CRUSHING OF JAPAN

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 79, 29 September 1944, Page 5

CRUSHING OF JAPAN

UP TO TWO YEARS AFTER GERMANY COMMENT BY OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION Washington, Sept. 27. The crushing of Japan will require an absolute minimum of 18 \ to 24 months after Germany’s defeat. This estimate is made by the Office of War Information after summarising the data furnished by the War, Navy and Foreign Economic Departments. The 0.W.1. states that the psychological effect of the end of the European war is likely to favour the Japanese rather than the Allies, because for the United States Germany’s defeat means that a halfway point has been reached in the global war, bringing extensive changes in war economy which might induce a letdown in effort and morale. For the Japanese it will mean that the war with the United Nations is just beginning and might well heighten Japan’s determination and fighting spirit. Factors which may enable Japan to prolong the war include the ability to increase production of almost every category of war equipment and military supplies. On the other hand Japan has so far failed to capitalise her conquests since Pearl Harbour, limiting production to her pre-war industrial plants. Geography is another factor favouring Tokio. Allied might, before attacking, must be based within striking distance of Japan’s homeland. The 0.W.1. pointed out that Super-Fort-resses raids, although only possible at intervals of ten days or more are regarded as a definite advance. The 0.W.1. stressed that tremendous shipping problems must be surmounted before the invasion of Japan is launched. It may be several months before shipping could be transferred to the Pacific. At present the course of the war in China was entirely in Japan’s favour. Instead of securing additional bases from which to strike Japan from the air. the Allies had lost several bases in recent months. Although the number of Japanese plane losses was high compared with America’s, Japanese plants were turning out planes as rapidly as they were destroyed. Japan would probably maintain and even increase this production. The Japanese were also able to mass their airpower in the narrowing war theatre. The sinkings of Japanese ships were estimated at 1.500,000 tons yearly. The output had not yet reached 1.000,000 tons. The 0.W.1. estimates Japan’s army at 4,000,000 men with approximately an additional 2,000,000 available and 1,500,000 in the 17-20 age group not yet drafted. On the Allied credit side the 0.W.1. pointed out that the United States produces 8.000 combat planes a month compared with Japan’s 1500. Pacific commanders also assert that Japan has lost the power for a strategic offensive beyond the range of her land-based planes. Nevertheless the possibility of sporadic raids on America’s west coast has not yet been eliminated.