines operated inside Pearl Harbour, relaying information for days before the attack. The Japanese used a secret aerial torpedo w'hich accounted for most of the damage to the fleet. The Japanese commenced training for the attack in home waters in July or August and left singly for the rendezvous in an isolated spot in northern Japan. The task force, consisting of six aircraft carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, a destroyer division and submarines, sailed on Nov. 27th. taking the northern ly route southwards of the the northernly route southwards of the shipping. Captured orders and prisoner’s information showed that the task force was instructed to destroy without trace any vessels, including Russian within 600 miles of its destination. The Japanese moved due. east to the north of Oahu, then south under forced draft to 300 miles from land and launched 300 of 424 available planes. The United States Navy had 180 planes. The American Navy would havb been unable in any case to have brought the Jaoanese under gunfire because the battleships would be too slow. INSTRUCTIONS OBEYED Major-General Short in a statement on the Pearl Harbour report said. “I was obeying my instructions from Washington as I understood them on Dec. 7th 1941 and acting in accordance with information available at that time. The commander must base his decisions on information before him at the time. Althugh the entire facts have yet to be revealed the board’s findings show bevond question there was available to the authorities in Washington before the attack critical information which was not disclosed to me and which was vital to my decision. My conscience is clear.” Rear-Admiral Kimmel beclined to comment. Mr George Bates, member of the House Naval Affairs Committee said General Marshall will be required to appear before Congress to give a full explanation of his official acts during the days preceding Pearl Harbour. He added that the report exposed only a small part of the real story.” I know General Marshall was blameworthy as anyone cl: e. He must answer Congress for his dereliction, details of which will shock the public.” added Mr Bates.