SECURITY COUNCIL

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 12 June 1945, Page 3

SECURITY COUNCIL

VOTING PROCEDURE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS SUBMITTED (Official News Service) San Francisco, June 9. Specific questions covering the voting procedure in the Security Council have been submitted by a sub-com-mittee of the Conference Committee on the Structure and Procedures of the Security Council to the delegations of the four Governments sponsoring the conference-—the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet and China. In dealing with these/questions the four delegations desire to make the following statement of their general attitude towards the whole question of the unanimity of permanent members in the decisions of the Security Council. PART ONE Paragraph I.: The Yalta voting formula recognises that the Security Council in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security will have two broad groups of functions. Under Chapter VIII the Council will have to make decisions which involve its taking direct measures in connection with the settlement of disputes, the adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, the determination of threats to th e peace, the removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of breaches of the peace. It will also heve to make decisions which do not involve taking such measures. The formula provides that the second of these two groups of decisions will be governed by a procedural vote —that is, the vote of any seven members. The first group of decisions will be governed by a qualified vote—that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of five permanent members subject to a proviso that in the decisions under Section A and part of Section C, Chapter VIII, parties to the dispute shall abstain from voting. Paragraph II.: For example, under y-ie Yalta formula, the procedural vote will govern decisions made under entire Section D of Chapter VI. This means the council will by a vote of any seven of its members adopt or alter its rules of preedure; determine the method of selecting its president; organise itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; select times and places of its regular and special meetings; establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; invite a member of an organisation not represented on the council to participate in its discussions when that member’s interests are specially affected; and invite any State when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the council to participate in the discussions relating to that dispute.

Paragraph III.: Further, no individual member of the council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the council of a dispute qr situation brought to its attention under Paragraph 11., Section A, Chapter VIII. Nor can the parties to such a dispute be prevented by these means from being heard by the council. Likewise, the requirement for unanimity of permanent members cannot prevent any member of the council from reminding members of the organisation of their general obligations assumed under the Charter as regards peaceful settlement of international disputes. LIKELY CHAIN OF EVENTS Paragraph IV.: Beyond this point decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might in the end require the council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement under Section B. Chapter VIII. This chain of events begins when the council decides to make an investigation or determines the time has come to call upon States to settle their differences or makes recommendations to the parties. It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso referred to above for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute. Paragraph V.: To illustrate: In ordering an investigation the council has to consider whether the investigation—which may involve calling for reports' hearing witnesses, dispatching a commission of inauiry or other, means—might not further aggravate the situation. After investigation, the council' must determine whether the continuance of a situation or a dispute would be likely to endanger international peace or security. If it so determines the council wuld be under an obligation to take further steps. Similarly, a decision to make recommendations even when all parties request it to do so or to call upon parties to a dispute to fulfil their obligations under the Charter, might be the first step on a course of action from which the Security council could withdraw only at the risk of failing to discharge its resposibilities. Paragraph VI.: In appraising the significance of the vote required to take such decisions or actions, it is useful to make comparison with the requirements of the League Covenant with reference to the decisions of the League Council. LEAGUE PROCEDURE Substantive decisions of the League of Nations Council could be taken only by a unanimous vote of all its members, whether permanent or not, with the exception of parties to the dispute under Article XV. of the League Covenant. Under Article XI. under which most of the disputes brought before the League were dealt with and decisions to make investigations taken, the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of parties to a dispute. Paragraph VII.: The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Under this system non-permanent members of the security council individually would have no veto. As regards permanent members there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right, namely the right to veto, a right which permanent members of the League .Council always had. The formula proposed for taking sufch action in the Security Council by a majority of seven would make the operation of the council less subject to obstruction than was th e case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity. Paragraph VIII.: It should also'be remembered that under the Yalta formula the five major powers could not act by themselves since even under unanimity requirement any decisions of the council would have to include the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members. In other words, it would be possible for five non-permanent members as a group to exercise a veto. It is pot to be assumed, however, that permanent members, any more than non-permanent members, would

use their veto power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the council. MAJORITY VOTING METHOD Paragraph IX.: In view of the primary responsibilities of permanent members they could not be expected in the present condition of the world to assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred. Therefore if majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible the only practicable method is to provide, in respect of non-procedural decisions, for unanimity of permanent members plus the concurring votes of at least two non-permanent members. Paragraph X.: For all these reasons the four sponsoring Governments agreed on the Yalta formula and have presented it to this conference as essential if an international organisation is to be created through which all peace-loving nations can effectively discharge their common responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. Part Two: In the light of the considerations set forth in Part One of this statement it is clear what the answers to the questions submitted by the sub-committee should be with the exception of Question 19. The answer to that question is as follows: (1) In the opinion of th e delegations of the sponsoring Governments the draft charter itself contains an indication of the application of voting preedures to the various functions of the council. (2) In this case it is unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether the procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise a decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or hot such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members. Question 19 referred to above reads: “In a case where a decision has to be taken as to whether a certain point is a procedural matter is that preliminary question to be considered in itself as a procedural matter or is the veto applicable to such preliminary question?”