WHY FRANCE FELL

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 30 August 1945, Page 6

WHY FRANCE FELL

“TRAGEDY OF A NATION."—VII-

CHURCHILL'S ATTITUDE

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(By PAUL REYNAUD)

Between May 28, when the Belgian Army capitulated, and June 11, the British Army of General Gort fought its way to the beaches of Dunkirk, from which 335,000 British and French troops were brought to south coast harbours. The Luftwaffe launched the first great terror-raid of the war against the civilians of Paris. And on June 10 Mussolini’s Italy stabbed France in the back by a declaration of war. As the German armies rolled forward to the French capital, the Government retired into the scattered chateaux of Tourainc. Paul Reynaud takes up his story again from this point: On June 111 received news of the arrival of an envoy from the British Government regarding a meeting of the Supreme Council to be held, at Churchill’s request, on that very day. The meeting took place that evening and the next morning at Weygand’s G.H.Q. in the Chateau du Muguet, near Briare, on the Loire. Those present were: On the French side: M. Paul Reynaud, Marshal Petain, General Weygand, General de Gaulle. General Georges. And on the British side: Mr Winston Churchill, Mr Anthony Eden, General Sir John Dill. Churchill said that he hoped a German attack on the United Kingdom would take place, as this would lead to a stabilisation of the French front. He announced that a Canadian division was landing that night, bringing up the total of British divisions in France to four. A further division would land about June 20. If the French Army could hold on till the spring of 1941, there would be from 20 to 25 British divisions available, and they could be used anywhere desired —for instance, in Continental bridgeheads. General Weygand explained the military situation. All his forces were engaged, and not a single battalion was available in reserve. Our armies, fighting at odds of three to one, had been forced to withdraw. The Germans had two bridgeheads south of the Lower Seine. Our men were fighting by day and marching by night: they fell asleep in their new positions as soon as they got there. FEW DAYS’ GRACE If the battle could be prolonged for a few days, then a new effort might be attempted with the four British divisions and the Chasseurs Division recalled from Narvik. Weygand’s conclusion could be summed up in the words: “The God of Battle will decide.” Churchill asked that General Georges should also be heard. He was fetched from his headquarters, which were in the vicinity, and made a report which confirmed Weygand’s account. He added that the entry of Italy into the war necessitated the sending to the South-Eastern front of a number of air squadrons, fighter planes, at the very moment when our fighter planes were reduced to a force of some 170 or 180 machines, with very tired pilots. Churchill expressed his regret that the British Armv which had escaped from Dunkirk was unable to take a greater part in the Battle of France. He observed that it was essential to keep in England a minimum of units ready to repel any German attempt at invasion. “And we only possess some territorial units and a very few Regular regiments,” h e said. “Two Regular brigades,” Mr Eden added. Churchill declared, however, that he did not exclude the possibility of a sudden and quick turn of the tide, as had been the case in the last war. Weygand intervened to stress the new factor of the swiftness of penetration of armoured forces. I contributed to the debate by remarking that the only immediate assistance our Ally could give us was in the air. Churchill replied: “Just after Dunkirk extrenae confusion reigned in our air units, but this has now almost ceased. firm conviction “The British Home Air Force in tervened almost daily with from six to eight fighter flights that refuelled I in France. There is also Air Marshal

WEYGAND INSISTS ON AN ARMISTICE

Barratt’s force, comnosed of six bomber and five lighter flights.” The Prime Minister promised that as soon as he got back to England he would examine the possibilities of improving on this. “England’s hesitations do not proceed from ill-advised selfishness,” he said, “but from the firm conviction that if the fighting air forces of Britain were to become dislocated it would be impossible to continue fighting.” For my part I asked that consideration should be given to the important effect the enemy air force had on the morale of our troops. To which Churchill replied that infantry always tends to consider itself insufficiently defended by the air forces—“So much so that British soldiers back from Dunkirk hissed airmen in England, although it was to the devotion of the latter that they owed their own escape from Flanders,” he said. Weygand spoke up again to say, "We are now living the last quarter of an hour. There is nothing to show whether we shall be able to win during that quarter of an hour, and that is why any help that could be given us is really indispensable.” He went on: “If the territory of Metropolitan France is occupied, one may well ask how France could gcon with the war.” CHU RCHILL'S PLEDGE I interrupted him to declare that j the Commander-in-Chief had just given most competent advice concerning the military plans, but that “the problem of continuing the war is of a political kind and comes within the province of Governmental decisions.” , Winston Churchill having inquired whether some sort of guerrilla warfare might not be possible in France in the event of organised resistance becoming impossible, Marshal Petain remarked that this would mean “the destruction of the country.” - I corrected this by remarking that the towns would undoubtedly suffer heavily. Winston Churchill then expressed eloquently Britain’s resolve to continue fighting whatever happened. The second sitting of the Supreme War Council was held on the morning of June 12. It was very short. Churchill requested to be heard by the French Cabinet before any definite decision was taken. WEYGAND INSISTS I had a brief conversation with Petain Weygand after lunch. I asked them whether, if fighting in Metropolitan France should become senseless, it might not be possible to reduce the number of prisoners by sending an army into Switzerland, as had been done with Bourbaki’s army in the 1870 war, and by sending soldiers home in civilian clothes. They answered “No.” Weygand Insisted on the necessity of an armistice. To my objection that we had pledged our word, he replied: "French public opinion will not forgive you for having, on account of England, neglected an opportunity to make peace!” Their ideal and the collective ambition which they set before the French people were simply a maximum of comfort and a speedy end to their sufferings. Such—in their eyes—was the spirit of France. In the afternoon I crossed the Loire from Briare to Tours, and arrived at 7 p.m. at the chateau of Cange, temporary residence of the President of the Republic, where the Cabinet meeting was to be held. TO AVOID DISORDER At the first Cabinet meeting at Cange, on June 12, General Weygand rendered a report on the military situation. The Commander-in-Chief stated that the God of Battle had given his decision, and he concluded that the Government must ask for an armistice. He alleged that all the generals commanding armies or groups of armies were in agreement with him. The Cease Fire alone could permit the maintenance of some order and cohesion in the Army. He pretended that if the fighting continued our Forces would be split up and the result would be flight and disorder. Not only military disorder, but general disorder, owing to the influx of unfortunate refugees without food supplies. It was clear that he was entirely absorbed by the problem of how to maintain social order. A large number of Ministers spoke against the armistice—Louis Marin, Georges Monnet, and Campinchi did so with great vigour. Alone, M. Jean Prouvost formally spoke as being in favour of an armistice together with Marshal Petain.

Chautemps remarked that as Churchill had asked to be heard before the Cabinet took any definite decision, it was our duty to defer to his wish. This I could not refuse, so it was decided to invite Churchill to come on the following day. ft was then 11 p.m. I resolved to confer with Churchill before the Cabinet meeting. (In point of fact, that conference lasted such a long time that at its close he expressed the wish to return at once to London). I found him in the prefecture at Tours, where he had just arrived with Lord Halifax, Lord Beaverbrook Sir Ronald Campbell, and General Spears. They were accompanied by Baudouin. FOR ENGLAND'S AID I did not ask Winston Churchill his opinion as to whether or not France should continue fighting. On that point my mind was made up. All I could do to meet the wishes of my colleagues who wanted to hear him was this: I drew the picture of the desperate situation of our Army and informed Churchill that, acting upon information received from America, I was about to address .7 sum-eme aopeal to Roosevelt T ll ™ I said to him: “You know that I will never capitulate. I only ask you to promise me that, if some Government other than mine .were to ask for an armistice England would not abandon France.” Churchill replied that England would not waste time on vain re criminations, and b P asked m e to wait for President Roosevelt’s reply to the appeal I was going to send. With tears m his eyes, the British Prime Minister said: “If Britain wins the war, France will be restored in all her power and greatness.” After this he asked me for leave to speak with his two colleagues in the garden of the prefecture and h e said to me on his return that they were of one mini with him. Then 1 left with Mandel for Cange, where we arrived at 5 in the afternoon.